

# THE RAMBLER.

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PART IV.

## THE SYMBOLISM OF THE CATACOMBS.\*

THERE was a long article on the Roman Catacombs in the *Edinburgh Review* of January last, in which the writer, after showing the supreme importance and interest of the Christian monuments of subterranean Rome to all students of the history of the first centuries of the Church, and after declaring that many of their memorials are contemporary records of primitive Christianity, of men who lived in and near the Apostolic age, and who have left us, in the architecture and ornaments of the Catacombs, the type of the Christian Church, and the germ of Christian art,—then complains that these memorials had been necessarily regarded with great suspicion by writers not Catholic, because they were the sources of so many of the legendary fables of Popery. Now, however, after the honest labours of such men as Bosio, Father Marchi, Father Garucci, and, above all, of the Cavaliere de' Rossi, the time, he says, seems to have come “to bring back the study of the early Christian memorials to a true standard of accurate research,” and “to establish their real value and importance on the grounds of science and history alone.” The reviewer, it will be seen, lays the blame of all their ill name on Catholic writers. “Roman Catholic writers have allowed themselves to be carried away by their preconceived notions into a wide field of exaggeration;” they have “attempted, by a highly symbolical interpretation of every object employed in the decoration of the tombs, to discover hidden indications of all the

\* An Introduction to early Christian Symbolism ; being the Description of a Series of Fourteen Compositions from Fresco Paintings, Glasses, and sculptured Sarcophagi ; with three Appendices : selected and arranged by William Palmer, M.A., and painted by Signor Bossi, of Rome. London: Longmans.

later dogmas and practices of the Church of Rome;" and they manifest "an exuberant desire to find evidence in support of them." According to the reviewer, Cardinal Wiseman and Mr. Northcote are great offenders in this line: they "have brought into one focus the traditions and remains of several different periods of Christian antiquity," and have forced the symbols of the pure and simple faith of the first ages to speak the elaborately artificial and complex language of the Council of Trent.

A serious charge, if it can be proved. Let us give an example of its effects; and to render it more striking, let us draw the example from the reviewer's own article. Cobbett, in his grammar, selects all the specimens of faults and improprieties of diction from kings' speeches, and the writings of the most famous politicians: in like manner, we may extract from the pages of our critic the choicest instances of the bad criticism with which he charges us. It has been shown, he says, in the able discussion before the Privy Council, that the distinction between a table and an altar is in truth an essential difference, marking the line between the celebration of the Lord's Supper and the Sacrifice of the Mass. He owns too, that, whereas the first altars in the Catacombs were movable wooden tables, long before the Catacombs came to be deserted in the fourth century the slabs on the graves of the martyrs had come to be used instead of them.\* "It thus appears," he says, "that the movable wooden table alone sanctioned by the Church of England, may be traced in the primitive ritual of the Catacombs; and that in proportion as the celebration of the Sacrament was transferred from the table in front to the altar-

\* We will not quarrel with this assertion, but the reviewer's proof of it is an egregious blunder. He says that there is abundant evidence that the altar-tombs under the *arcosolia* were not originally altars, and that the primitive practice was otherwise: of course, in the Scotch Review it was necessary to say that the Communion service was celebrated in the Scotch manner, "the early Christians sitting round a table." "In one of the chapels," he says, "of the cemetery of St. Calixtus, traces of the sockets to receive the four feet of a table in front of the tribune or apsis are distinctly visible;" this arrangement, he continues, is still found in the basilicas, where "the altar is not contiguous to the eastern end of the church, but placed in the middle of the choir, and the officiating priest turns his face westward towards the people, looking over the altar." The blunders of these sentences are innumerable; for *eastern* read *western*, for *westward* read *eastward*; and for *primitive practice proved by the sockets*, read *later practice*. It is true that the sockets exist, and that the feet of the altar *did* rest there; but the whole thing was added, not before, but *after* men had ceased to use the original tomb as an altar. It was Pope Damasus who cased the whole chapel with marble, fragments of which still remain in their places; and in particular a massive tablet, on which his inscription was engraved, *blocked up* the altar-tomb, and necessitated another altar being placed in front. No sensible man who has ever seen the chapel doubts this.



tomb behind, the ceremony itself, and the doctrine it embodied, gradually assumed a different character." Is not this ignoring the difference of times?—interpreting the developments of the first three centuries by the progress of the Puseyite controversy in the nineteenth?—arguing that, because the substitution of stone altars for tables in the Anglican Church manifests a romanising tendency, therefore we can prove a similar change of doctrine by the same material changes in the Catacombs? Thus the Roman ritual, and the Christian community which submitted to, or encouraged, the change of the material altar from wood to stone, is identified with the Anglican ritual and community, which strenuously and pertinaciously refuse to admit any such change. By similar arguments Arians have attempted to prove themselves the true representatives of primitive Christian faith; and trustees of charities have laboured to show that they were honest executors of the founder's will, in doling out the exact number of groats that he defined, without regard to the changed value of coin, or to the immense improvement of the estates, whose surplus they pocketed.

This example of interpreting the signs of one age by the ideas of another, shows us what we have to shun in studying the symbols of the Catacombs. We have to avoid assuming, as a matter of course, that the ideas of those days were exactly the same as the ideas of to-day, and supposing that the paintings of *Roma sotterranea* spoke to their contemporaries exactly the same as they speak to us. We must not fancy that the interpretation of hieroglyphics is a plain business, taught by nature. The reviewer says truly, that "the real signification of these memorials is rendered clear and intelligible mainly by comparing them with the literary and biographical details which have come down to us with reference to the persons thus brought, as it were, visibly before us." But it is one thing to make a law, another to obey it; and we are sorry to say that the reviewer is the first to break his own rules in trying to interpret the symbolism of the Catacombs.

"It is gratifying to remark, that the doctrines they convey, and the truths they represent, are for the most part those on which all Christians agree, as in the primitive faith, and not those on which subsequent differences have arisen. *The subjects painted are strictly historical.* They are selected, with hardly an exception, from the Bible; and they were evidently intended partly to instruct the uninformed by pictures addressed to the eye, and partly to awaken the mind of the Christian to the symbolical meaning of those types. Thus the Temptation of Eve, Moses striking the Rock, Elijah ascending in the Chariot of Fire, Noah in the Ark, Daniel in the Lions' Den, the

Young Men in the Fiery Furnace, Jonah and the Gourd, Jonah's Deliverance from the Whale's Belly; and from the New Testament, the Good Shepherd, the Adoration of the Magi, in which alone the Virgin Mary is introduced,\* the Delivery of the Keys to St. Peter,† the Sower, the Wise and Foolish Virgins,—are continually repeated on the ceiling of the *cubiculi*. The ornaments were in the Roman taste, but every object became symbolical. Thus the Church was represented by a ship, or a woman in the attitude of prayer, &c. But this is the sum-total of these paintings; no legends, no saints, few portraits even of Apostolic persons; here and there, but seldom, a head of the Saviour. It is extremely remarkable, that the early Christians never represented those scenes of the passion and death of our Lord which afterwards became the favourite subjects of Christian artists. The Crucifix was unknown till long afterwards; and even the plain cross, anterior to the monogram of Constantine, seems to have been secreted in the lowest depth of the Catacombs."

No one could have penned this passage except an Englishman of the nineteenth century, with the particular ideas of Christianity which make up the Anglican orthodoxy of the present day, and which lead him to regard the paintings on the ceilings and walls of the *cubiculi* as similar to the questions headed, "The Rudiments of Faith and Religion," in the Oxford examination of candidates "*qui non sunt de corpore Universitatis.*" "Quote the sentence passed after the Fall upon the serpent, the woman, and the man—Trace the journeyings of Abraham and Jacob—Describe the position of Mount Sinai—What was the Passover?—Give some account of Melchizedek, Jethro, and Balaam—Enumerate the twelve tribes of Israel—Sketch a map, showing where they were severally placed—Who were Gideon, Jephthah, and Samson?—Describe the rebellion of Absalom—Give some account of the building of the Temple."‡ The uninstructed Christian in the Catacombs had only to stare about him to suck in such "rudiments of faith and religion." He would say to himself, This is Eve, that Moses, that Elias, that other Jonas, and this is the whale; and with this sort of historical litany he would (if he could) strengthen his will for martyrdom, and prepare his mind for heaven. No wonder that men of any depth protest against this "historical" religion; that they write elaborate books, like Francis Newman's *Phases of Faith*, to prove that "history is not religion," and that the "religion of the letter is

\* This is quite false.

† We are glad to hear that this is one of the subjects of the Catacomb pictures; we did not know of it before; if it is a mistake, it is a comfort to think that it was not a malicious forgery of some enthusiastic and extravagant Papist, but only a harmless dream of a Protestant reviewer.

‡ Examination-Papers and Division-Lists for the Examination held in June 1858, pp. 20 and 68.



to be renounced." To have read through the Bible, to know how many years Melchisedech lived, and whether or not Toby's dog wagged his tail, has simply nothing to do with faith: the man who knows it may be a stranger to faith, and the man who has all faith may be a stranger to it. "We do not read in the Gospel," says St. Augustine,\* "that the Lord said, 'I send the Paraclete to teach you the course of the sun and moon;' for He wished to make us Christians, not mathematicians;" or, we may add, antiquarians and historians. There is a deep reality in the protest against confounding history with faith. Suarez† even says of the external facts of our Lord's life, that, considered as mere phenomena, they are not objects of faith, but of experience; they were not revealed, but seen; they were not proposed to be believed, but shown that they might lead to faith. The truth or reality that underlies the thing seen is something different, and it is with this that faith is really conversant.

But the reviewer does own that the mind is to be awakened "to the symbolical meaning of these types;" at the same time, our readers will remember, he objects to our "highly symbolical interpretation." There is a plain symbolical interpretation which he allows, and a highly symbolical one which he rejects. So far as the types of the Old Testament are evidence of the facts of the New, as being an acted prophecy of them, they are to be pondered upon; but not otherwise mystified, or used for worship. The uneducated Christian in the Catacombs might say, This is Jonas, whose sojourn for three days and nights in the whale's belly was a type of the burial and resurrection of Jesus; this is Moses, who struck the rock; and this is Paul, who said that rock was Christ, 1 Cor. x. 4. To go beyond this would be exaggeration: to say, Christ is like a pelican, which is (erroneously) believed to feed her young with her own blood, is allowable; but to turn teaching into worship, to cry out, "*Pie pelicane Jesu Domine*," is to forget all sobriety and propriety, and to overstep the limits that divide faith from practice. The Council of Eliberis decreed that nothing that was worshipped should be painted on the walls; then the paintings of the Catacombs could only be intended for a sober lesson addressed to the mind, not an appeal to the heart, for fear of the excited feelings forgetting the bounds of decorum, and throwing a man on his knees before the image of the Lamb, and making him idolatrously cry out, "*Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata mundi, miserere nobis!*"

\* *De Actis cont. Fel. Manich.*

† *De Fid. Disput. ii. § 9.*



We see, then, that the reviewer innocently and helplessly falls into the pit where he says we lie. He reads the paintings of the Catacombs by the light of his own opinions and principles, and calls it dishonest of us if we read them by the light of ours. This bland assumption of a superiority that does not belong to him, would justify us in treating the reviewer with some severity. A man who has bestowed only a cursory inspection on one of the Catacombs, must be perched up on a very lofty pinnacle indeed, if he thinks that one examination authorises him to interpose in the disputes of men who have spent years in the study, and to decide dogmatically upon difficulties which have puzzled much abler heads than his. But to the superficial man every thing is easy; he sees no difficulty in any thing. "The Catacomb paintings;—quite plain, my dear sir; the subjects are all taken from the Bible. The Apostles were Bible Christians, true Protestants." But if we were to ask him why, in a thousand paintings, we should have five hundred Good Shepherds, three hundred Jonases, and near two hundred Moseses, with a sparse sprinkling of other subjects; if we demanded why these few subjects alone are taken from the Bible, why of the infinite possible number of gleanings these alone are gleaned,—what has he to say? That the primitive Christians were ignorant of all the rest of the Bible, or thought it not worth knowing? Yet, as the reviewer confesses, it is precisely all that *is* most worth knowing in the history of the New Testament that is omitted, namely, the scenes of the passion of our Lord; precisely those that St. Paul and the apostolical fathers St. Barnabas and St. Clement most insist upon. The reviewer's key evidently will not unfasten the lock. He should, then, look on with patience while Catholics try their key, and watch whether the doctrine of the Roman Church is not the real cord on which all the paintings of the Catacombs may be strung, and which will account for the selection of subjects.

The study of symbolism is regarded with some superciliousness by modern thinkers; but it was the only science of the ancients. They only inquired what nature means, we inquire what it does; we look for organisation, they looked for intention; we ask for the material cause of things, they sought for the final cause. But, however out of the path of modern science symbolism may lie, the study of it is clearly necessary for the history of opinion. No one who has read history can doubt, that for ages the whole thought of man was directed to find out the meaning that lies hid under things, and to utter this meaning in a new symbolic dress.

"All who have treated of divine matters, barbarians as well as Greeks," says Clement of Alexandria,\* "have hid the principles of things, and delivered down the truth enigmatically, by signs and symbols and allegories." A man may think their thought childish, and their symbols foolish; but clearly, if he wishes to know what their thought was, and what their symbols meant, he must study their symbolism. And the study, after all, is not so dry; that which interested mankind so long, cannot have lost all its interest now, if rightly approached. Symbolism lies at the root of all languages. Now though, since language was perfected, it has not been so exclusively the direct study of all thinkers as during the ages when mankind was still lost in wonder at this marvellous instrument of thought and was daily testing the range of its powers, yet there are still many minds whose faculties lead them into the same field. No doubt it demands a mind of peculiar make. No man attaches himself to it, except he has that mystical turn which delights in perusing these outward signs of his inward beliefs. His danger is, that instead of investigating in a dry way, he will employ himself in making new combinations and compositions of old symbols, which he will employ to express his own ideas; this, however, would not be an investigation of old symbolism, but a creation of new. But if the presence of this mystical turn leads a man to pursue will-o'-the-wisps, and lands him in bogs and quagmires, its absence simply disqualifies him from the study. The symbols will appear to him only dead husks, which he will arrange by their shapes and colours, and by the places whence they are taken; nay,—like an amateur conchologist, who carefully burns out all traces of the ugly slug that defiles his pretty shell before he deigns to look at it, or to grant it a place in his collection,—such a man would explain away all mystery, and reduce all things to the plainest common sense, before he would consent to examine them, even though he was discussing the symbols of the most mystical of oriental sects.

Mr. Palmer, whose little book we are reviewing,—a book which is only intended as a precursor of a costly volume of plates, for which it is to solicit subscribers,—is a man well fitted by nature for the investigation of the theory; with sufficient mysticism to give him a real interest in it, and with sufficient self-command to prevent his going wool-gathering after unfounded fancies. Whether he has taken quite the best method, is another question; at any rate, he has taken a method, and he has generally pursued it consistently in his investigations.

\* *Stromata*, v.



He is "far from wishing to suggest that the early Christians painted their doctrines around the tombs of the martyrs *systematically*, or for the purpose of *teaching*." It was natural for them to paint their crypts "in the same style which was used by the heathens, their contemporaries; only instead of mythological or other heathenish subjects, they substituted paintings of their own, congenial to their own belief and feelings." So far is plain sailing; now comes Mr. Palmer's peculiarity:

"Their souls being full of certain ideas which had a true mutual relation one to another, and which altogether formed one coherent system, it was likely enough that what they painted or sculptured about the same tomb or sarcophagus, or in the same crypt, should sometimes take the form of a composition. . . . Speaking generally, the arrangement of the compositions in the present work is no more to be ascribed to the early Christians, than the scientific classification of plants in a herbarium, or of living creatures in a zoological work, is to be ascribed to nature. Such arrangements, however, are useful; and far from giving any false or perverted notion of the separate parts, they teach at a glance, by the comparison and juxtaposition of groups, what would not be seen at once, nor so clearly, if each representation presented itself separately, as in a purely antiquarian collection."

We have not yet seen the drawings by which these principles are exemplified, so we are groping somewhat in the dark; but it seems to us that Mr. Palmer is using the word *composition* in a double sense, artistic and scientific: and in its scientific sense we find two applications: in one, it means a classified arrangement of cognate symbols, grouped side by side for easier comparison; in another, it is an arbitrary arrangement of symbols of which he does not know whether, in the eyes of the early Christians, they were capable of being thus grouped together. There is no fundamental difference between these two processes. All arrangements must be on theory; we first form in our minds a plan according to which we will arrange things, and then we test the validity of our plan, by seeing whether things really allow themselves to be so arranged or no. No investigation is possible except we know what we are investigating; that is, unless we problematically throw out a theory, to try whether it is false or true by collecting all the instances which we can bring under its operation, and so finding whether it only wants correcting, or whether it is entirely right or wrong. Even if it should turn out to be quite untenable, the labour has not been entirely lost; much less has any doubt been thrown on the method of investigation: the work remains as a monument of indivi-



dual skill. Thus, if any of Mr. Palmer's "compositions" fail to prove that the primitive Christians consciously held the theory on which he groups their scattered symbols, at least they show that his own theory can be expressed more or less satisfactorily by means of their symbolism.

The only fault, then, that we find with the principle of Mr. Palmer's "compositions" is, that he should call them by such a suspicious name. They are, or ought to be, simply attempts at a scientific classification and arrangement of the elements of early Christian symbolism. The word "compositions" suggests a degree of art and design in the making up, which will prejudice people against a book of which a controversial use is sure to be made. Men will say that the key of the compositions is not to be sought in the ideas of those who furnished the elements, but in the composer's mind. Now, without invidiousness, we may say, that what men want to be sure of is, not what Mr. Palmer thinks, but what the early Christians thought; and this is to be found by the use of a number of tests, one of which is the scientific investigation of their symbolism. From every such investigation all appearance of arbitrariness should be shut out; the individual idiosyncrasy should be suppressed; all anxiety to appear too complete should be avoided: because such appearances are suspicious; and however honest a man may be in telling exactly how much is his own composition, and how much belongs to his materials as he found them, he will never get over the prejudice which the word "composition" suggests. We suppose that the word was chosen because the drawings assume an artistic instead of a tabular shape; but even in this case, we think it a pity to have used a word which is so certain of being misunderstood. Mr. Palmer himself is aware of this, and confesses that his work is *not* intended to be *antiquarian*. But if not, why call it an introduction to early Christian symbolism?

Although, then, there is no objection to the *principle* of Mr. Palmer's compositions, or arrangements, each separate one must of course be judged on its own merits, and must stand or fall according to its own strength; and, indeed, each stands on a different foundation. Thus the first composition, which is properly so called,—for it is formed, not by a classification of similar symbols, but by a union of different ones,—actually occurs as a whole in the cemetery of St. Callistus, and is explained with great felicity by Mr. Palmer; though the interpretation of the figure of Moses, which occurs twice, side by side, in the same picture,—once as a youth putting his shoes off his feet, where he is made to stand for a proselyte;

and again as striking the rock, where he represents a minister, —is one to which we cannot at once assent. Mr. Palmer is obliged to elaborate a distinction between the shod and shoeless proselyte which seems to us very unlikely to have occurred to the primitive painters. The next five groups, or compositions, in which several separate symbols of the “woman,” the “rod,” the “two apostles,” the “scriptures,” and the “eucharist,” are brought together, are on the whole very satisfactory, because the idea which runs through them is simple, capable of easy illustration by drawing, and of copious proof from the early fathers: yet even here objection may be taken to several details; as at p. 9, where Mr. Palmer assures us that Bosio has misunderstood a figure which we believe the Cavaliere de’ Rossi is sure that Mr. Palmer himself has misunderstood. Once or twice, too, he not only groups the several pictures according to his own theory, but even alters the picture itself, which should be kept sacred as the ultimate element of his alphabet. He confesses to having done so, and defends and explains it, pp. 26, 31, 37, and 50. There is no dishonesty here; whatever is done, is done quite openly; but it discredits a theory when a man is obliged to truss his instances before he exhibits them. The remaining eight compositions we consider to be of little value to the antiquary or to the historian, whatever they may turn out to be to the artist and church-decorator. The theory upon which each is built is too complicated, if not in itself, at least in Mr. Palmer’s application. The hopelessness of finding the seven sacraments so illustrated is confessed in his own introduction to the group of symbols by which he illustrates them:

“The Christians of the first three centuries did not paint their doctrines systematically for any purpose of instruction; and even if they had, no series of the seven sacraments could have been painted by them, as the present mode of numbering and defining the seven sacraments was introduced much later. Still, as the present technical language of the Church on this subject is based on a true mutual relation between seven holy acts which have been ever in the Church, for spiritual birth, strength, and food, for spiritual and bodily healing, and for natural and spiritual reproduction; and as by these seven means of grace, as by ‘joints and bands,’ the body of the Church is perpetuated and increased, so that no one of the seven can be taken away, nor any eighth added,—it is possible to discover and put together the mediæval group of the seven sacraments, even from the paintings of the first three centuries; and nothing is really added or changed in sense by our doing so.”

In one of the pictures of baptism in this group, Mr. Palmer deems it allowable, “on the principle followed in these com-



positions, to take the dove from the Baptism of Christ, and group it into a composition with any other painting of a Christian baptism;" and, as he is not able to find any representation of Extreme Unction, he gives us a picture of the healing of the woman with the issue of blood instead. This is marvellously far-fetched, and will, we fear, contribute not a little to damage the rest of the book. In his elucidation of the composition of the prophet Jonas (p. 55), he says, "the order of the parts in their Christian application is not the same as in their original history." Of course, it will be replied, not according to the particular interpretation he chooses to give. But the fathers, as Mr. Northcote shows, p. 59 of the second edition of his work on the Catacombs, give various mystical interpretations of the history of the prophet; Mr. Palmer, then, has no right to confine us to one by shuffling the order of the events of his life.

On the whole, if we are to consider Mr. Palmer's book a contribution to the history of the symbolism of the primitive Christians, as, in spite of his disclaimer of antiquarianism, its title leads us to suppose, we are disappointed with it. Nothing could be more admirable than the idea of grouping all similar symbols in juxtaposition, so that the eye might at once take in their variations: they might be in mere outline, and on a very small scale; and there might be analytical indexes, showing where the different component elements of each picture were to be met with in other compositions. Such a collection would carry with it an evidence of its own, which too many of Mr. Palmer's compositions lack. What shall we say to a confession like that on p. 46, where he owns that a rod in the hand of the infant Saviour is so indistinct that it is doubtful whether it is not a mere accidental mark on the plaster; so he leaves out the rod when the figure is introduced in composition ix.; "though in composition iii. ('of the rod'), *where it is so much in place*, this consideration was allowed to weigh in favour of its admission"! We must have one thing at a time; we must have either artistic compositions representing modern views in terms of the ancient symbolism, or we must have strict and dry classifications of the ancient symbols, without any tricks played with them. This will not be done till some one tries to do it in a cheap form, on a reduced scale, and without the luxury of colour.

We blamed the Edinburgh reviewer for not attempting to explain the principle of the selection of subjects painted in the Catacombs. If mere Biblical knowledge of histories and of types was the object, there would have been no end to the possible subjects; the designs might have been as multifari-



ous as the Oxford examination-questions. But they are not so; the question is, what were the principles that limited the choice?

The first, we suppose, was the *disciplina arcani*; which was so strictly observed, that in the place for the instruction of catechumens in the cemetery of St. Agnes not a painting is to be seen: "for in those days they would not present the doctrines and mysteries of the Christian faith, even under signs and symbols, to the eyes of those who were not received as members of the Christian household."\* This disposes of the idea of the paintings being meant to teach; for before the scholar had been fully taught he was not allowed to see the paintings.

If there was this care in concealing the mysteries even from the uninitiated, much greater precaution would be used in concealing them from the heathen. But paintings on the walls could not be removed like the rolls of the gospels. If the persecutors ever broke into the cemeteries, as they often did, the whole series of symbolical paintings was open to their inspection. One object, then, would be to render their meaning hopelessly unintelligible except to the initiated; and another, to remove all the most sacred signs, such as the cross, from possible insult and pollution. Accordingly, in these crypts the heathen intruder found nothing but a shepherd with a lamb on his shoulders; a dragon, like that painted with Andromeda, devouring an infant—such was the conventional method of representing Jonas and the whale; a man in a box with a dove—the conventional Noah's ark; men with arms extended, with lions, or sheep, by their side; or representations of feasts. All these subjects were such mere variations of known pagan forms, that no great curiosity would be excited at seeing them; and certainly no portion of the Christian doctrine could be learned from them.

The secret discipline was carried to such an extent, and led to such reserve in the earliest Christian writers, that we suppose the scattered notices of heathen authors regarding Christianity contain more startling revelations and suggestions of the Christian teaching of those days than do the Christian writings themselves. Apostates, on whom the heathens depended for their information, of course had no reserve. In the same way, although, as the Edinburgh reviewer reminds us, there is no crucifix among the paintings of the Catacombs, "no host, no adoration of the sacrament, no sign of a transcendental character," but such reserve that, as he asserts, "even the plain cross seems to have been se-

\* Northcote, p. 93.

creted in the lowest depths of the Catacombs," yet the heathens or apostates had no such scruples; and one of Mr. Palmer's supplementary plates

"exhibits a blasphemous crucifix, scratched on the wall of a bath in the palace of the Cæsars. It was found during some recent excavations on the slope of the Palatine towards the Circus, and, the plaster having been carefully detached, is now preserved in the Museum of the Roman College. The figure of a man clad in a dress not Roman, and with the head of an ass, is rudely represented on a cross formed like the letter **T**; a little below, to the right of the figure, is another man in the same sort of dress, with an over-big head, and with his arms thrown apart in a mock attitude of prayer and admiration. A Greek inscription is added, 'Here is Alexamenus, worshipping his God.' Tertullian, a writer of the second century, having mentioned that already in his time the heathen had begun to mock the Christians by representing Christ as a man with an ass's head, in a gown, fixed to a cross, we are probably not wrong in ascribing this specimen of the same mockery to the third century."

To our minds this satirical picture is a satisfactory reply to any controversial objections against our religion drawn from the reticence of the Catacombs; the Christians of those days had not only to withdraw the holiest symbols from public knowledge, but had to guard them by secrecy from insult and mockery.

But the heathen were not the persons to be chiefly consulted. If on their account the Christian truths were to be veiled in symbol, yet the symbol should be precise, known to all, unvarying, and simple. One main difficulty in Egyptian hieroglyphics is, that a single letter may at different times be represented by forty different symbols. When direct representation of a reality is for any reason disallowed, license in symbolic representation must be at the same time repressed, or the precision of the doctrine will soon vanish in a haze. In consequence of the intimate union between faith and worship, the symbols under which our Lord was represented in the pictures were probably those under which He was most frequently named in the liturgies. In the mosaic immediately over the altar of St. Vitalis at Ravenna, we see the sacrifices of Abraham, Melchisedech, and Abel; who does not see here a hieroglyphic of the Canon of the Mass, "*hæc accepta habere digneris, sicuti accepta habere dignatus es munera pueri tui justi Abel, et sacrificium Patriarchæ nostri Abrahæ, et quod tibi obtulit summus sacerdos tuus Melchisedech*"? May we conjecture that the primitive hymns and liturgies would throw a similar light on the selection of those Good Shepherds, those Daniels, and Moseses, and Peters, and



Jonases, which are so constantly seen in the subterranean chapels?

But in the absence of any certain knowledge of these liturgies, we are compelled to interrogate "the literary and biographical" remains of the primitive Church to elucidate these memorials. This is what the Edinburgh reviewer tells us we ought to do; but it is just what he does not do, and what Catholic writers on the Catacombs have always endeavoured to do. Let us quote a passage from Mr. Northcote, the most elaborately worked-out statement of the subject that we can find. If we differ from the author, in regarding the pictures rather as devotional than as didactic, this difference does not affect the argument; for unless they had a meaning, they could not serve for devotion:

"Horace has compared pictures to poems; the pictures with which we are at present concerned may certainly with still greater justice be compared to sermons, or rather to popular catechetical instructions. They were one continual homily, addressed to the eye as well as to the mind, and setting before both, in a figurative but most efficient manner, all the principal mysteries of the faith. Each painting was, as it were, a sacrament, according to the ancient definition of that word; viz. when some past action is so commemorated as that it shall be understood that something else is thereby signified. The events of the Old and New Testaments are the actions here commemorated; and they stand side by side, intermixed and confronted, as one may say, with one another, in such a manner as to set Christ and His Church before us as the only complete fulfilment of them both. We have the authority of St. Paul for recognising in every principal incident of Jewish history a type or prophecy of something in the Christian Church; and as there is this *prophetic* sense hidden under the historical letter of the old law, so is there a *symbolical* sense under the historical letter of the new,\* and it is only by bearing in mind this very important canon of interpretation of Holy Scripture that we shall be able thoroughly to comprehend the earliest productions of Christian art. Take, for instance, the paintings in the newly-discovered *cubicula*, close to the burial-place of the Popes, in the Catacomb of St. Callixtus. Speaking generally, we may say that the same series of subjects is repeated with slight variations in each of these chambers; and they are in the following order. First, there is a man striking a rock, from whence flows a copious stream of water; next, a man catches fish in this stream; and then he pours some of the water over another, standing before him. These are followed by a feast, wherein seven men, seated at a table, partake of bread and fish; and in two or three instances another picture is added, in which bread and fish again appear, but under different circumstances, which shall be presently

\* "See this argument ably drawn out with reference to the miracles and other actions of our Lord, in Card. Wiseman's Essays, vol. iii."



explained. Now, what does all this mean? In the first picture every one will at once recognise Moses striking the rock and giving water to the children of Israel in the wilderness; and we need not multiply words to show how this is symbolical of the faith and grace of Jesus Christ imparted to us through the sacrament of baptism. 'The rock is Christ' (1 Cor. x. 2); and 'as often as water is mentioned in Holy Scripture,' says St. Cyprian, 'baptism is preached.' The next representation, of a man catching a fish, immediately brings to our mind our Lord's words with reference to the Apostolic function of fishing for men (Luke v. 10); and, indeed, many of the early Greek fathers, as St. Cyril, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and others, speak of our Lord Himself under the same figure, as seeking to catch fish from amid the bitter and unstable waters of this world, not that He may put them to death, but that He may impart to them new life. And how is this new life given? In the laver of regeneration, through the life-giving waters of baptism; as Tertullian says, 'we are little fish, born in water, and only saved through its agency.' And accordingly the next scene in our picture represents the act of baptising.

This same truth is expressed in a somewhat different manner in one of the old mosaics at Ravenna. Instead of two separate figures of a man and a fish, there is but one figure, half man, half fish,—*non totus homo*, as the legend says, *sed piscis ab imo*. The painting in the Catacomb is more simple and more expressive: we have first an event of Old-Testament history *prophetical* of holy baptism; next, an ordinary human action *symbolical* of it; and lastly, the literal act itself.

The two other pictures, which, as we have said, are found in immediate connection with these, preach with no less distinctness the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist. In these the fish no longer represents an ordinary Christian, but Jesus Christ Himself, according to the universal teaching of the early fathers. Tertullian, St. Jerome, St. Optatus, St. Augustine, Eusebius, and others, speak of our Lord under this figure; deriving it from the titles which are given to Him in the famous acrostic verses of the sibyl, as quoted by the last two writers.\* The initial letters of those titles make up the Greek word ΙΧΘΥΣ, or 'fish';† and accordingly, in every story of Sacred Writ connected with a fish, the early Church recognised some figure of our Lord. 'He is *our* fish,' says Tertullian. 'Who by His descent, when we call upon Him, into the baptismal font, causes that which before was water to be now called *piscina*,' says St. Optatus (*a pisce piscina*). 'He is the fish,' says St. Jerome, 'in whose mouth is found the tax, or tribute-money, to be paid to those who demand it, whereby alone Peter and all other sinners can be redeemed.' Finally, 'He is that fish,' says St. Optatus again, 'whom Tobias seized in the river Tigris, whose flesh was good for food, whose liver drove away the devil from his wife Sara, and whose gall restored sight to his

\* "S. Aug. de Civ. Dei, xviii 23; Euseb. in Orat. Const. c. 18."

† "'Ιησοῦς Χριστός, Θεοῦ Υἱός, Σωτήρ—Jesus Christ, Son of God, Saviour."

aged father.' 'Even so we,' say St. Prosper and St. Augustine, 'are daily fed and illuminated by Jesus Christ.' Accordingly, it is with especial reference to the Christian's privilege of feeding upon his Lord in the Holy Eucharist, that this symbol of the fish is most frequently used both by Christian writers and artists. A Greek sepulchral inscription of the greatest antiquity bids us 'receive the sweet food of the Saviour of the Saints, taking into our hands *the fish*;' St. Austin, in his Confessions, describes the Eucharistic feast as that solemnity 'in which *that fish* is set before us, which, drawn forth from the deep, becomes the food of pious mortals;' and the '*piscis assus*,' or broiled fish of the Gospels, wherewith our Lord fed seven of His Apostles by the sea of Tiberias (John xxi. 13), is always by the fathers held to be mystically significant of '*Christus passus*.' 'Our Lord,' says St. Austin, commenting on this passage, 'made a feast for these seven disciples of the fish which they saw laid on the hot coals, and of bread. The broiled fish is Christ; He, too, is that bread which came down from heaven; and in Him the Church is incorporated for the enjoyment of everlasting happiness, that we all who have this hope may communicate in so great a sacrament, and share in the same bliss.' Fish and bread, therefore, when taken together, furnish a very proper secret representation of the Holy Eucharist; the one denoting its outward and seeming form, the other its inward and hidden reality: and any occasion on which our Lord distributed those two kinds of food together could not fail to bring that adorable mystery before the minds of the faithful.

Bearing this in mind, let us return to our paintings in the subterranean chambers of S. Callisto. We have said that in each chamber, after the paintings which represent Holy Baptism, we see seven men seated at a table, eating fish and bread; surely it is impossible to doubt but that this is the feast recorded by St. John as being 'the third time that Jesus was manifested to His disciples after He was risen from the dead,' when He came 'and took bread and gave them, and fish in like manner.' But still further; as the sacrament of baptism was represented first symbolically, then literally, so here too, side by side with this symbolical feast, is to be seen, in one place a three-legged table (reminding us of the mystical *tripos*) with two loaves and a fish placed upon it, and in another the same table with a single loaf and a fish, over which a priest is stretching forth his hands for the purpose of blessing; while on the opposite side stands a woman with uplifted hands, in the attitude of prayer. It may be doubted whether this figure were intended to represent the Church, or only the particular individual buried in an adjacent grave; but we cannot doubt that the whole picture refers to the consecration of the Holy Eucharist.


In another *cubiculum*, in a distant part of the same cemetery, or rather in the adjoining cemetery of St. Cornelius, and not very far from the tomb of that pontiff, the bread and fish may be seen in a different combination, but with the same meaning. A fish, bearing on its back a basket of bread, appears twice repeated, as a kind of



ornament on either side of one of the principal paintings on the walls. The bread is not of the ordinary kind,—in small loaves, *decussati*, as they were called, *i.e.* divided into four equal parts by two cross lines,—but of the kind known among the Romans by the barbarous name of '*mamphala*,' a bread of a gray ashen colour, which was used by the people of the East, especially the Jews, as an offering of the first-fruits to the priests, and was therefore considered sacred. Within the basket, too, may be clearly distinguished a glass full of red wine; so that the whole painting brings forcibly to our recollection the description given by St. Jerome of a Bishop's treasures,—'*Corpus Domini in canistro vimineo*' (for the basket in the painting is precisely of this character, made of osier-twigs), '*et sanguis Ejus in vitro*,'—'The Body of our Lord in an osier basket, and His Blood in glass.'"

Compare this elaborate proof of the recognition of the precise meaning of the symbols by the fathers with the shallow sentence of the Edinburgh reviewer: "An attempt has sometimes been made to connect the fish with the doctrine of transubstantiation; but, in fact, it is much more probable that this scene represents the meal near the sea of Tiberias, described in the last chapter of St. John's Gospel." Here we have the ruling passion again; that eternal Bible Christianity which can talk of "sacred" geography, "sacred" zoology, "sacred" botany, and can make the chronology of the patriarchs a part of theology; but which cannot bear, in symbol or in plain speech, to have its attention called to the mystical doctrines of religion. In comparison to such obtuseness of intellect, which totally unfits a man from entering into any opinions but his own, and so completely disables him from any historical judgment, Mr. Palmer's most arbitrary compositions shine forth as torches in a cloudy night.

It is manifest that the symbolism of the Catacombs is a very small part of the historical teaching that may be drawn from them; the inscriptions furnish us with direct contributions to history, both of events and of dogmas. The organic forms of the chapels, and altars, and tombs, lead to many sound inferences concerning the rites, ceremonies, and customs of the early believers; there are separate sciences of the architecture, and of the painting and sculpture, that distinguish them. The science of their symbolism is one separable from all these, and in the present article we have treated it as quite distinct.



## THE FORMS OF INTUITION.

"THE result," says Mr. Mansel,\* "of the critical philosophy, as applied to the speculative side of human reason, was to prove, beyond all question, the existence of certain necessary laws of intuition and thought, which impart a corresponding character to all the objects of which consciousness, intuitive or reflective, can take cognisance. Consciousness was thus exhibited as a relation between the human mind and its object." The laws of intuition and thought are the result of the mechanism of our mind; and Kant's fundamental position amounts to no more than this: "that we can see things only as our own faculties present them to us; and that we can never be sure that the mode of operation of our faculties is identical with that of all other intelligences, embodied or spiritual."†

Consciousness depends on the relation between the human mind and the thing minded, between the subject perceiving and the object perceived. Hence knowledge varies not only with the object, but with the subject. The thing seen can only appear such as the seeing eye can take in. The same thing, then, will appear different to different faculties or capacities—*res eodem modo se habens diversemode a diversis potest cognosci*‡—knowledge varies with the subject; and different things appear different to the same faculty—knowledge varies with the object. In analysing knowledge, then, it becomes important to find what elements are derived from the subject, and what from the object. This is no new question; it was agitated by philosophers long before the time of Kant.

St. Thomas§ finds in all objects certain *principles* (*principia*), by partaking of which they become *principled* (*principiata*): the *principia* he derives from the mind, from the *intellectus agens*, but the experience or *doctrina* from without; hence the composite knowledge of the *principiata*. There may be, he says, a kind of knowledge, namely, the knowledge of principles, acquired from within only (*ab intellectu agente*); and another knowledge, that of *principiata*, or phenomena embodying principles, from a combination of internal and external sources, by the intellect coöperating with experience

\* Bampton Lectures, lect. vii. p. 200; 3d edit.

† Ibid. note 10 to lect. v. p. 368.

‡ St. Thomas, Comment. in Boethium de Consol. Phil. in pros. iv. lib. v.

§ Ibid. lib. iii. metrum xi.



or sense. But no knowledge can be derived from the outside only—otherwise a stone could see and think as well as a mind.

What now is the test of the *principia*, or principles derived entirely from within, from the mind, and not from the objects of sense? The test by which Kant distinguishes that which is given from within (the form) from that which is given from without (the matter) in our ideas is, that the form is universal and necessary, the matter only contingent, because only known by experience, which is liable to be reversed any moment by a fresh experience. The great peculiarity of Kant was, his establishing that necessity and universality were the tests of the subjectivity of the presentation. According to Hamilton, Descartes was the first to hint, and Leibnitz to draw out, this theory. But all its elements are found in Aristotle, who (1) denied the obligation of affirming the objective truth of that which was subjectively necessary; (2) gave to the intellect, apart from experience, the paternity of *principia*; and (3) asserted the necessity and universality of *principia*. Now when he said\* that it was not logical to transfer the necessity of our conception (*νόησις*) to the necessity of nature, he must have held that the conceived necessity was only subjective, only valid for minds, not known to be valid for nature. The knowledge of necessary *principia* could not originally be deduced from nature, if, on looking closely into nature, we cannot even now be sure that these necessary *principia* are there. To say that possibly in the region of the fixed stars two straight lines may enclose a space, but not here, because we have never seen them doing so, is not properly to derive necessity from experience, but to deny the reality of any conception of necessity at all. Whereas to say that in the region of the fixed stars two straight lines cannot enclose a space, is to own that the necessity is not derived from experience; for who ever saw lines drawn in that region?

These *principia* have been called “innate ideas,” and many other names; they have been considered as ready-made propositions, instilled into the mind at its creation, and awakened by a kind of reminiscence with the growing faculties. Kant, on the other hand, looks at them not as ideas, but as *forms* of the mind, and laws of the mechanism of the intellect. Of these aboriginal forms of the mind, he only enumerates two—space and time. Our object in this paper is to inquire whether this enumeration is sufficient. Space and time, no doubt, are such forms: that we apprehend objects as

\* Phys. iii. c. viii.

existing in space is not a consequence, but a condition, of experience; it is the result of a peculiar constitution or preformation of our minds, which would exist whether we ever had experience or no. Experience, says Dr. Whewell,\* gives us information concerning things without us; but our apprehending them *as* without us takes for granted their existence in space: experience acquaints us with their form and position; but that they have form, position, or magnitude, presupposes that they are in space. We must begin by representing things as in space; and such previous representation cannot come from the subsequent experience. Nor could experience ever attach either universality or necessity to the truths it teaches us: its examples are limited, therefore its generalisations are short of being universal: it shows us the fact that a thing *is* so; it can never suggest the thought that it *must be* so, and cannot be otherwise. Yet such are the propositions which result from the partitions of space; every where and always the angles of a triangle must equal two right angles; the materials given by sensation are subject to inevitable rules, and can never be imagined to be exempt from the conditions of their form. Then, for the idea of space itself: "Extension," says Hamilton,† "is only another name for space; and our notion of space is not one that we derive exclusively from sense, not one that is generalised only from experience; for it is one of our necessary notions—in fact, a fundamental condition of thought itself. The analysis of Kant, independently of all that has been done by other philosophers, has placed this truth beyond the possibility of doubt, to all those who understand the meaning and conditions of the problem."

This fundamental notion of space is a form of the perceptive power, a condition of perception; something originally inherent in the mind perceiving, and not derived from the objects perceived. "What I mean by the form or condition of a faculty," says Hamilton,‡ "is that frame, that setting (if I may so speak), out of which no object can be known. . . . That the forms are native, not adventitious to the mind, is involved in their necessity. What I cannot but think must be *à priori*, or original, to thought. It cannot be engendered by experience upon custom."

And if space is such a form, so also is time. Time is not a notion gained from experience; for the perceptions of experience can only be perceived in succession, and succession

\* History of Scientific Ideas, vol. i. p. 91.

† Lectures on Metaphysics, lect. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 113.

‡ Ibid. lect. xxix. vol. ii. p. 191.



presupposes time. Thus time is a necessary preliminary condition of the perception of all occurrences. Necessary, for we cannot conceive its removal: we can conceive void time, with no occurrence to occupy it; but we cannot conceive occurrences to happen, without their happening in time. Time always is, and always is present; and we cannot conceive any thought without presupposing it.

But are space and time the only original forms of the mind? Are all others derived from these? Are there no necessary truths except those which are derived from, and can be resolved into, propositions of space and time? Are there not other conditions necessary as preliminaries to our knowledge of things, as, in fact, we do know them? The importance of this inquiry is obvious, as soon as we realise the idea that all necessary knowledge is formal, and derives its necessity from our minds, not from external experience, so that we can have no mathematical certainty of any proposition which is not demonstrable from the mechanism of our minds. But if these forms are only two, space and time, no propositions which are not logically derivable from them will be necessary. It will not be necessary that every effect must have a cause; that every design implies a designer; that ingratitude in all possible circumstances must be bad; for these propositions are not derivable from the partitions of space and time.

Besides this, the well-being of all sciences demands that we should perfectly comprehend the truth that their form, and therefore their demonstrative necessary character, depends upon our minds—either arbitrarily, by our definitions, or naturally and spontaneously, by an inward necessity. The reason, says Kant, why logic and mathematics have advanced, while metaphysics has remained stationary, is because, in the former sciences, the truth is admitted that we have no other universal and necessary knowledge of things than what we place in them ourselves. We only know so much *à priori* of things as we attribute to them from the stores of our own minds. This is clear in logic, which only touches the formulæ of understanding and reasoning, and does not pretend to travel outside the mind. In mathematics, no advance was possible till Thales discovered that, in order to investigate the equilateral triangle, he must not passively contemplate the figure already drawn, but must actively construct it, and produce it in his imagination; and that if he would know any thing securely about it *à priori*, he must attribute nothing to the thing, except that which followed necessarily from what he had placed in it himself according to his con-

ception. So in physics; a random observation gives nothing but a disjointed chronicle of miscellaneous events; such "vague experience" rather stupefies than informs: but when the philosopher began to interrogate nature on a certain forecast plan; when he conceived a theory, and then contrived his experiments to prove or disprove it, modifying it as circumstances required, and only satisfied when he had put it to the severest crucial experiments,—then physical science began to advance. This plan was not Bacon's invention. Aristotle\* had taught that knowledge is built on doubt, and consists in the solution of doubts. Difficulties are not only the knots we have to untie, but are also the sign-posts to show us the road. Without this guidance we do not know whither we are going, nor do we know whether we have found what we were looking for till we determine what we were in search of.† This amounts to the maxim of Bacon and Kant, that without a view it is useless to interrogate nature; that the view, or doubt, or theory, is the law which guides us in our search, and without which our search is properly no search at all. Yet withal, we must ever carefully distinguish our theory from the facts—the thread from the beads. The same, says Kant, must be done in metaphysics: all our knowledge is divisible into two elements,—the contingent, which we receive by experience from without; the necessary and universal, which must be looked for within the mind. To criticise our knowledge aright, we must separate these two elements: we must remember that the necessary and universal propositions arise from the very make of our minds; that to us the only evidence of universality and necessity is the inability to conceive a thing otherwise; and that the inability to conceive it otherwise arises from our powers of conception being so formed as to be obliged to conceive in this way, and unable to do so in any other way.

There are, then, three questions for metaphysics to solve. (1) What are the forms of the mind to which all necessary and universal propositions can be reduced? (2) In what way

\* Metaph. lib. ii. c. i.

† So St. Thomas, in Boeth. de Con. Phil. in met. iii. lib. v., in answer to the difficulty—if the soul desires to know, it is either to know what it knows, or to know what it knows not. The first is absurd; the second difficult. How can the will seek the unknown? If it does not know, it cannot recognise, but is like a policeman sent to apprehend a thief without a description of the person; he may talk with him fifty times without knowing him. "I say," says St. Thomas, "that he knows in general; in special and in proper form, he knows not. 'No one seeks to know what he knows,' unless he knows it only in general, and wants to know it in special. 'If he knows not, he will never find;' not if he knows not either in general or in special, either *in posse* or *in actu*. But if he knows *in potentia et in universali*, and knows not in act and in its proper form, then he may find and learn."



do these forms influence one another, and how are they mixed up with experience? And (3), all our necessary and universal ideas being derived from within, what proof have we of the external reality of objects which are presented to us in the framework of these ideas? how bridge over the gulf which yawns between subjective conception and objective reality? The first of these questions will be quite enough to occupy our present space.

Kant's reduction of the original forms of the mind to two, time and space, has been generally acquiesced in both by his friends and his foes. But the difficulty is, that whereas all *à-priori* thought requires a mental action, the forms of space and time are perfectly passive. They are rather attributes of the passive *sensorium* than productive forces of the *intellectus agens*. They are like white sheets hung up in the mind's workshop, whereon phenomena and events paint their pictures, to be hung up in the galleries of perception and memory. They behave themselves as passive in our contemplation; they do not coöperate while we drink in all the sensations that flicker on their surfaces. And then, all these sensations that come and go are merely phenomenal and contingent; they make no advance towards the necessary and universal: we see what seems, we do not yet know what is and what must be. To know this, we require an activity which does not belong to space or time—to space, the passive receptacle in which, or on whose surface, extended objects are presented to us; to time, the thread on which the beads of our successive sensations are strung by the memory. Space and time are the forms of thought; for they are the shapes, the frames, the moulds, the vessels, the necessary receptacles of our thought. But in the scholastic sense they are not forms of thought; they do not vivify or give life to our ideas, as the soul vivifies the body, of which it is the form. They constitute the *where* and the *when*, the *how much* and *how often*, of our thought; but not the reality or the substance, or the *how* or the *wherefore*.

So far, then, from space and time exhausting the catalogue of forms of thought, they only give us the inert shapes of the passive intelligence, and have nothing to do with the working formative forces of the active intellect. Kant knew this, and therefore proceeded at once from these forms to reason out and construct a complete list of the categories of the pure understanding. But he sought the living among the dead. It is only to echo the universal judgment, to say that here he fails; that the singular power and clearness which had nerved his reasonings up to this point, here desert him; and that he

now becomes confused, unintelligible, contradictory. By fixing on space and time as the only two *à-priori* forms of intuitive thought, he has bound himself to derive all *à-priori* elements of thought from them. So reality, causation, intensity, are all affiliated to space and time, and derived from their fundamental properties. Granting his assumption, his conclusion is inevitable. If space and time are the only forms of the intellect, the only valid processes of the intellect are those which are confined to objects in space and time, that is, to material phenomena. But though Kant demonstrates space and time to be forms of the mind, he does not prove them to be the only forms. Yet his argument required this proof.

To prove that space and time are not the only forms, we have only to examine his derivation of our idea of cause from them. In the sphere of phenomena cause only reveals itself to experience as a constantly recurring connection of two events; we only see two events succeeding in time. Is, then, all our *à-priori* idea of cause to be found in the idea of time? Kant answers, Yes. We cannot think of past, present, and future, without thinking of causal connection. It is a law of the idea of time, that if we think of one state of things as coming to an end, we must think of another as succeeding. But this succession is not causation; the cessation of a former state makes room for another, allows it scope, verge, and occasion to come into being, but is not the reason of its coming to be. When a tenant leaves a house, another may succeed; but the departure of the first is not the cause of the second choosing the house. The notion of cause requires, not only that one state should cease, and make way for another, but that the first should possess a power the transfusion of which brings the second to pass. Without this force there is no causation; and the idea of force cannot, by any alchemy, be extracted from the forms of space and time. In these forms only succession is exhibited; and succession implies, but does not constitute, causation. We desiderate another form of thought to give us the fundamental and constituent element of causation.

Dr. Whewell solves the difficulty in an offhand way. He adds cause to the list of original mental forms. His position is, that as "the nature of truth on all subjects is the same, and its discovery involves like conditions,"\* the different sciences come in succession within the province of the inductive philosophy, which alone can put them on a firm and really scientific basis. Before they are in this position, we cannot

\* History of Scientific Ideas, vol. i. p. 4.



separate the *à-priori* ideas on which they are built from the contingent phenomena which furnish their materials. Afterwards we may arrive by induction at a knowledge of the *à-priori* ideas on which inductive sciences are built. We have only to make a list of the sciences built on such ideas, then to separate the ideas, and we shall have the catalogue we were seeking. With this intention, Dr. Whewell (p. 82) gives a list of sciences, commencing with geometry and arithmetic, and ending with physiology and palætiology; and the result of his induction is, that the human mind consists of the following fifteen *à-priori* forms of fundamental ideas: Space, Time, Number, Externality, Media of Perception, Polarity, Chemical Affinity, Substance, Symmetry, Resemblance, Natural Affinity, Assimilation, Irritability, Final Cause, and Historical Causation.

We could scarcely expect more from one who tries to get at *à-priori* ideas from induction—to find out what he owns to be *in* the mind by examining only what is outside it. Kant calls Aristotle's categories a mere heap, without internal order or organisation; what would he have said to Dr. Whewell's loose list? Rosenkranz, the biographer of Hegel, quotes it from the first edition of the *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, and justly adds, "What a confusion of logical, metaphysical, physical, and psychological definitions! Yet this is admired in Germany; and men completely forget how much higher Kant's table of categories is than this."\* Mill observes upon it,† that Whewell is "a writer who has gone beyond all his predecessors in the manufacture of necessary truths, that is, of propositions which, according to him, may be known to be true independently of proof; who ascribes this self-evidence to the larger generalities of all sciences (however little obvious at first) as soon as they have become familiar." And it is his obvious and easy success in refuting Whewell that leads Mill to suppose that he has refuted the philosophy of which he sets up Whewell as the representative.

Dr. Whewell fails to observe that sciences, demonstrative in their progress, may be built on ideas which are neither necessary nor universal. It does not signify to the validity of a logical series whether its fundamental premiss is really, or only hypothetically, necessary. In the natural sciences, which Whewell uses as the models of all others, it is very doubtful whether the fundamental principles are more than a limitation of the sphere of the particular science. In physics, the fundamental principle is, "in all changes of the corporeal

\* Aus einem Tagebuch, 1854, p. 114.

† Dissertations, vol. ii. p. 453.

world the quantity of matter remains unchanged." Is this meant for a challenge to Christians, who believe in God's power to create and annihilate at will; or merely a modest declaration that physical science only applies to changes where the quantity is constant, and that all miraculous changes, if there are any, are extra-scientific, out of the sphere of physics? In the latter case, the necessity of the proposition does not hold good for the universe, but only for that part of it with which science is conversant. Creation and annihilation may still be possible; but it is impossible for physics to take cognisance of them. So with the fundamental proposition of mechanics—"in all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal to one another." This must be true of all motions for which the science of mechanics can legislate. But other laws of motion are conceivable; nay, we know that other laws hold good in the universe. We move our limbs by an act of will: what is the sense of saying that "the reaction of the arm on the will is equal to the action of the will on the arm"? Mechanics does not attempt to give rules for the action of mind upon matter, or for the impact of the *πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον* upon the spheres. The fundamental proposition about action and reaction is universal and necessary, not for nature, but for the science of mechanics. Such propositions serve a double purpose: first, they mark out the limits of the science; secondly, they affirm a truth which is universally necessary for objects within those limits, because objects to which that truth does not apply are *ipso facto* outside the sphere of the science.

Perhaps, then, the necessity of the fundamental propositions is only hypothetical in all sciences? Dugald Stewart, and before him Aristotle, maintained that it was, even in pure mathematics. "Is necessity a simple fundamental idea, or does it result from hypothesis?\*" For instance, *if* I must saw wood, it is necessary to have a tool; *if* I want to build, I must have materials. Thus, in nature, the necessity follows from the end proposed; and the end is set forth in the *λόγος* or definition. Similarly in mathematics; given such a definition of a straight line, and then the three angles of a rectilinear triangle equal two right angles. But there is no necessity for the straight line to exist; we only know that if the three angles are not equal to two right angles, then the lines are not straight. So in nature; two things are necessary, matter and form, without which there could be no beings; but the necessity of matter and form only follows from the assumption that beings are to exist." In similar strain

\* Aristotle, Phys. ii. c. ix.



Stewart argues that the necessity of mathematical truth is only hypothetical, dependent on arbitrary definitions, not on the nature of things. Dr. Whewell replies, that no one has yet been able to construct a system of mathematical truth by the aid of definitions alone; that no definitions are arbitrary, but that all agree with distinct and necessary conceptions in the mind; and that if Stewart had only taken the ordinary geometrical axioms as his instances, his assertions would have been obviously erroneous. Whewell concludes by asserting that the real foundation of the necessity of mathematical truths is the idea of space, which may be expressed partly by definitions, partly by axioms.

There are, then, some propositions generally supposed to be universal and necessary which are only so *ex hypothesi*; and there are others which are so as agreeing with distinct and necessary conceptions, such as Descartes required to establish the objective reality of a thought. Is there any criterion by which we may distinguish these two kinds? A criticism of Dr. Whewell may bring it to light. His mistake is, to assert that the idea of space is the foundation of the necessity of mathematical propositions, when that idea is simple, without contents, a perfect blank, an infinite expanse, a vacuum, nothing in itself, though apt to contain all things. Of the things contained in it, we have either sensation, or memory, or intuition: sensation of things presented to us by present experience; memory of past experience; intuition of the lines and figures generated in ideal space by the active powers of the mind. On these three modes of perception are founded three classes of judgments. A present perception is the base of a particular judgment; memory gives the grounds of a general judgment in empirical matter; an intuition gives the foundation for a universal judgment in necessary matter. Sensation takes in the image; memory reproduces it ready-made; intuition knows how to make it. One of our greatest powers has its root in impotence and weakness; for generalisation, if the memory was perfect and stable, would be scarcely possible. If the child distinctly remembered every characteristic of the individual he was first taught to call a horse, he would be unlikely to call the next horse he saw by the same name, because he would immediately recognise that it was not the same individual. But as the perception was vague, and the memory of it unstable, presenting little more than an inconstant mass with head and legs; and as every other animal the child sees agrees equally well with this vague representation,—he will call them all by the same name, and pigs and cows also will be “horse.” When a more dis-

tingent representative image of a horse is conceived, the old vague image will not be annihilated, but will be relegated to a wider significance, and will stand for the conception of "beast," or "animal," which will be painted in the imagination as a mass moving by organs. The general notion of "man" or "beast," so far as the image is concerned, is no more precise than the drawings scrawled over walls by children to represent the same objects. A generalisation at once precise and general is taken out of the field of imagination and representation, and belongs to the sphere of definition. We cannot *represent* "horse" in general, of no particular colour, size, or shape; but we can have a vague unstable memory of a particular horse, which, when recalled, easily adapts itself to the image of the horse here and now perceived. So there is no image of the universal triangle which is neither rectangular, nor equilateral, nor scalene; but there may be an unstable image of a triangle which easily adapts itself to any, not so much as a symbol of the class, but as a vague image in a state of perpetual *production* in the memory, which changes it from moment to moment according to the exigencies of thought, without the thought taking note of the change, just as in dreams. The universal exists in the intuition as a rule, as a definition, or a knowledge how to make the thing—a knowledge which, however empirical in its rise, is *à priori* in its origin, and, though suggested by experience, yet derives its great characteristics from the mechanism of the mind itself.

It is in the memory that the dictum of Aristotle is true, that knowledge proceeds from the indistinct to the distinct,\* from the vague to the determinate; and that of Hamilton,† "Language at first expresses neither the precisely general nor the determinately individual, but the vague and confused: out of this the universal is elaborated by generification, the particular and singular by specification and individualisation;" or of St. Thomas:‡ "To understand a thing in general, and not specially, is an imperfect knowledge; our intellect, while it is being evoked from possibility into actuality, arrives at a universal and confused knowledge of things before it gets a proper knowledge; for it proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect." Sense takes in wholes, and transfers wholes to the memory. It does not construct things out of their elements, and so does not know how to make them. Whatever it knows, it knows only contingently,

\* Phys. i. c. i.

† Lectures on Metaphysics, lect. xxxvi. vol. ii. p. 327.

‡ Sum. 1, q. 14, art. 6.



and so can never reach to the absolutely necessary and universal. When it affirms "always and every where," it understands "to the best of my knowledge and experience." Sense furnishes the ground of judgment that this particular paper is white. Memory receives the image of the paper, and reproduces it as often as it chooses; so, as each act of memory presents a distinct image, we find that an individual sensation may produce many images in the memory, all which taken together make the individual into a species: that which was an individual to the sense, is a species to the memory; and we are enabled to pronounce the judgment that paper as a species is white. But as our individual experience has not given us all paper, we cannot say that all paper is white (unless by definition we exclude all that is not white from being paper); still less that it must be white. Similarly, our imaginations of space, and our memories of ready-made shapes in space, belong only to a kind of dreamy spontaneity which can never generate science. Though you showed me a triangle ready formed, I should know nothing about triangles in general; when I reproduce it in my memory, ready-made as a whole, I have a general instead of a particular image, but I know nothing of the necessity that rules triangles. When I produce it in my intuition by the rule of the definition, then I at once recognise the necessity of its properties. Hence, the only really useful intuitions of space are those expressed by definitions, which prove themselves by performance; thus becoming axioms, which are only self-evident problems whose generation is their demonstration. But space and time themselves can generate nothing. Generation requires not only a passive receptacle, but also an active formative power. This power, in mathematics, is expressed by postulates; and thus postulates and definitions together form the whole active base of geometrical proof, whereby the necessary properties of lines, figures, surfaces, and solids, are demonstrated. Intuition alone can recognise the universality and necessity of mathematical truth; for universality can only be affirmed when our knowledge of the subject is universal and complete; and this can only be when we have a creative force within us which is able to produce the thing in our intuition from its original atoms, with the certainty that all possible elements are given to us, and that no external experience can ever possibly upset our proof by adding an element formerly unknown. Hence, for mathematics, no mere sensation of shape is enough, no mere reproduction of the shape in the memory, but a force which acts, forms, creates, and generates the shapes, and knows all about them; because there can be

nothing in them which it did not put in. Whewell knows this as a fact, but does not perceive its significance :

“ Our consciousness of the relations of space is inseparably and fundamentally connected with our own actions in space. We perceive only while we act ; our sensations require to be interpreted by our volitions. The apprehension of extension and figure is far from being a process in which we are inert and passive. . . . When the geometer bids us form lines, surfaces, or solids, by motion, he intends his injunction to be taken as hypothetical\* only ; we only need conceive such motions. But yet this hypothesis represents truly the origin of our knowledge : we perceive spaces by motion at first, as we conceive spaces by motion afterwards ; or if not by actual motion, at least by potential.”†

Aristotle‡ had already said as much : *πρῶτον δεῖ κατανοῆσαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐζητεῖτο ὁ τόπος, εἰ μὴ κίνησις τις ἦν κατὰ τὸν τόπον* ; there would have been no inquiry about space, unless there had been motion in space. And the search for the properties of space is a similar motion. Without motion, space is a formless void ; with the data of the point and power of motion, we can build up the whole fabric of geometry in the pure intuitive space. We move the point ; its motion creates the line : we take two points, and move one towards the other ; of the infinite number of the possible connecting lines one is the shortest of all—this is the straight line. This generation of the straight line is the proof that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, or cannot cut each other in more points than one ; otherwise between these two points there are two shortest lines of all, which is absurd. And the postulate of motion requires that we should be able to move lines as well as points, and thus generate surfaces. If we can move points evenly, so as to form straight lines, we can also move straight lines evenly, so as to form parallelograms ; so that each of the points in the line shall have a uniform motion, and that all of them shall always be equidistant from the places they occupied while the line was at rest. The axioms about parallel straight lines are reduced to propositions by this postulate. “ If two straight lines cut one another, one of which is parallel to a third straight line, this third straight line is not parallel to the other.” Move the third line evenly till it coincides with the parallel line ; then it is seen to cut the other line. *Solvitur ambulando*. The proposition is proved by enacting the postulate. In like manner, Whewell’s axiom and definition of a circle are but

\* What a strange use of the word *hypothetical*=internal in the mind, not external in space !

† History of Scientific Ideas, vol. i. p. 124.

‡ Phys. iv. c. iv.



a postulate and a proposition. "Axiom: if a line be drawn so as to be at every point equally distant from a certain point, this line will return into itself, or will be one line including a space. Definition: the space is called a circle, the line the circumference, and the point the centre." This formula does not show us how to make a circle; it should be—Postulate: take a line, fixed at one end, and movable at the other; turn the line by its movable end till it returns to its original position. Definition: the figure described by the movable end is a circle. Proposition 1. The circumference must return into itself, otherwise the line has grown longer in its revolution, and is no longer the same. 2. All radii are equal; for they are all one and the same line in the different positions it has passed through. Thus we see intuitively the necessary character of all the properties of a circle as soon as we have drawn it according to the directions of the postulate. And so the postulate, the statement of our power, becomes the most important element in mathematical proof.

Psychologists suppose that motion of the eye is necessary even for perception. If the eye was fixed in a particular position, and the picture of the object was painted on the retina, they think that the eye could not attend to this picture, because it could not travel round from point to point. But such movement is necessary to perception; though it is performed with such rapidity as to be instantaneous in effect, except when the figure is very complex.\* The concentrated attention is successively given to the various points of a figure, and by the motion of the eye-balls the figure is made apparent to the muscular sense, and so drawn and engraved on the memory. Whewell objects to this—"Surely we should have no difficulty in perceiving the relation of the sides and angles of a small triangle placed before the eye, even if the muscles of the eyeball were severed," so that we could not move the eye to trace the shape. But though this may be so in the case of external sensation, it is not so in the internal intuition. There we must find potential motion; the index of the mind must trace the shape, or we know not how to generate it. If there was no activity in the intuition, and if forms were only presented to us passively, and we were without power to generate shapes according to the postulates and definitions, even though we perceived the relations of the special shape presented to us, we could not tell whether the rule *necessarily* applied. It is only when we generate a shape according to its definition, that we see how each figure must have certain properties; and thus our intuition of the neces-

\* See Dugald Stewart, Elements, vol. i. c. ii.

sity and universality of geometrical laws is a function of our power of generating figures in pure space according to a pre-conceived definition or plan. Thus also definition and creation are two aspects of the same act; we can create only what we can define, and can only define what we can create. "It was as easy to create as to define," says Dr. Newman. This is the fundamental principle of Vico's philosophy: "The intellect knows what she creates, and only what she creates, and because she creates it. Fact and Truth are synonymous words; and creation is the only criterion of truth." Kant's principle is similar: "We only know that *à priori* of things which we put into them ourselves;" or, as we should express it, "we can only know apodictically those things which are capable of being generated in our intuition according to a definition, or rule of production." This principle is unwittingly admitted by a celebrated writer, in a passage where he is arguing against any *à-priori* necessity whatever.

"If we advert," says Mr. Stuart Mill,\* "to one of the characteristic elements of geometrical forms—their capacity of being painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to reality; in other words, the exact resemblance of our ideas of form to the sensations which suggest them—this, in the first place, enables us to make (at least with a little practice) mental pictures of all possible combinations of lines and angles, which resemble the realities quite as well as any we could make upon paper; and, in the next place, makes those pictures just as fit subjects of geometrical experimentation as the realities themselves. . . . The foundations of geometry would therefore be laid in direct experience, even if the experiments (which in this case consist merely in attentive contemplation) were practised solely upon what we call our ideas, that is, upon the diagrams in our minds, and not upon outward objects. . . . Without denying, therefore, the possibility of satisfying ourselves that two straight lines cannot enclose a space by merely thinking of straight lines without looking at them, I contend that we do not know this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one real line to another. The conclusion, therefore, is still an induction from observation. And we should not be authorised to substitute observation of the image in our mind for observation of the reality, if we had not learned by long-continued experience that all the properties of the reality are faithfully represented in the image."

It will be noticed, that Mr. Mill attributes the demonstrative character of geometry to our capacity of making mental pictures of all possible lines and angles; that is, upon

\* Logic, vol. i. p. 309, 1st edit.



the feasibility of the postulates. And though afterwards he calls this "mere contemplation," we must understand a creative contemplation, which makes what it looks at. Whether this interior intuition is direct experience or not, at least it is evident that it alone, and not external experience, can furnish grounds for necessary conclusions; and therefore that we seek the foundation of necessary science in the powers of the personal self. Now, though Kant maintained that our knowledge of the personal self is equally phenomenal with that of external objects, yet, as Mr. Mansel says, "my personal existence is identical with my consciousness of that existence." That this consciousness comes out gradually, by distinct stages of experience, does not prevent our saying that all the grounds of it preëxisted in the personal self; that they were *à priori*, internal, not external. Mr. Mill's doctrine, that we assert the necessity of mathematical proofs only because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, is manifestly false; for we can build up a necessary science of these imaginary lines without once entertaining the question whether, on our spherical earth-crust, it is possible to draw any real straight line at all. Evidently we can only have perfect knowledge of that which we generate entirely from our own thought, without deriving any of the constituent elements from experience, except the hint and the motive that set us to work. Perhaps we should never draw lines in our intuition, unless we had seen lines drawn by moving objects in nature; but the hint once given, our internal powers act on it, and begin to discover necessary *à priori* truths. The necessity is not from experience, unless, with Mill, we choose to call the internal *nisus* experience. Any external experience that may be requisite to furnish a constituent element of the thought, at once deprives the thought of its apodictic certainty; because we have neither full power over, nor full knowledge of, external realities, and a new experience may any day contradict our most constant and long-continued observations.

Hence the perfect feasibility of the postulate, by the internal powers alone, is the criterion of positive necessity: when any element of the postulate is derived from external experience, the necessity can only be hypothetical, as in the mixed sciences.

Thus, from this one inquiry into mathematical necessity, we see that space and time are neither the sole forms, nor, indeed, the active forms at all, of our reason; they have no formative or demonstrative power. By themselves they will not even account for the straight line; for the ultimate geometri-

the peculiarity of *virtus* (intensity) as opposed to extension: "virtus superior virtutem includit inferiorem" in such a way, that "quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest et superior, et magis."\* If power is thought of as infinitely extended, it is in a measure identified with infinite space: now distinct spaces cannot lie in the bosom of infinite space without appropriating and subtracting some of its component parts, thereby rendering it less, and destroying its infinity. Thus, to fancy power infinitely extensive, renders the distinction between God and creatures impossible. But we can easily conceive a multitude of distinct beings, each endowed with finite powers, co-existing with a Power intensively infinite, the Creator and Upholder of all the inferior powers, able to do all they can do, and infinitely more. If a thousand men each possess an acre, the total is a thousand acres; if each knows exactly the same things in the same way, the total of knowledge is no more than if one knew them. If a man gives away things that come within the category of extension and number, less remains to him; if he imparts things that can only be measured by the category of personality, he does not diminish his stock. This we suppose is the meaning of the rule which Mr. Mansel declares to be impossible: "In contemplating God, transcend time."† But it is the rule of St. Augustine; of Eckart, who says, "Time and place are parts, and God is one; therefore, if our soul is to know God, it must know Him above time and place;" and of many others, quoted by Mr. Mansel in his note.‡ If Mr. Mansel forbids our transcending space as well as time, the world of philosophers is against him. "God," says St. Athanasius,§ "encloses all things, is enclosed by none; within all in power, without all in His proper nature." Again, "Man cannot be without place; but it does not follow that God is in place."|| So St. Clement:¶ "God is in substance far off, but most close in power." The common doctrine that God is every where present in substance, must not be made to confuse His substance with space or extension. He is present to all things by His power, which is His substance; He is not present as occupying their space, extending Himself with them, and subjecting Himself to the laws of space. St. Bernard says well,\*\* "He reaches from the worm to the angel, not by motion or *local diffusion*, but by His substantial and ever-present power." "Non enim," says St. Augustine,††

\* St. Thomas in Boet. de Consol. lib. v. pros. iv.

† Lect. iii. p. 82.

‡ Note 18 to lect. iii. p. 339.

§ Nicene Def. § 9, Oxf. Trans. p. 18.

|| Discourse i. c. vii. § 2, p. 214.

¶ Stromat. 2, circ. init.

\*\* De Grat. et Lib. Arb. c. x.

†† De Trin. vi. c. vii.



"mole magnus est, sed virtute." So St. Thomas:\* "God fills all space, not as body, for body fills space by reason that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time; . . . but incorporeal things are not in space by *dimension*, but by power (*virtus*). Atom is indivisible, but in the genus of things extended; soul also is indivisible, but *extra totum genus continui*. Therefore there is no common measure for soul and extended things," for "virtual" and "corporeal quantity."†

The categories derived from time and space being thus inadequate to measure our ideas, what are the required forms of our personality which are to be the criteria of reality, existence, causation, and ideas of that class? The personality is the soul; and the old transcendental analysis of the soul makes it consist of three powers—force, reason, and will—*posse, scire, velle*. These three powers are the supplementary forms of intuition of which we were in search.

Besides space and time, the concurrence of these three are requisite even for a geometrical demonstration. No such demonstration is possible without the voluntary production of the figure according to a plan. Voluntary production is force set in motion by will; the plan is an offshoot of reason. In these three are the real forms of demonstration, and the grounds of necessity. Space and time are forms, somewhat as the day of the month is a form of the event that happens, or a sheet of paper the form of the picture drawn upon it.

Again, mechanics is the science of motion, which, whatever it may be in itself, to our apprehension is the action of a thing in space and time; and the fundamental proposition is that "action and reaction are equal." Now to what category are we to attribute motion? To space? But space is a passive vacuum. To time? But time communicates no motion while it passes; or, in another view, it is the motionless receptacle and measure of motion. The real category, condition, or form, of motion is *force*; whether the motion is purely mental, as the generation of a line in the intuition, or external and experimental, as the fall of an apple, it is always conditioned by our idea of force.

Again, causality, the "soul of metaphysical philosophy," as Mr. Mansel calls it, is not mere succession in time, according to Hume, and even Kant's analysis; nor need we, with Mr. Mansel, represent it as an act of will. Cause cannot be thought except in the form and under the condition of force.

\* Sum. 1, q. 8, art. 2.

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cal element is the point: but as the point has no parts and no magnitude, no number of points ranged side by side can make a line. A line can only be conceived as the trail left by the motion of a point, or a point in constant infinite motion between two termini. But motion is no derivative from space or time; they are passive, motion is a manifestation of activity. It is a force; and *force* is its form. The point also, which has no magnitude, and therefore is no part of space, belongs to this form. The point is inconceivable, except as the *locus* of a potential force that may issue from it, in any direction, to create the line. The angles formed by cross lines all rest on one point; so this point, which is no part of space, contains any number of angles up to four right angles. It is, then, a *locus* of force, from which linear motions may start at any angle; the angles, abstracted from the lines, can only mean the possible *nisus* or direction of the force about to issue forth. Thus even the mathematical point, if considered as any thing more than mere abstract position, must be the position or *locus* of force, and must be divested of inertia in order to be comprehensible. The question, then, comes to this: How many new forms of thought, besides space and time, do we require? Mr. Mansel proposes *personality* as the one supplementary form:

“Subordinate to the general law of time, to which all consciousness is subject, there are two inferior conditions, to which the two great divisions of consciousness are severally subject. Our knowledge of body is governed by the condition of *space*; our knowledge of mind by that of *personality*. I can conceive no qualities of body, save as having a definite local position; and I can conceive no qualities of mind, save as modes of a conscious self. . . . In the antithesis between the thinker and the object of his thought, between myself and that which is related to me, we find the type and the source of the universal contrast between the one and the many, the permanent and the changeable, the real and the apparent. That which I see, that which I hear, that which I think, that which I feel, changes and passes away with each moment of my varied existence. I, who see, and hear, and think, and feel, am the one continuous self, whose existence gives unity and connection to the whole. Personality comprises all we know of that which exists; relation to personality comprises all we know of that which seems to exist.”\*

Here Mr. Mansel asserts that the forms of personality are the forms or conditions of reality, or existence; but in a subsequent lecture he relaxes his grasp, and makes personality not the form of reality, substance, and unity, but only the form of morals:

\* Bampton Lectures, lect. iii. pp. 83, 87, third edit.



“In a former lecture I have enumerated three such conditions—Time, Space, and Personality. . . . From these are derived three corresponding systems of *necessary truths*, in the highest human sense of the term; the science of numbers being connected with the condition of time, that of magnitudes with space, and that of morals with personality.”\*

If Mr. Mansel had remained constant to the idea that personality is the form or condition of reality, he would have avoided criticising the idea of an infinite consciousness (the highest reality) by the Kantian categories of quality and limitation, which are not applicable to other than material phenomena, because they are derived from the forms of space and time, and not from the forms of personality. But he says: the first condition of consciousness is the distinction between one object and another; now such a distinction implies limitation, for the conscious subject is limited by the object of consciousness: hence neither can a consciousness, such as we can conceive it, be infinite, nor can we conceive a consciousness that is not limited; therefore an infinite consciousness is totally beyond the power of thought. This must be true if consciousness is any portion of space, or any interval of time; but need not be true on any other supposition. If consciousness is reduced to terms of space and time, of course, when so reduced, it is subject to the laws of space and time, and an infinite consciousness will inherit the difficulties of infinite space. Not so, however, if we criticise the idea by the categories derived from the forms of personality. If any portion of infinite space or time is appropriated to something finite, the infinite will be lessened by so much, and will be no longer infinite. But an infinite consciousness, estimated by the rules of space and time, would necessarily comprehend and be made up of every possible portion of consciousness; for if any portion of consciousness remains outside of it, it is no longer infinite. But to measure forms of consciousness, we should banish all idea of extension, and use only that of intensity. Infinite consciousness, or infinite power, is not the sum of all the portions or moments of partial finite consciousness, or of beings endowed with portions of force;† but it is an intensity of knowledge or power, which virtually comprehends all subordinate minds or forces only because it infinitely transcends them when taken altogether. This is

\* Bampton Lectures, lect. vii. p. 204.

† “The infinite cannot be conceived . . . after the analogy . . . of an intelligent being, possessing some one or more modes of consciousness in an infinite degree, but devoid of others.”—Mansel, lect. ii. p. 45. But the highest mode of consciousness does potentially include all the lower, as feeling includes living and being.

the peculiarity of *virtus* (intensity) as opposed to extension: "virtus superior virtutem includit inferiorem" in such a way, that "quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest et superior, et magis."\* If power is thought of as infinitely extended, it is in a measure identified with infinite space: now distinct spaces cannot lie in the bosom of infinite space without appropriating and subtracting some of its component parts, thereby rendering it less, and destroying its infinity. Thus, to fancy power infinitely extensive, renders the distinction between God and creatures impossible. But we can easily conceive a multitude of distinct beings, each endowed with finite powers, co-existing with a Power intensively infinite, the Creator and Upholder of all the inferior powers, able to do all they can do, and infinitely more. If a thousand men each possess an acre, the total is a thousand acres; if each knows exactly the same things in the same way, the total of knowledge is no more than if one knew them. If a man gives away things that come within the category of extension and number, less remains to him; if he imparts things that can only be measured by the category of personality, he does not diminish his stock. This we suppose is the meaning of the rule which Mr. Mansel declares to be impossible: "In contemplating God, transcend time."† But it is the rule of St. Augustine; of Eckart, who says, "Time and place are parts, and God is one; therefore, if our soul is to know God, it must know Him above time and place;" and of many others, quoted by Mr. Mansel in his note.‡ If Mr. Mansel forbids our transcending space as well as time, the world of philosophers is against him. "God," says St. Athanasius,§ "encloses all things, is enclosed by none; within all in power, without all in His proper nature." Again, "Man cannot be without place; but it does not follow that God is in place."|| So St. Clement:¶ "God is in substance far off, but most close in power." The common doctrine that God is every where present in substance, must not be made to confuse His substance with space or extension. He is present to all things by His power, which is His substance; He is not present as occupying their space, extending Himself with them, and subjecting Himself to the laws of space. St. Bernard says well,\*\* "He reaches from the worm to the angel, not by motion or *local diffusion*, but by His substantial and ever-present power." "Non enim," says St. Augustine,††

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\* Sum. 1, q. 8, art. 2.

† Sum. 1, q. 3, art. 1 ad 1, and q. 42, art. 1 ad 1. Hence St. Augustine addresses God, "Magnus es sine quantitate, et ideo immensus,"—"Thy greatness has nothing to do with extension or quantity, and is *therefore* infinite" (Meditat. c. xxix.).

The relation of things to each other in space is position ; in time, succession ; and in force, causation, or action and reaction.

Further, as the objects of sensation are judged not to be mere empty appearances, but substances and forces, and by their order, skill, beauty, and use, to be manifestations of reason, design, and intention ; while, on the other hand, the senses, our sole windows of external experience, cannot report any thing about substance, force, reason, or intention,—it is clear that these ideas come from within, not from without ; belong, not to the matter, but to the form of our thoughts ; and are given, not by our perceptive organs receiving the emanations of external objects, but by the formative forces of the mind. Hence there is even more reason to call force, understanding, and will, *forms* of the faculties, than to give that name to space and time.

Like space and time, force, understanding, and will are no empirical conceptions derived from external appearances, but are necessary representations *à priori*, that lie at the foundation of all judgments. They are not constructed ideas, that can be exhausted by analysis, but an ever-renewed source of vitality for the ideas we construct. Hence I need not apprehend myself as a distinct activity, a personal force, mind, and will, before I can form such an idea as causation. In that case, as Mr. Mill objects, we must have an *à-priori* necessary knowledge of our personal activity : but the fact is, that we perceive external things before we perceive ourselves ; we apprehend them as substances before we advert to the fact that we are persons. The personal forms are the mechanism of our minds, that begins to work as spontaneously as the stomach. Force, understanding, and will, are preformations of mind, conditions of our faculties, the consciousness of which is no more a necessary preliminary to thought, than the consciousness of time and space is a necessary preliminary to the perception of extended phenomena. It is only by subsequent analysis of the formed thought that we learn its constituent elements.

Force is not a mere conception of the relationship of things, otherwise it would not exist as a form previously to the sensation of objects ; but it does so exist, and the first perception we have of motion is as necessarily referred to the category of force, as the first seen extended phenomenon is referred to the form of space. So with understanding and will.

Space is represented as an infinite extension ; force, knowledge, and will, as infinite intensions. But the infinity attri-



buted to space is only a deduction from the infinity previously attributed to force. It is only by exploration, as Aristotle says, that we know space, or its infinity; we cannot explore without ideal motion, which is ideal force; we only recognise the necessity of considering space as an infinite quantity by discovering the impossibility of limiting motion. Assume a limit to space,—assume that with our ideal motion we have arrived there; yet the possibility of motion is not exhausted; we may go beyond: but, on the assumption, there is no space beyond; force, in that case, will create space, and space is infinite because the possibility of motion or force is infinite. And of these two ideas—infinite space and infinite force—the former must be the derivative idea, because it is the one which involves self-contradiction, and is strictly impossible and unintelligible. It is an infinite and eternal nonentity, a necessary unity made up of parts. It must be either complete or incomplete: if incomplete, it does not all exist, and therefore is not infinite; if complete, it must have shape, and must be limited by lines and surfaces; and as space is the possible receptacle of body, all space may be filled by one whole body. But with an infinite whole, motion is impossible—either linear, for it already fills all space; or circular, because any arc, however small its angle, would be infinite, and a point would require an infinite time to move through it. Or all space may be filled with a number of bodies; but no finite number could fill infinite space; and infinite number is impossible, because all number is measurable by unity. Therefore, as St. Thomas concludes,\* infinite magnitude can only be *in potentia*; it can only be a possibility of infinite action, verge and scope for infinite motion. Both he and Aristotle conclude that an infinite whole magnitude taken at once is impossible; that it is only conceivable by successive additions; *quia post quamlibet multitudinem potest sumi alia multitudo in infinitum*. It is only possible by perpetual genesis of the new, and oblivion of the old. But, on the other hand, the idea of infinite force involves no contradiction, because there may well be a force infinite *intensivè*, and yet numerically distinct from all incomplete or subordinate forces *extensivè*: potentially including them, because they subsist only through it, and at its mercy, and because it can do all they can do, and infinitely more; actually excluding them, because infinite intensity is given as a unity, as a degree one and indivisible, not made up of a number of lesser moments, but only virtually equivalent to them all even when multiplied by infinity. So the necessity of thinking space to be an infinite quantity only arises from

\* Sum. i. q. 7, art. 3.

the prior necessity of affirming the possibility of infinite motion, which is equivalent to the reality of infinite *posse*. When we have come to the supposed limits of the universe, it is possible to go further, not because there is already space beyond,—for this our thought has not yet conceived,—but because we cannot set a limit to force. Hence motion creates space, instead of space being the condition of motion. Space and force are simultaneous in thought, as matter and form; but in logical order space is after force. Similarly, the necessity of affirming the eternity of time only proves the prior necessity of affirming the possibility of eternal thought. Assume any limit for time; yet beyond that limit duration can be ideally counted on and on for ever: thus, while we are yet unconvinced of the infinity of time, we assume the necessary eternity of a numbering power, and we come to Aristotle's conclusion, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον, ψυχῆς μὴ οὔσης,\* “time is impossible without mind.” The conception of an infinite succession in time is a process of thought in which the boundary is thrust back for ever and ever, that is, it requires an eternal thought.† Kant's derivation of causation from the necessary properties of time only shows that he had tacitly assumed the perdurability of force to be a condition of temporal succession; change of time is represented as change of state. But one state cannot end without another succeeding; in other words, when we try to think of the cessation of time, we are obliged to admit the persistence of a force which must give rise to new conditions of time. Our notion of infinity, whether in time or space, arises not from the necessity of affirming the existence of something beyond any assumed limits, but from the necessity of thinking a power or possibility to transcend the limits given in space, and a knowledge that can transcend those assumed for time. Power and knowledge, not space and time, are the first and real infinities.

Again, like space and time, the ideas of force, knowledge, and will, are not conceptions, but intuitions. Conceptions once formed are finished, and can only be analysed; they cannot of themselves lead to further knowledge, for we know at once all that is in them. But intuitions grow upon us as we examine them, and are always leading to new results; beyond the imagined limit more comes into view; what was just now the horizon, becomes a stand-point commanding new horizons. Thus the idea of force not only generates and demonstrates the infinity of space, but it also underlies the idea of cause, and suggests the axioms of mechanics. Force, then, is an ac-

\* Aristotle, *Physics*, lib. iv. c. xiv.

† See Mansel, *lect. iii.* p. 80, and note 11, p. 334.



tive principle, a condition of our perception, and a form and framework of our thought.

We have now given a list of the forms of the mind to which the interior, *à-priori*, or necessary and universal propositions are to be referred. Besides space and time, the passive forms, there are force, knowing power, and will—*posse, scire, velle*—the active forms. To show that these forms are exhaustive, that *all* necessary propositions are ruled by them, and that they habitually modify the empirical receptivity of the mind, must be reserved for a future occasion.

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## Communicated Articles.

### THE ANCIENT SAINTS.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM—THE SEPARATION.

JOHN of Antioch, from his sanctity and his eloquence called St. Chrysostom, was approaching sixty years of age, when he had to deliver himself up to the imperial officers, and to leave Constantinople for a distant exile. He had been the great preacher of the day now for nearly twenty years; first at Antioch, then in the metropolis of the East; and his gift of speech, as in the instance of the two great classical orators before him, was to be his ruin. He had made an Empress his enemy, more powerful than Antipater; as passionate, if not so vindictive, as Fulvia. Nor was this all; a zealous Christian preacher offends not individuals merely, but classes of men, and much more so when he is pastor and ruler too, and has to punish as well as to denounce. Eudoxia, the Empress, might be taken off suddenly, as indeed she was taken off a few weeks after the saint's arrival at the place of exile, which she personally, in spite of his entreaties, had marked out for him; but her death did but serve to increase the violence of the persecution directed against him. She had done her part in it, perhaps she might have even changed her mind in his favour; probably the agitation of a bad conscience was, in her delicate condition, the cause of her death. She was taken out of the way; and her partisans, who had made use of her, went on vigorously with the evil work which she had begun. When Cucusus would not kill him, they sent him on his travels

anew, across a far wilder country than he had already traversed, to a remote town on the eastern coast of the Euxine; and he sank under this fresh trial.

The Euxine! that strange mysterious sea, which typifies the abyss of outer darkness, as the blue Mediterranean basks under the smile of heaven in the centre of civilisation and religion. The awful, yet splendid drama of man's history has mainly been carried on upon the Mediterranean shores; while the Black Sea has ever been on the very outskirts of the habitable world, and the scene of wild unnatural portents; with legends of Prometheus on the savage Caucasus, of Medea gathering witch-herbs in the moist meadows of the Phasis, and of Iphigenia sacrificing the shipwrecked stranger in Taurica; and then again, with the more historical, yet not more grateful visions of barbarous tribes, Goths, Huns, Scythians, Tartars, flitting over the steppes and wastes which encircle its inhospitable waters. To be driven from the bright cities and sunny clime of Italy or Greece to such a region, was worse than death; and the luxurious Roman actually preferred death to a life of exile. The suicide of Gallus, under this dread doom, is well known; Ovid, too cowardly to be desperate, drained out the dregs of a vicious life on the cold marshes between the Danube and the sea. I need scarcely allude to the heroic Popes who patiently lived on in the Crimea, till a martyrdom, in which they had no part but the suffering, released them.

But banishment was an immense evil in itself. Cicero, even though he had liberty of person, the choice of a home, and the prospect of a return, roamed disconsolate through the cities of Greece, because he was debarred access to the senate-house and forum. Chrysostom had his own *rostra*, his own *curia*; it was the Holy Temple, where his eloquence gained for him victories not less real, and more momentous, than the detection and overthrow of Catiline. Great as was his gift of oratory, it was not by the fertility of his imagination or the splendour of his diction that he gained the surname of "Mouth of Gold." We shall be very wrong, if we suppose that fine expressions, or rounded periods, or figures of speech, were the credentials by which he claimed to be the first doctor of the East. His oratorical power was but the instrument, by which he readily, gracefully, adequately expressed,—expressed without effort and with felicity,—the keen feelings, the living ideas, the earnest practical lessons which he had to communicate to his hearers. He spoke, because his heart, his head, were brimful of things to speak about. His elocution corresponded to that strength and flexibility of limb, that quickness of eye, hand, and foot, by which a man excels in



manly games or in mechanical skill. It would be a great mistake, in speaking of it, to ask whether it was Attic or Asiatic, terse or flowing, when its distinctive praise was that it was natural. His unrivalled charm, as that of every really eloquent man, lies in his singleness of purpose, his fixed grasp of his aim, his noble earnestness.

A bright, cheerful, gentle soul; a sensitive heart, a temperament open to emotion and impulse; and all this elevated, refined, transformed by the touch of heaven,—such was St. John Chrysostom; winning followers, riveting affections, by his sweetness, frankness, and neglect of self. In his labours, in his preaching, he thought of others only. “I am always in admiration of that thrice-blessed man,” says an able critic,\* “because he ever in all his writings puts before him as his object, to be useful to his hearers; and as to all other matters, he either simply put them aside, or took the least possible notice of them. Nay, as to his seeming ignorant of some portions of the meaning of Scripture, or careless of entering into its depths, and similar defects, all this he utterly disregarded in comparison of the advantage of his hearers.”

There was as little affectation of sanctity in his dress or living, as there was effort in his eloquence. In his youth he had been one of the most austere of men; at the age of twenty-one, renouncing bright prospects of the world, he had devoted himself to prayer and study of the Scriptures. He had retired to the mountains near Antioch, his native place, and had lived among the monks. This had been his home for six years, and he had chosen it in order to subdue the daintiness of his natural appetite. “Lately,” he wrote to a friend at the time,—“lately, when I had made up my mind to leave the city and betake myself to the tabernacle of the monks, I was for ever inquiring and busying myself how I was to get a supply of provisions; whether it would be possible to procure fresh bread for my eating, whether I should be ordered to use the same oil for my lamp and for my food, to undergo the hardship of peas and beans, or of severe toil, such as digging, carrying wood or water, and the like; in a word, I made much account of bodily comfort.”† Such was the nervous anxiety and fidget of mind with which he had begun: but this rough discipline soon effected its object, and at length, even by preference, he took upon him mortifications which at first were a trouble to him. For the last two years of his monastic exercise, he lived by himself in a cave; he slept, when he did sleep, without lying down; he exposed himself to the extremities of cold. At length he found he

\* Photius, p. 387.

† Ad Demetrium, i. 6.

was passing the bounds of discretion, nature would bear no more; he fell ill, and returned to the city.

A course of ascetic practice such as this would leave its spiritual effects upon him for life. It sank deep into him, though the surface might not show it. His duty at Constantinople was to mix with the world; and he lived as others, except as regards such restraints as his sacred office and station demanded of him. He wore shoes, and an under garment; but his stomach was ever delicate, and at meals he was obliged to have his own dish, such as it was, to himself. However, he mixed freely with all ranks of men; and he made friends, affectionate friends, of young and old, men and women, rich and poor, by condescending to all of every degree. How he was loved at Antioch, is shown by the expedient used to transfer him thence to Constantinople. Asterius, count of the East, had orders to send for him, and ask his company to a church without the city. Having got him into his carriage, he drove off with him to the first station on the high-road to Constantinople, where imperial officers were in readiness to convey him thither. Thus he was brought upon the scene of those trials which have given him a name in history, and a place in the catalogue of the saints. At the imperial city he was as much followed, if not as popular, as at Antioch. "The people flocked to him," says Sozomen, "as often as he preached; some of them to hear what would profit them, others to make trial of him. He carried them away, one and all, and persuaded them to think as he did about the Divine Nature. They hung upon his words, and could not have enough of them; so that, when they thrust and jammed themselves together in an alarming way, every one making an effort to get nearer to him, and to hear him more perfectly, he took his seat in the midst of them, and taught from the pulpit of the Reader."\* He was, indeed, a man to make both friends and enemies; to inspire affection, and to kindle resentment; but his friends loved him with a love "stronger" than "death," and more burning than "hell;" and it was well to be so hated, if he was so beloved.

Here he differs, as far as I can judge, from his brother saints and doctors of the Greek Church, St. Basil and St. Gregory Nazianzen. They were scholars, shy perhaps and reserved; and though they had not given up the secular state, they were essentially monks. There is no evidence, that I remember, to show that they attached men to their persons. They, as well as John, had a multitude of enemies; and were regarded, the one with dislike, the other perhaps with con-

\* Hist. viii. 5.



tempt; but they had not, on the other hand, warm, eager, sympathetic, indignant, agonised friends. There is another characteristic in Chrysostom, which perhaps gained for him this great blessing. He had, as it would seem, a vigour, elasticity, and, what may be called, sunniness of mind, all his own. He was ever sanguine, seldom sad. Basil had a life-long malady, involving continual gnawing pain and a weight of physical dejection. He bore his burden well and gracefully, like the great saint he was, as Job bore his; but it was a burden like Job's. He was a calm, mild, autumnal day; St. John Chrysostom was a day in spring-time, bright and rainy, and glittering through its rain. He, as well as Basil, was bowed with infirmities of body; he was often ill; he was thin and wizened; cold was a misery to him; heat affected his head; he scarcely dare touch wine: he was obliged to use the bath; obliged to take exercise, or rather to be continually on the move. Whether from a nervous or febrile complexion, he was warm in temper; or at least, at certain times, his emotion struggled hard with his reason. But he had that noble spirit which complains as little as possible; which makes the best of things; which soon recovers its equanimity, and hopes on in circumstances when others sink down in despair.

Every one has his own gifts. I often muse upon, I have sometimes quoted, St. Athanasius's words about St. Antony; how the young ascetic went first to this holy man, and then to that, according as each was qualified to teach him; "marking down in his own thoughts the special attainment of each; his refinement, or his continuance in prayer, or his meekness, or his kindness, or his power of long-watching, or his studiousness." And thus there was in Basil tenderness, gravity, self-possession, resignation, penance; in Gregory, innocence, amiableness, an inward peace, a self-resource, an independence of external things; and all these graces in both saints grafted upon Christian perfection, and raised to an heroic standard. The Giver of all good suits His gifts to the circumstances of the recipient. John, in like manner, was endowed with those which John required.

But now all these fragrant and beautiful flowers of grace are to be placed where, to all seeming, they will "waste their sweetness on the desert air," and then wither away, as far as this earth is concerned. The eloquent voice is to be mute: Chrysostom has preached his last sermon; for the last time crowds of devoted followers—holy bishops, zealous priests, youths whom he is training to virtue, noble ladies who have become deaconesses of the Church,—for the last time the court,

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the populace, his faithful poor, have lingered on the sound of his touching accents. They shall never hear him again. The silver cord is to be broken; the golden fillet is to shrink; he is vanishing from the eyes of men. It was just at the summer solstice, in the year 404, that the order came to him from the emperor to go. He had resisted a like order already; but now the state of things was so near upon a bloody quarrel, that it seemed expedient to obey. He went into his church for the last time; to take leave, as he said, of the angel who had the charge of it. Then he bade farewell to some ecclesiastics, his intimate friends: "I am going to take some rest," he said, so calling his exile; "but do you remain here." And then, lastly, he took leave in the baptistery of some heart-broken pious women, to whom he spoke with greater sadness and effusion of heart. "O my daughters," he said, "come and hear what I have to say; my matters have an end, as I see well. I have finished my course; it may be, you will not see my face again. But one thing I ask of you, continue your services to the church; and, if there be one put into my place against his will, and without his seeking, and with the consent of all, him obey as if he were John; for a church cannot be without a Bishop: so shall ye find mercy. And remember me in your prayers."\* Then, ordering the beast he rode to the western gate of the ecclesiastical buildings, to mislead his people, who were keeping guard over his person, he issued by the eastern, and, with a protest, surrendered himself to the imperial guard. He was at once put into a boat, and carried over into Asia. Oh, how down was his heart, and what sorrowful thoughts chased one another across it; and how his life seemed to him a dream, and his long labours to have done nothing at all, and to be lost, as he landed on the opposite coast, and was conducted up the country to Nicæa, there to stay awhile, till his place of banishment was finally determined!

His sadness, however, was of no long duration; "weeping may take place in the evening, but in the morning gladness." The change of air and scene, the quiet, and above all, his own cheerful spirit, came to his aid; and he began to hope again. Men of gentle and generous tempers cannot understand how any one can be a good hater; and certainly our saint did not realise the inveterate malice and the savage determination of his enemies. He might forgive them; they could not forgive him. This, however, was not as yet a matter of experience with him; accordingly he began to speculate on the possibility of the emperor's relenting, and changing his place of

\* Pallad. p. 35, &c.



exile to some neighbouring city. He was soon undeceived in his anticipation. He was to prepare for a long journey. Scythia was mentioned as his destination; then Sebaste in Pontus; at length, Cucusus. It was his custom in all his afflictions, as we shall see in his letters, to use the words "Glory to God" upon every event; and he now soon reconciled himself to his disappointment. He had to remain at Nicæa about a fortnight, and during that delay wrote various letters to Constantinople, some of which have been preserved.

One of his most devoted of friends, and zealous of correspondents, was St. Olympias. This celebrated lady was the daughter of Count Seleucus, and the grand-child of Ablavius, the powerful minister in the reign of Constantine. She had been left an orphan and a pagan; and she did not change her single state for marriage before she had relieved her worse desolateness by entering into the family of Saints and Angels. In St. Chrysostom's words, she "deserted to Christian truth from the ranks of an impious family." Her husband, who was Prefect of Constantinople, died not many months after the marriage; on which, in spite of her great friends, she became a deaconess of the Church. At this time she was between thirty and forty years of age. The exiled Bishop wrote to her from Nicæa as follows:

*"To Olympias.*

My consolation increases with my trial. I am sanguine about the future. Every thing is going on prosperously, and I am sailing with a fair wind. There are, indeed, hidden rocks; there are tempests, the night is moonless, the darkness thick, and crags and cliffs are before me; yet, though I am navigating a sea like this, still I am not at all in worse case than many a man who is tossing about in harbour. Reflect on this, my religious lady, and rise above these alarms and troubles; and please to tell me about your own health: for myself, I am in health and in spirits. I find myself stronger than I was; I breathe a pure air; the soldiers of the prefecture, who are to accompany me, are so attentive as to leave me no need even of domestics, for they take on themselves domestic duties. They actually volunteered this charge of me for love of me; and wherever I go I have a body-guard, each of them thinking himself happy in such a ministry. I have one drawback; my anxiety for your health. Inform me on this point" (*Ep.* 11).

He writes to her again a few days later:

*"To Olympias.*

Have no fear about this either, I mean my journey; as I have already written you word, I am improved in health and strength. The climate has agreed with me; and my conductors have shown

every wish, and done all in their power—more, indeed, than I desired myself—to make me comfortable. I have written this when on the point of starting from Nicæa, the 3d of July. Give me some account from time to time of your own health; and also tell me that the cloud of despondency has passed away from you. If I were assured of this from yourself, I should write more frequently to you, under a feeling that my letters might be of service; but, so it is, many persons have crossed to this place who might have brought me a letter from you, and it has been a great sorrow that I have received nothing” (*Ep.* 10).

Perhaps he exaggerated his own hopefulness, in order to increase hers. He describes his state of feeling more exactly, and reveals more fully what occupied his thoughts, in a letter of about the same date to Constantius, a priest of Antioch, and intimate friend, who had taken a forward part together with the saint in extending Christianity to Phœnicia. This, as so many of his other letters, shows us how little his personal troubles had damped his evangelical zeal or his pastoral solicitude.

“ *To Constantius.*

I am to set off on July 4 from Nicæa. I send you this letter to urge you, as I never cease to urge, though the storm increase in fury and the waves mount higher, not to fail to do your part in the matter which you originally undertook,—I mean the destruction of the Greek worship, the erection of churches, and the cure of souls; and not to let the difficulties of things throw you upon your back. For myself, if I do not take my share of the work, but am remiss, I shall not be able to excuse myself by my present trouble; for Paul in prison and in the stocks fulfilled the office which fell to him, and Jonas inside the monster, and the Three Children in the midst of the furnace. You, then, my lord, remembering this, do not give over your duties towards Phœnicia, Arabia, and the churches of the East, knowing that your reward will only be the greater if, amid so great hindrances, you contribute towards the work.

And do not be backward in writing to me from time to time, nay, very frequently; for I now know that I am sent, not to Sebaste, but to Cucusus, whither it will be easier for you to get letters to me. Write me word how many churches are built every year, and what holy men have passed into Phœnicia, and what progress they have made. As to Salamis in Cyprus, which is beset by the Marcionite heretics, I should have treated with the proper persons, and set every thing right, but for my banishment. Urge those especially who have familiar speech with God, to use much prayer with much perseverance, for the stilling of the tempest which is at present wrecking the whole world” (*Ep.* 221).

Thus he set off into exile. He could not fully realise what was coming upon him; nor was the prospect of things so



threatening as to suggest grave apprehension. Cucusus, his destination, was not so bad as Sebaste, much better than Scythia. It was on the high military way into Mesopotamia ; it was a place at which two lines of road met from Asia Minor and Armenia, not to say a third from Issus on the Mediterranean. After the junction, the above roads passed on, as it would seem, to Melitene on the Euphrates, which afterwards, if not then, was a principal emporium in the commercial intercourse between Europe and Asia. Moreover it was the seat of a bishopric ; and, what was of more consequence, was in the neighbourhood, and within easy reach, of his friends at Antioch. That city lay about 120 miles due south of Cucusus : those who visited him would pass by the high road through the Amanus or Black Mountain to Pagræ, and then, crossing or skirting round the Bay of Issus, to the mouth of the Pyramus, would ascend the valley of that river till they came to Cucusus. Nor was the journey thither from Nicæa at first sight formidable, except that the season was against him. It lay all the way along the great high-road of the Empire, passing from Nicæa to Dadastana or to Dorylæum ; thence to Ancyra, the capital of Galatia ; then, turning to the south-east, down to Cæsarea, the capital of Cappadocia ; then to Comana, the chief city in Cataonia ; and thence, over the Taurus, to Cucusus, which was the first town out of Asia Minor, opening upon the valley of the Euphrates.

And, as he would have to pass along a noble road, so would he pass through rich towns in a fertile country. Ancyra was finely situated in the middle of an extensive plain, which, even under the Turkish yoke, is described by Tournefort as beautiful, well watered, and in parts well cultivated. Cæsarea, in the century before St. Chrysostom, had counted 400,000 inhabitants. Comana was placed in the richest of valleys, to which the Turks have given the name of Bostan, or the Garden. Nor was the journey less adapted for spiritual than for mental refreshment. It lay through Cæsarea, the see and tomb of St. Basil ; and through Nyssa, the like home in life and death of St. Gregory his brother. Nazianzus lay to the right. The country of Cappadocia and Pontus was classical to an oriental Christian, for the great saints who had adorned it. Meanwhile he was gaining strength in Nicæa, a magnificent city magnificently placed ; and, moreover, as full of religious inspirations as any city in the East. There it was that the Great Council had been held eighty years before, in which Arianism had been condemned, and the faith of the Apostles solemnly proclaimed, for the edification of all faithful souls in the many years of turbulence and temptation which were to follow.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE JOURNEY.

I LEFT St. John Chrysostom turning his face eastward, and leaving the shores of the Propontis for his distant exile. He had been banished on the pretence of his resumption of the episcopal functions before the legitimate reversal of a synodical decree, which had condemned and deposed him; and such an offence, by a recent imperial law, was punished by banishment to a distance at least of a hundred miles. In consequence, he might have been simply told to vanish from Constantinople, and make his way to the prescribed limit as best he could; but a definite place having been assigned to him, Cucusus, on the eastern slope of the Taurus, it was necessary, and even considerate, to send guides and protectors with him. Two soldiers seem to have been named by the Prefect for this purpose; and, as we have seen, he speaks well of them. They might have been better, perhaps; but they certainly might have been worse. He might have suffered ill-treatment at their hands, as he did from his guards on his second journey; and without their aid and countenance it is probable he never would have reached his destination. They had their share, of course, in many of the hardships to which he was exposed, yet they seem to have borne their share with temper, if not with spirit; and the saint appears to have liked them at the end of his expedition as well as at the beginning. This was no slight merit in them or in him; for many a time it happens, as all must know who have experience of travelling, that the persons we fall in with in what may be called an official capacity, or the acquaintance we make, are much more amiable and satisfactory at first, and can more easily be got on with, than when our relations have continued with them through a certain space of time. Such persons often do not excite pleasant memories in the retrospect. It is worth recording, then, that, writing back, some time after his arrival at Cucusus, to a friend at Constantinople, the saint speaks of one of them as "my honoured lord Theodorus, of the prefecture, who took me to Cucusus;" and he implies that he had talked confidently with him.

He must have left the beautiful Nicæa with regret, except as rejoicing to suffer in the cause of religion. Rich in marble edifices and works which were carried even into the Ascanian lake, it lay on an eminence in the midst of a well-wooded, flower-embellished country, with the clear bright waters at its foot, and successive tiers of mountains behind,



which terminated in the snow-capped Olympus. He took a last look of the last fair place which he was to see on earth; and as he passed out by the south-eastern gate to begin a pilgrimage which was to end in the gate of heaven, the scene at once changed. He entered a valley which, as travellers tell us, rose and fell again through a succession of wild crags and distant peaks, till at length he reached a cultivated track, and then a forest region. Let him enjoy it while it lasts, for signs of volcanic action are multiplying on every side of him; and even though he travels in the evening or at night, the bare lava and limestone rock, like some vast oven, retain the intolerable heat of the July day. Nor is the traveller's prospect much better when he has reached the high table-land of the Asian peninsula, nearly 2000 feet above the level of the sea, which stretches for hundreds of miles in every direction. Fertile as this vast plateau may be, and verdant and well watered, at an earlier season, it presents from June to the end of October an arid and scorched surface; and on it lies the road of St. Chrysostom for months, till he comes to the spurs of the Taurus, on the further side of Cæsarea. Perhaps on the third or fourth night after starting he rested at Dorylæum.

Well had it been for him if the emperor, or any of his great officers, had allowed him the use of the *cursus publicus*, or government conveyance. It would have carried him on with fair speed, and without expense of his own. This privilege, indeed, could hardly have been expected by one who was in the place of a criminal; yet the same sanguine spirit which led him to hope for a sojourn at Cyzicus or Nicomedia, might, when a distant exile was decreed, have contemplated such an alleviation. He had had trial of that "public course" at an earlier date, on the only real journey which he had ever made in his life,—and, ah, under what opposite circumstances!—on that memorable occasion when an imperial summons impetuously hurried him away from his dear Antioch. The splendid circumstances of that journey seem to have impressed themselves on his imagination; and in one of his works, speaking of the merit of Abraham's pilgrimage from Mesopotamia to Palestine, he contrasts with it the facility with which travelling was performed along the military lines of road in his own day. "The distance," he says, "between place and place is what it was; but the condition of the roads is very different. For now the line passes through stations placed at intervals, and through cities and farms, and is crowded with wayfarers, who avail for the security of travel not less than farms, towns, and stations. Moreover,

by order of the city magistrates, a provincial police is raised, —picked men, as well skilled in the javelin and sling as bowmen are adepts in the arrow, and the heavy-armed in the lance,—with commanders over them, and that for the express purpose of protecting the roads. Further still, as an additional security, buildings are placed a mile from each other, as guard-houses; this watch and ward being the most complete defence against the attacks of plunderers. In the time of Abraham there were none of these.”\* And so he proceeds, rejoicing, as it were, in his picture of a state of convenience and security, which the Roman empire alone could boast, but which in the event was to be so strikingly reversed in every particular in the melancholy journey which was to close his labours.

Left, then, to himself to find his own conveyance, he chose the *basterna*, which answered pretty nearly to the Sicilian *lettiga*, being a sort of car or palanquin carried between two mules, one before and one behind. Such, at least, was his style of carriage at a later part of his journey; and he would advance by means of it at the rate of from three to four miles an hour. The distance between Dorylæum and Ancyra he may be supposed to have accomplished within eight days; at least such is the time which a caravan employs upon it. If Tournefort’s account is to be taken, the route has few attractions, even at a better season. He speaks of a beautiful plain, of villages, streams, gentle undulations of surface, and a marked absence of wood. It was the ancient Phrygia, and celebrated as a corn country. Mount Dindymus, famous for the fanatical worship of Cybele, rose on his left, an outpost, apparently, of the north Olympic range. At length the temples and public buildings of Ancyra, nobly situated on an elevated terrace, greeted his weary eyes in the distant horizon.

So far his course seems to have been prosperous; nothing, at least, is recorded to the contrary. He would travel at his own hours, and at his own pace; with rumours, indeed, of the evils which were coming upon him, but probably with no foretaste of them. The villages, however, of Phrygia had within a few years been devastated by the insurgent Goth Tribigildus, and this might affect the convenience of his lodging and his halts; and at all times the inns would be a great difficulty to any respectable traveller, not to say a saintly Bishop. They were of the lowest description, and contained the worst of company; and it was usual for those who had

\* Ad Stag. ii. 6.



good connections to avail themselves of the country houses of their friends, as, indeed, St. Chrysostom did in the sequel.

When he got to Ancyra his troubles began; we have but a confused account of them. Leontius, Bishop of that city, was one of the very foremost of his enemies, and in some way or other nearly brought about his death. The Isaurians, too, had just descended from their mountain-holds, and spread themselves over the country. The interior of Asia Minor was a scene of disorder: the country people were flying, the cities fortifying themselves, the road-stations deserted, the guards gone. On leaving Ancyra, our traveller had to make for Cæsarea as quickly as he could, in order to avoid the danger of falling into the enemy's hands. He travelled night and day; from fatigue and anxiety he fell ill; a tertian fever seized on him; wholesome food and water could not be obtained; with much difficulty and in the greatest distress he accomplished the 200 miles between the two cities, and found himself in the metropolis of Cappadocia.

It is very observable that, in spite of the indescribable confusion of the populations through which he passed, Christian zeal and charity did not allow their personal sufferings to interfere with the homage and interest due to the presence of so illustrious a confessor. They poured out upon his line of road to greet him and condole with him. At this time, as I shall show presently in his own words, he was in extreme weakness and distress of body; but, as the poor people neglected their own temporal troubles, so did he his. It was a triumph of the supernatural on both sides. His suffering, too, so far from making him selfish, left him at liberty to write. The following letter to Olympias, written as he was approaching Cæsarea, is striking for the sympathy which it breathes both for her and for the generous people he writes about:

*“ To Olympias.*

When I see whole populations of men and women, in the highway, at the road-stations, and in the cities, pouring out to see me, and weeping at the sight, I am able to comprehend your grief at home. For if these people, who now see me for the first time, are thus broken with sorrow (so that they could not be comforted, but when I besought them, and exhorted, and admonished them, their hot tears did but stream the more), most certainly on you the storm is beating more violently still. But the greater also will be your reward, if you persevere under it with thanksgiving and with becoming fortitude, as you do. You know this well, my religious lady; therefore beware of surrendering yourself to the tyranny of sorrow. You can command yourself; the tempest is not beyond your skill. And send me a letter to tell me this; that, though I

live in a strange land, I may enjoy much cheerfulness from the assurance that you bear your trials with the understanding and wisdom which becomes you. I write this when not far from Cæsarea" (*Ep.* 9).

In a second letter, written apparently about the same time, he again complains of her silence, which seemed to him a token of excessive grief; and he adds, in like manner: "I see that not even my removal from Constantinople can release me from distress; for those who meet me on my journey, some from the east, some from Armenia, some from other parts, are drowned in tears at the sight of me, and follow me with piercing laments as I travel onwards" (*Ep.* 8). Not a word about his own sufferings.

He seems to have had a special fear of frightening Olympias, and takes care to write when he has good news to communicate, either about himself or about things around him. Accordingly, he selects the most favourable moment of his sojourn at Cæsarea to send her an account of his state and circumstances. This, too, I will submit to the reader, before addressing myself to those of a more painful character belonging to the very same days. It runs as follows:

*" To Olympias.*

Now that I have got rid of the ailment which I suffered on my journey, the remains of which I carried with me into Cæsarea, and am already restored to perfect health, I write to you from that place. I have had the advantage here of much careful treatment at the hands of the first and most celebrated physicians, who nevertheless did even more for me by their sympathy and soothing kindness than by their skill. One of them went so far as to promise to accompany me on my journey; so, indeed, did also many other persons of consideration. Now I am often writing to you of my own matters; and you, as I have already complained, are very remiss in that respect yourself. I can prove to you that it is your own neglect, and not the want of letter-carriers; for my honoured lord, the brother of Bishop Maximus of blessed memory, arrived here two days since, and, on my asking him if he brought me letters, he made answer that there was no one who had any to send by him, nay, that when he expressly applied to Tigrius the presbyter, the latter brought him none. I wish you would inflict this upon him, and upon that true and warm friend of mine, and on all the rest who are about Bishop Cyriacus. As to my changing my place of abode, do not trouble him or any one else about it. I accept their kindness: perhaps they wished, and could not effect it. Glory be to God for all things. I will never cease saying this, whatever befalls me. But suppose they could not effect it, still could they not at least write? Thank in my name my ladies, the sisters of my most honoured lord Bishop Pergamius, for the great trouble they have



taken about me. For yourself, write me word frequently how you are, and about my friends; but as for me, have no anxiety about me, for I am in health and in good spirits, and in the enjoyment of much repose up to this day" (*Ep.* 12).

It is the case with most people who leave home, even in this day, when the arrangements of the letter-post are so complete, that the friends whom they have left seem never to write to them, and they get impatient at the supposed neglect. St. John Chrysostom, who lived in his friends, and knew what persecution they were enduring, was especially open to this misconception during his journey; and he shows his sense of it much more openly in the following letter to Theodora, to whom he does not think it necessary to show the tender consideration which Olympias required. He writes to her, when at the worst, on his first arrival at Cæsarea, and takes no pains to hide a distress which he did hide from others, and which perhaps he found a relief in expressing :

*"To Theodora.*

I am done for; I am simply spent; I have died a thousand deaths. On this point the bearers of this will be the best informants, though they were with me only for a very short time. In truth, I was not in a state to converse with them ever so little, being prostrated by continual fever. In this condition I was forced to travel on night and day, stifled by the heat, worn out with sleeplessness, at death's door for want both of necessities and of persons to attend to me. I have suffered and suffer worse even than men who labour at the mines, or who are confined to prison. Hardly and at length I arrived at Cæsarea; and I find the place like a calm, like a port after a storm. Not that it set me up all at once, after the severe handling which preceded it; but still, now that I am at Cæsarea, I have recovered a little, since I drink clean water, bread that can be chewed, and is not offensive to the senses. Moreover I no longer wash myself in broken crockery, but have contrived some sort of bath; also I have got a bed, to which I can confine myself" (*Ep.* 120).

He goes on to bring out the feelings which are obscurely intimated in his letter to Olympias. For the moment he thought his friends unkind, because, rich and powerful as they were, they could do nothing towards securing him the cheap indulgence, which even convicts obtained, of some place of banishment more tolerable and nearer home, some place where there would be nothing to try so severely his bodily strength, or to inflict the terrors which he experienced from the Isaurians. However, he adds, "Even for this, glory be to God: I will not cease glorifying Him for all things; blessed

be His Name for ever." And then he goes on to complain of Theodora herself for not writing. "I am astonished at you," he says; "this is the fourth, if not the fifth, letter I have sent you; and you have sent me but one. It pains me much to think that you have so soon forgotten me."

Poor Theodora had doubtless been in continual prayers and tears, and could give her own account of her silence, as the others could also. Tigrius, for instance, whose silence he wonders at in his letter to Olympias, had been scourged and racked, in spite of his informant, and lay probably between life and death. His martyrdom is commemorated in the Martyrology on January 12. However, we are not concerned here with any confessors but St. John; so I go on to explain who the Isaurians were, and how it was that the fear of them made him travel night and day for two hundred miles at midsummer, when a fever lay upon him, and death seemed to threaten. The country through which his route lay was in fact the theatre of war, for the outbreak of the barbarians could be called nothing less; in the very month, almost in the very days, when he was passing through Cæsarea, a battle had taken place, perhaps in the neighbourhood, between the Romans and the insurgent forces; and I shall require a page or two to set before the reader how things came to be in this pass.

In truth, the Isaurians were not insurgents, unless that name can be given to a people who had never fairly been conquered. The passes of Mount Taurus had ever sheltered a wild independent people, whom the student of history naturally connects with those Cilician pirates who so audaciously insulted the Roman republic, and were at last punished and suppressed by Pompey. Even after the lapse of four centuries, however, the Isaurians had not given up their old craft; and we find them in the reign of Constantius seizing and plundering the vessels which passed along their coast. However, the direction of their rapacity was on the whole turned landwards after Pompey's time; and the whole continent, from the Ægean almost to Egypt, was kept in a state of unsettlement and insecurity down to the time of Justinian by the fitful devastations of these freebooters. After a time of nominal subjection to the Roman power, in the middle of the third century they placed themselves under the rule of Trebellian, one of the Thirty Tyrants, as they are called; proclaimed independence, coined money, and when Trebellian was killed in battle, worshipped him as a god. For a time they formed, together with Galatia, part of the empire of Zenobia. After her fall they returned, under various bold



and skilful leaders, to their raids and depredations; till the imperial government, despairing of carrying the war into their mountainous recesses with effect, contented themselves with surrounding them with a *cordon* of forts, while they kept a large force in the interior, and a stronghold on the coast to secure communication with the sea. In the reign of Probus they had extended themselves along Pamphylia and Lycia. Under Constantius, besides their piracy, which I have already noticed, they had overrun the plains of the interior towards Pontus. Under Valens, they cut to pieces a Roman force commanded by the Vicar of Asia, and were only stemmed in their onward course by the local militia. Within a dozen years after, they appear to have poured down again, if St. Basil speaks of them when he describes the country as being full of plunderers, and the roads unsafe from Cappadocia to Constantinople. If we may take the Canons in evidence, which are contained in one of the epistles of the same father, they forced their captives to renounce the faith and to take part in idolatrous rites. At another time their raid extended as far as the Euxine on the north, and as far east as Damascus.

One of their most formidable outbreaks was precisely at the time when Chrysostom was sent into the countries bordering on them; and it would greatly increase the guilt of his persecutors, if they knowingly exposed him to this additional misery. But the movements of barbarian mountaineers are ordinarily sudden, and the imperial court was probably as much taken by surprise by the Isaurians as by the contemporary irruption of the Huns. On this occasion they spread themselves along the coast from Caria to Phœnicia, so as even to threaten Jerusalem; and, what is more to our purpose to observe, they poured over the interior of the country till they found themselves in the neighbourhood of the river Kur and the Caspian. In spite of partial successes, two Roman generals failed before them; and this terrible scourge continued till the year after the saint's death. His years of exile were spent in the very scene, almost in the heart, of these horrors.

I have said, it was doubtless the neighbourhood of these freebooters which forced St. John Chrysostom to hurry over the ground between Ancyra and Cæsarea when he was so little able to bear it. He looked forward to Cæsarea as a harbour after the storm, as he says in his letter to Theodora; and at first he found it so; but troubles arose of another kind. The Bishop of Cæsarea, though pretending to be his friend, really wished to get rid of him. Chrysostom became a centre of attraction to all the religious feeling of the place,

and the prelate did not relish this; he did not like the saint's lingering in his own city; he determined to send him on his journey without delay, at all costs; and, when he could not do so peaceably, he did not scruple, as we shall see, at violent measures. He forgot somehow the text about receiving angels unawares, and the promise attached to those who welcome a prophet in the name of a prophet, and the just in the name of the just. I shall draw out the account of what took place chiefly in his own words, as contained in letters from him to Olympias after he had arrived at Cucusus, his destination. It will be recollected that in his last letter to her from Cæsarea he spoke of his health and good spirits and repose, his only trouble being that he had no news how she and his other friends were getting on at Constantinople. Now that he was safe at Cucusus we shall find him writing about his condition at that same date in far different terms.

*"To Olympias.*

Hardly at length do I breathe again, now that I have reached Cucusus, from which place I write to you; hardly at length am I in the use of my eyes after the phantoms and the various clouds of ill which beset me during my journey. Now then, since the pain is passed, I will give you an account of it; for while I was under it I was loth to do so, lest I should distress you too much. For near thirty days, or even more, I was wrestling with a most severe fever; and, during my long and severe journey, was beset besides with a most severe ailment of the stomach; and this when I was without physicians, baths, necessities, or relief of any kind, and in continual alarm about the Isaurians, besides having the ordinary anxieties of travel. However, all these troubles are at an end. On arriving at Cucusus I got rid of all my ailments, and all that appertained to them, and am now in the most perfect health" (*Ep.* 13).

After this introduction, and more of the same character, he resumes the subject in a second letter:

"When I got rid of our Galatian friend [the Bishop of Ancyra] (who, indeed, almost threatened me with death), and was on the point of entering Cappadocia, I met many persons on the road who said, 'My lord Pharetrius [Bishop of Cæsarea] is expecting to see you, and is going here and there in his fear of missing you; and is taking great pains to see and embrace you, and show you all love. He has even set in motion the monasteries and nunneries.' I, however, did not anticipate any thing of the kind; rather I formed just the contrary surmises in my own breast: however, I did not say a word to that effect to those who brought me the news.

At length, when I arrived at Cæsarea in a state of prostration, a mere cinder, in the fiercest flame of my fever, in the deepest depression, in extremities, I found a lodging in the outskirts of the



city ; and I did my best to get medical advice for the quenching of this furnace, for I entered the place almost a corpse. And then, to be sure, the whole clergy, the people, monks, nuns, physicians, at once came about me; I had an abundance of attention, all of them doing all in their power in the way of ministration and service. Even with all this care, I was altogether delirious in the burning heat, and lay in imminent danger. At length, by degrees, the malady gave way and retired. All this while Pharetrius was not to be found; he was but looking out for my departure, I cannot tell why" (*Ep.* 14).

Chrysostom had been eager to proceed, wishing to get his journey over, and to be at last at rest at Cucusus; and scarcely was he better when he thought of moving. Then came the news that the Isaurians were approaching, and made him hesitate.

"While I was in this state, suddenly the tidings came that the Isaurians are overrunning the neighbourhood of Cæsarea in great force; that they have burned a large village, inflicting every evil on the people. On receipt of the news, the city commander, with such soldiers as he had with him, went out to meet them; for they were even apprehensive of an attack on the city. Indeed, all persons were in a state of great alarm, in great excitement, their native soil being in jeopardy; so that even aged men took part in guarding the walls. Things were in this state when on a sudden, at the break of dawn, down comes a battalion of monks (I can use no better word to express their fury), beset the house where I was, and threaten to set fire to it, to burn it down, to do me all possible mischiefs, unless I took myself off; and neither did the danger from the Isaurians, nor my own serious state of body, no, nor any thing else, avail to disarm their violence."

Here I interpose a word of explanation. Nothing which has been hitherto said of the monastic bodies, would lead one to expect such a sudden movement as this. The monks, as we have seen, generally treated the saint with great consideration and reverence, as he passed in their neighbourhood. But at this time, it must be confessed, they were a very rude and excitable set of men, at least in certain places; they were not under the strict discipline which afterwards prevailed; and they were sometimes, as here, at the command of their Bishop, sometimes actuated by strong local or national feelings. Moreover there was a vast number of fanatical monks at that day, whom the Church did not recognise, and who were exposed to the influence of any wild calumnies or absurd tales which might be circulated to the prejudice of Chrysostom. However, be the explanation of this incident what it may, this monastic troop played

a chief part in worrying the saint out of Cæsarea. He continues :

“ Nor did any thing avail to calm their violence; but they urged their point with such an explosion of wrath as even to frighten my companions, the soldiers of the prefecture. For they threatened to beat even them; and they boasted that many were the Prefect's soldiers before now whom they had badly beaten. When my soldiers heard this, they came to me, and begged and prayed that, though they should in consequence fall into the hands of the Isaurians, I would rid them of these wild-beasts. The mayor of the city also heard what was going on, and he hastened to my house with the wish to assist me; but the monks would not listen to his entreaties, and he too was unsuccessful. Upon this, feeling the dilemma in which matters were, not daring to advise me either to go out of the city to certain death, or to remain within it exposed as I was to the fury of the monks, he sent to Pharetrius, entreating him to give me a few days' grace, both by reason of my illness, and of the danger which lay in my way. However, he was not able to obtain even this, for on the next day the monks came with still greater violence; and no one of the presbyters ventured to stand by me or succour me; but with shame and a blush on their faces (for they said they acted on the orders of Pharetrius), they shuffled away and kept out of sight, and refused to answer when I appealed to them. Why many words? Though such dangers threatened me, and death was almost in sight, and my fever was preying on me, I threw myself into my *lectica*, noontide as it was, and set off amid the wailings and laments of the whole people.”

However, he had one more chance: at this moment Seleucia, the wife of one of the principal persons of Cæsarea, sent to offer him the use of her suburban villa, at a distance of five miles from the city; a kindness which he joyfully accepted. This good lady, moreover, gave orders to her steward to gather together the labourers on her farms round about, if the monks showed any disposition to repeat their violence, and fairly to give them battle. Nay, she had a fortified building on her ground, where she wished to place him; where neither the monks nor the Bishop could reach him. However, the Bishop was too much both for her and St. Chrysostom. He terrified her by threats into submission to his will; and a priest, one of his creatures, was sent to the saint. The sequel shall be told in his own words:

“ At midnight Evethius, the presbyter, came into my room when I was asleep; he woke me, and cried out loudly, ‘Up, I pray you, the barbarians are coming; they are close at hand.’ Fancy what my perplexity was at these words. I said to him, ‘What is to be done? It is impossible to make for the city; for I should fare worse there than at the hands of the Isaurians.’ He began to urge



me to set off on my journey. There was no moon; it was midnight; it was dark, pitch dark: this, again, was a great perplexity. I had no one to aid me; they all had deserted me. However, compelled by the danger, and expecting instant death, I rose from my bed, overwhelmed with misery as I was, and ordered torches. Evethius insisted they should be put out again: he said, 'The barbarians will be attracted by the light, and will fall upon us;' so put out the torches were. The way was broken, steep, and stony. The mule, which was carrying my litter, fell; down came the litter, and I in it; and I had near been killed. I jumped out of it, and began to crawl along. Evethius dismounted, and got hold of me; and thus I was assisted or rather dragged forward; for I could not possibly walk on such difficult ground, amid formidable mountains, and in the middle of the night."

The saint's military friends do not play a specially brilliant part in this affair; and their conduct tempts one to think that his praise of them is rather owing to his cheerful forgiving spirit, sanguine before trouble, and buoyant after it, than to any merit of theirs. We may suppose they did not go to Seleucia's villa with him; if they did, it is strange he does not mention them in the last scene. After this we know nothing more of his adventures before he reached Cucusus, though he had still much heavy travelling over the mountains; he proceeds thus:

"Who can describe the other troubles which befell me on my journey—the alarms, the risks? I think of them every day, and always carry them about with me; and am transported with joy, and my heart leaps to think of the great treasure I have laid up. Do you rejoice also over it, and give glory to God, who has honoured me with these sufferings. But keep it all to yourself, and tell no one, though the soldiers are able to fill the city with their tales; especially as they were in extreme peril themselves.

However, let no one know these matters from you; and stop the mouths of those who talk about them. And if you are pained at this memorial of my hardships, know for certain that I am now clean rid of them all; and I am stronger in health than I was in Constantinople. Why are you anxious about the cold? My dwelling is most comfortably built, and my lord Dioscorus busies himself in every way that I may not have the very slightest feeling of the cold. If I may conjecture from the trial I have had of it, the climate seems to me quite oriental, just like that of Antioch; such is the temperature, such the character of the air. Nor need you fear the Isaurians from this time; they have returned to their country: the Prefect has left nothing undone to effect this. I am much safer here than I was at Caesarea. Henceforth I fear no one but the Bishops; a few of them excepted. How is it that you say, you have received no letters from me? I have sent you three; one by the

soldiers of the prefecture, one by Antony, one by your domestic Anatolius: they were long ones."

It is curious to see, that while he was complaining of the silence of his friends at home, they were complaining of his.\* But now we may fairly stop, having brought the great confessor, whose trials we are tracing, to his place of exile.

O.

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#### MILL ON LIBERTY.†

ANY book of Mr. Mill's which professes to lay down fixed principles, applicable to important questions of social and individual ethics, deserves to be as carefully studied by those who possess known landmarks and unalterable methods for the guidance of life and the discipline of the soul, as by those to whom all questions of the kind are still open. The Catholic faith places a man in the best position for forming a sound ethical code, and extending it to new cases and exigencies as they arise; but it does not itself explicitly include such a code. The leading rules and distinctions of ethics form no part of divine revelation: no one ever laid them down so clearly as Aristotle; and from him, in the middle ages, saints received them, to blend them into one harmonious whole with the truths of revelation. Even now all the work is not done to our hand, for the ethical philosophy of Catholics is not unprogressive; and therefore a work like the *Essay on Liberty*, though chiefly interesting to Protestants, concerns us also. A denial of this would go far to justify the imputations of mental torpor which are so freely made against us. Although ethical *principles* do not change, the *applications* of those principles may vary with changing circumstances and relations. The moral relation between a child and a father changes as the child grows to be fifteen. Slavery may be, under one set of circumstances, justifiable; or, under another set, abominable. So with liberty of thought and of action. It may be that, under the social conditions of former ages, a degree and kind of repression of error might advisably, because successfully, be employed; which under modern conditions would, if attempted, cause more evil than it would cure.

Perhaps there is no single moral question upon which a greater medley of opinions is afloat among Catholics than that of individual liberty. This by itself shows the disput-

\* Vide also Ep. 137.

† *On Liberty*. By John Stuart Mill. J. W. Parker and Son, 1859.



able nature of the whole subject; for upon articles of faith it is notorious that there is no such discordance. Yet the *data* possessed by a Catholic places him in a peculiarly favourable position for solving difficulties. But to recommend his views to others, he must neither spare the labour of thought nor shrink from the arena of discussion.

The occasion of Mr. Mill's Essay is to be found in the relation of the rationalist party in England to the prevailing state of opinion. As far as external indications go, rationalism in England is less influential, less progressive, than it was twenty years ago. In these last years, such wild outbursts of spiritual rebellion as the *Nemesis of Faith* no longer rise to startle the religious world from its propriety. Fifteen years back, the popular book on cosmogony and geology was the *Vestiges of the Natural History of the Creation*; now it is the *Testimony of the Rocks*. Among the Reviews of that school, some, like the *Prospective*, have vanished altogether; others, like the *Westminster*, contrive to exist, but with a stationary circulation, and less than the old pugnacity. The *Examiner* has dropped its racy diatribes upon Anglican Bishops, finding probably that they would not suit the soberer tastes of its present public. In 1834 the Church Establishment appeared to be tottering under the blows of a legion of enemies; in 1859 it seems to be as secure against a crash as the Bank; and yet, in spite of these appearances, it is certain that rationalism is not less, but probably more widely spread. The thinking, reasoning persons in a nation must always form a small minority; and when the mediocre majority are attached to orthodox opinions, or what they deem such, while the social fabric is steady and the social bond strong, the dissenting or rationalist opinions can only find favour among the thinking minority. Now in England it is probable that a considerably larger proportion of this small class belongs to the rationalist camp at the present day than twenty years ago. On the Continent, at least in France, the course of things I believe has been the reverse. Meantime the majority, little suspecting the true movement of the currents of thought, are so well pleased with themselves, and their national character and religion, that, with the usual insolence of ascendancy, they are gradually becoming more intolerant of marked divergence on either side from the popular standards. For the system of the Catholic is no less offensive in their eyes than that of the rationalist. Strange to say, English Protestantism is tending to a sort of unity, which may be described as a common national sentiment, strong enough to cause the special differ-

ences between sects to be felt as very small matters. In vain do a few hundred clergymen, and a few rural coteries, point to the language of the Liturgy, insist on the value of the old fringe which Martin still bears upon his coat, and utter solemn warnings against the sin of schism. In Mr. Carlyle's language, "the Puseyite logic runs off John Bull like water;" and he answers, in no gentle tone, "In spite of all your formularies, Protestant I am, and Protestant I will remain."

Against this disposition of the majority to encroach upon the freedom of thought and action of dissenting minorities, Mr. Mill, on the side of the rationalists, has skilfully chosen his ground. In some ways, the yoke of the dominant system is more oppressive to rationalists than to Catholics. We are, indeed, liable to be treated with unjust suspicion, to have our children proselytised, and to experience in the court of law and in the board-room the intolerance of the half-educated masses; but, at any rate, we are not now persecuted into conformity. But rationalists, having no external organisation, are left under the full pressure of the popular system in many things where it is most irksome. They may think that marriage should be a revocable contract; yet public opinion renders a marriage before a registrar ordinarily inadmissible. They may consider baptism an idle ceremony; yet few of them will brave social opinion so far as to deprive their children of it. Thus opinion exacts a conformity to the usages of the popular religion, which rationalists cannot but feel to be humiliating. In order to mitigate this rigour of opinion, Mr. Mill correctly judged that a direct attack upon the received system would not advance his object. But he took up the cry which the received system loudly utters, and prefixing the name of Liberty to his essay, he claimed for the thing its full application in the domain of law and of opinion.

In his introductory chapter, Mr. Mill traces the gradual development of the idea of human liberty. The first epoch of the struggle between liberty and authority is marked by the establishment of definite rights and immunities, wrung by the subjects from the governing few with the view of protecting themselves against abuses of power. Such was the law erecting the tribuneship of the commons at Rome; such the Magna Charta of our ancestors. A further step in the same direction consisted in the establishment of constitutional checks, mainly through the contrivance of a system of representation, and by committing to the representatives a control over the public expenditure. When power was so limited by checks that it ceased to be formidable, it was



perceived that antagonism between the governors and the governed was, after all, no necessity of nature; that when the idea of representation is completely carried out, the distinction would be obliterated by the people coming to be their own governors. Since, then, the powers of the government had come to emanate solely from the governed, the necessity for multiplying checks on its exercise seemed to be superseded; for why should the people require to be protected against itself? But experiments have made it evident that new dangers to liberty have emerged. "The 'people' who exercise the power, are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous, or the most active, *part* of the people." Hence arose a new species of tyranny, the 'tyranny of the majority'—as manifested either in the acts of the public authorities, or in the *social* intolerance habitual to a majority. "Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways; and to compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own." The object of the Essay, therefore, is, "to assert one very simple principle,—that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection." Our ideas of our neighbour's good may justify our remonstrating with, or counselling him; "but not our compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise."

In the second chapter Mr. Mill states four grounds on which he infers that it is necessary to the welfare of society to allow the liberty of thought and discussion in the fullest extent. First, the opinions prevailing in society may be false; but unless a free examination and public discussion of their grounds be permitted, they cannot be disproved. Secondly, the received opinion may be partly true, partly false; while the dissenting opinion, though also partly false, may contain the truth which is wanted to complete the popular half-truth. Thirdly, though the received opinion is wholly true, yet, unless it be vigorously attacked from time to time,

so as to elicit equal vigour in its defence, it may become a mere prejudice, a matter of habit, not of understanding. And lastly, the meaning of the received doctrine itself may be lost or enfeebled: it may become a mere lip profession, ineffectual for good, only obstructing the growth of other truths which might be held with real conviction.

Mr. Mill, in the third chapter, inquires whether the same considerations do not require that men should be free to *act* on their opinions, provided it be at their own risk. Here the chief difficulty is, that the end to be attained—individual spontaneity of conduct—is so little valued; that few even comprehend William Humboldt's dictum, "the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole." Not that each man is to aim at independence of self-development, so as to undervalue the teachings of experience; on the contrary, education is unceasingly to communicate them to us. But afterwards the individual should be free to use and interpret experience in his own way, instead of having some customary rendering imposed upon him. Conformity to custom, merely *as* custom, even though it may happen to be good, involves no practice of the faculties, no moral choice. "It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it." To choose his plan of life, and follow it, demands the employment of all a man's faculties, judgment, observation, activity, discrimination, decision, and firmness. This makes him more of a man, and his life ampler, more eventful, and more richly stored, than the life of the slaves of custom. His desires and impulses, "the raw material of human nature," are strengthened; and their possessor is made capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good.

In early stages of society individuality was in excess, and the difficulty was to keep the passions of individuals within the bounds of the general interests of society. But in our own day "society has got fairly the better of individuality." The danger lies now in the uniform mediocrity which threatens to become the almost universal type of character; even in amusements men "like in crowds;" "until, by dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow, their human capacities are withered and starved."

Is such a state, he asks, desirable for a human being? It is so according to the Calvinistic theory, which makes obedience the one duty of man, and self-will his one offence.



Yet surely, he argues, it is more religious to believe that a good Creator gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and consumed. In what follows, the author confounds Calvinism with Christianity; but a nobler passage succeeds:

“It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating; furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself; and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence; and when there is more life in the units, there is more in the mass which is composed of them” (p. 113).

If genius is necessary to mankind, the soil in which it grows must be preserved. “Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom.” The present ascendancy of society, and the power of the masses, was perhaps inevitable; but still, “the government of mediocrity is mediocre government.” “The initiation of all wise or noble things comes, and must come, from individuals; . . . the honour and glory of the average man is, that he is capable of following that initiative.” The increasing tendency of European society is to frown down individual diversities of character and practice, and to gravitate towards the state of things which prevails in China and all oriental countries, which, though once progressive, have for many ages been, properly speaking, without a history, because they have become stationary and inanimate under the numbing despotism of custom. This tendency must, it is argued, be resisted before it is too late, by asserting the claims of individuality.

Having now stated the doctrine of individual freedom, Mr. Mill considers what restraints on that freedom are permissible, and where the line is to be drawn between the authority of society and the liberty of its individual members. His principle is simple: “To individuality should belong that part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, that part which chiefly interests society.” The individual (supposing him of legal age and of sound mind) should be free to act in any manner that pleases him,

so long as the interests of others are not directly injured. But how to apply this principle? Is a person who is grossly deficient in the "self-regarding" as distinct from the social virtues,—in industry, sobriety, frugality, and the like,—yet who directly injures no one else by his conduct,—to be in no way amenable to society? Such a person is amenable to society in respect of the *spontaneous* and *natural* consequences which flow from his conduct, viz. the displeasure, contempt, and avoidance of his neighbours; but not in respect of positive penalties. If, indeed, he is so deficient in his duty to himself as to become disabled from discharging some definite duty to others, he may become the fitting subject of moral reprobation and punishment. But for the merely contingent or *constructive* injury which his conduct may cause to society, it is better that society should bear the inconvenience than that the principle of liberty should be infringed; especially as it will generally happen that society itself is partly to blame, in having neglected to provide for the education of the offender to a right understanding of his duties and opportunities as a human being. Ill-judged attempts at the coercion of conduct generally end, as in the case of the Puritan government before the Restoration, in a strong rebound in the contrary direction. With reference to certain cases, in which the free action of the individual or the minority might appear disputable, as in the abhorrence felt by a Mohammedan society for the practice of eating pork, the disgust with which a Catholic population regard a married clergy and a heretical worship, the horror with which Sabbatarians are inspired by Sunday amusements, or teetotalers by dram-drinking,—the author argues that the only principle which will apply to all these cases, and defend the weaker body against coercion into conformity to the tastes of the stronger, is this, "that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere."

To the doctrine of human freedom, thus explained, I am disposed to give a decided general adherence. That doctrine is, that the liberty of thought and of its expression should be entire; and that the liberty of tastes and modes of living should be only limited by the single condition, that the rights and interests of others be respected. By liberty, I mean absence of accountability to any *temporal* authority; and, with Mr. Mill, I understand by the subjects of this liberty persons of full age and of sound mind. And my thesis is this, that although, in bygone states of society, the employment of coercion in order to bring recusants to conformity may have been occasionally defensible, as producing, on the whole, more



good than evil, the circumstances of modern society are such as to render the use of such coercion inexpedient and reprehensible, because certain to produce more evil than good.

It is objected that such a doctrine is suitable enough to the circumstances of a Catholic minority in England, but that no English Catholic would advocate its application to the case of the Catholic majority in Austria, or France, or Spain, or adapt to the latitude of Vienna the rule which he approves for the latitude of London. I answer, that I make no mental reservations. Having faith in my thesis, I am prepared beforehand for the extension of the principle laid down to every variety of circumstances.

Mr. Mill himself, in defining the range of his doctrine, "leaves out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its 'nonage' (p. 23). Liberty," he says, "as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. When the wisdom of the governors is far in advance of the wisdom of the governed, and the means do not exist, by the communication and comparison of ideas, of equalising the two, it is desirable and right that the subjects should be coerced, if necessary, to their own good."

In the employment of coercion, whether directly or by penalties attached to non-compliance, to bring men to the true faith, I believe that the test of lawfulness is success. To exact the hollow profession of the truth, while the heart internally rebels, so far from being a success, is a more disastrous failure than acquiescence in open recusancy. Coercion *succeeds* only when it produces higher moral results to the persons coerced than were attained under toleration; only when they, or at least the majority of them, are brought to admit the expediency of the coercion, and are visibly benefited in their moral nature by having embraced the true and discarded the false opinion. To such success I conceive three concurrent conditions are requisite:

First, that the persons coerced should not be persons of fully-developed intellect, but in that immature mental state, akin to the case of children, which justifies, in Mr. Mill's own opinion, the use of despotic means to effect their improvement.

Secondly, that there should exist a body of teachers on the side of that true faith to which men are to be coerced, sufficiently wise, zealous, and virtuous, and also sufficiently numerous, to ensure that the true doctrine shall be exhibited in its proper light to the persons coerced; that they shall be led to see its intrinsic superiority to the falsehood which they

had formerly embraced, and, partly through that insight, partly through the moral elevation caused by contact with the wise and good, attain to a higher and more developed state of being than they had formerly known.

Thirdly, that there should not exist, in the neighbourhood of the scene of coercion, a civilised community or communities of persons, who, having themselves repudiated the true doctrine, will sympathise with those who are being coerced to accept it—will encourage them to make resistance, active or passive, to the coercive measures employed, and will nourish in them a feeling of ill-usage, and of suffering unjustly in a good cause, if the resistance is unsuccessful.

Only when these three conditions meet can coercion be really successful, and therefore legitimate. It is not difficult to show that, at various times in the history of the Church, all three conditions have concurred. For three hundred years Christianity suffered from coercion, but could not inflict it. The laws and administration of Theodosius were the first attempt on a large scale to employ on the side of the true faith the weapons which had so often been turned against it. Heresy was made a crime punishable by the civil tribunals; the pagan worship was prohibited, and its temples transferred to the use of the Church. On the whole, this coercion was successful; its partial failure was owing to the imperfect fulfilment of one or other of the first two conditions. There were many individual cases in which the objects of coercion, being persons of fully-developed faculties, were irritated, not rendered submissive, by the treatment they received; and there was in many parts of the empire a dearth of good and wise Christian teachers to make the faith a living reality to the pagan multitude who were forced to profess it. Hence we read of individual Donatists and Priscillianists filled with a bitter and burning sense of wrong at the operation of the imperial laws; and also of numbers of the poorer classes relapsing secretly into paganism in remote districts, doubtless to their own grievous moral degradation,—because the truth had come to them in name only, and not in power.

St. Augustine's letter to Count Boniface (Epist. 185) on the complaints of the Donatists, to whom the severe laws of Theodosius had been applied to compel them into submission to the Church, is an exceedingly remarkable production. Defending the employment of coercion towards the Donatists, the saint makes use of language which has been on the lips of persecutors ever since; citing, for instance, the text, "compel them to come in," and the prophecy that "the



kingdoms of the world are become the kingdoms of the Lord and of His Christ;" and referring to the conversion of St. Paul as a case of compulsion exercised by the Lord Himself. Yet, if we read this letter attentively, and note the heavenly and loving earnestness which it breathes, as of one bent to win souls to God and truth, we shall see in it not the narrow intellect and flinty heart of the persecutor, but the earnest love of a father, rejoicing that even by chastisement his erring children are brought back to the paths of duty. To restore to the wanderer the priceless treasure of the truth is his one thought; and if the severity of law will effect this, where persuasion would have failed, he welcomes that severity. Moreover, he distinctly testifies that the coercion used *has* been successful; that crowds of schismatics, humbled and penitent, have been received back into the Church, to their immense moral gain: "Multis profuit (quod experimento probavimus et probamur) prius dolore vel timore cogi, ut postea possent doceri." On the whole, therefore, this experiment with the Donatists seems to have succeeded. Yet there were individuals among them whom it was useless to treat like children, and who maintained the right of the human mind to liberty; they said (I quote from the same letter), "Liberum est credere vel non credere; cui vim Christus intulit? quem coegit?" and I cannot feel the answer of St. Augustine to be satisfactory.

Again, in the case of our Saxon forefathers, and other Teutonic tribes, whom the authority of their princes compelled to relinquish heathenism and embrace the true faith, as all the three conditions were indubitably present, so the act of coercion was eminently successful, and therefore legitimate. So far as it failed, it was in consequence of the inadequate fulfilment of the second condition; teachers could not be found in sufficient numbers to instruct in the Christian doctrine the obedient crowds who came to receive baptism.

The coercion of the Albigenes is too mixed and difficult a question for me now to discuss. That of the Lollards, though perhaps in the main successful, is yet a doubtful case; partly because, through the prevalence of ecclesiastical corruptions, the second condition was imperfectly fulfilled, partly owing to the extravagant nature of the coercion itself. The statute *De hæretico comburendo*, made for the use and behoof of the Lollards, indicates an increased degree of severity in coercion, at the very time when advancing civilisation was making even the minor degrees of questionable utility. The cases, under the early Christian emperors, of the capital punishment of heretics are exceedingly rare. One memorable

instance is that of Priscillian, executed under the sentence of a civil court in 384. On this occasion the great St. Martin (I quote from Fleury) "implored the Emperor Maximus to spare the blood of the guilty ones; saying that it was quite enough that, having been declared heretics by the judgment of the Bishops, they should be excluded from the churches: finally, that there was no precedent for bringing an ecclesiastical cause before a secular judge." The notion that it can be either right or advisable to kill one man, in order to convince others that he and they are in the wrong, seems to me one of the most singular hallucinations which ever had a firm hold on the imagination of mankind.

An examination of the various conditions presented by the chief cases of religious coercion which have occurred since the time of Constantine would fill a volume. I will refer to one more instance, that of the coercion of the French Protestants under Louis XIV., culminating in the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. If ever, in modern times, coercion to the true faith stood a chance of success, it was now. And, in truth, it was very *nearly* successful. The mass of the Huguenot population held their opinions traditionally, and certainly did not stand on so high a grade of intellectual cultivation as the French Catholics. Many even of their ministers, so long as the coercion to which they were subjected did not proceed to extravagant lengths, and no extraneous sympathy came to their support, were led to enter into themselves, to meditate calmly, and either embrace, or approach very nearly to Catholic communion. Thus the first condition was tolerably well fulfilled. The second was fully carried out in some parts of France. What Protestant could feel any humiliation in yielding to the massive intellect, the glorious eloquence, the apostolic charity, of the great Bossuet? Accordingly, through all the coercive measures of the government, until they reached an extravagant height, the diocese of Meaux under Bossuet, like that of Hippo under St. Augustine, was the scene of innumerable *real* conversions, placing the converts in a higher state, morally and intellectually, than they were before.\* In other parts of France, which then could boast of an unusually large number of holy and enlightened Bishops, things took, though less strikingly, the same course. But there were districts where instruction was wanting, or grossly defective; and here coercion produced lamentable results. However, its average operation had tended to produce good rather than evil, until the time when, over-

\* For particulars I refer to the admirable Life of Bossuet by the Cardinal de Bausset.



straining the bent bow, it endeavoured, by one grand *coup*, to extirpate the remaining recusancy of France. The third, negative, condition, which had hitherto been fulfilled, immediately broke down. All the neighbouring Protestant communities took the alarm, and expressed by every means in their power their sympathy with the sufferers, and their indignation at the treatment they were receiving. England received them with open arms, subscribed for them, wrote for them, fought for them. Thenceforward the coercion employed could obtain at most a political success.

Ever since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the party of literature, and the non-Catholic communities of Europe, have been incessantly on the watch to detect any attempt at coercion to the true faith which may be made in any part of Western Europe, and to encourage the objects of this "persecution" to every species of resistance, material and moral. Evidently, therefore, the third condition of success does not and cannot exist in Europe; whence I conclude that, in our times, coercion to the true faith is impossible.

Again, every year that passes renders the first condition less easy of fulfilment; because advancing civilisation develops the general intellect, and alters that childlike condition of the human mind to which alone compulsion can be applied with moral benefit. In Asia and Africa it is still possible that occasions may arise when coercion may be employed with profit; in Europe, that period seems past for ever.

The whole case may be illustrated by the laws of parental discipline. It is obvious, that although in the early years of boyhood punishment is often the best means of effecting moral improvement, it becomes ever less and less expedient as the boy is passing into the youth; until a time arrives when the attempt to inflict it, so far from tending to good, is attended with the worst moral consequences to both parties. The early stage of the boy's education answers to my first condition. But there may be cases in which a father may find punishment inexpedient, even before the arrival of the time when it would become so in the course of nature. Suppose that a son, whom his father had just chastised, instead of being left to himself to reflect in loneliness upon his fault and upon the means of regaining his father's favour, were to be immediately surrounded by a number of his playmates, assuring him that he had done nothing wrong, condoling with him for what he had suffered, inveighing against the unjust severity of the father, and suggesting to him measures of resistance for the future. The case is not imaginary; a similar occurrence is related in Johnson's *Travels in New*

*Brunswick*, of a family that removed from Canada into the United States. The consequence will be, that unless the boy is endowed with more than ordinary firmness and humility, he will adopt the view of the case suggested to him;—he will mutiny internally, if not openly rebel, against any future attempt on the part of his father to coerce him by punishment; and any such attempt, if made, will have a hardening and lowering effect on his moral nature. This is an exact illustration of the present state of European society. Any attempt to spread what is deemed the truth by coercive means, raises up at once a swarm of sympathisers, who denounce the employment of these means as persecution, and encourage and assist the sufferers. I do not pretend to decide whether this state of things is desirable or undesirable, but only to state the fact. If it tells against coercion used *by* Catholics in one place, it checks coercion used *against* them in another. If it helps Protestants in Tuscany and Austria, it helps Catholics in Sweden, Denmark, and Poland. But from these facts the inference is inevitable, that coercion cannot succeed in Europe at the present day, and is therefore illegitimate.

I do not shrink from any consequences of this doctrine, however apparently startling. It may be said, "Would you, then, abolish the censorship of books by the civil power in Catholic countries, and allow not only foreign heterodox works to be imported, but those of home growth to be published? Would a Christian government which so acted, consult as it ought for the faith and morals of the people committed to its care?" I answer—not, with Mr. Mill, that restraints on reading and publishing such works may possibly keep out the truth; not, with Protestant divines, that every individual has a moral right to construct his religious creed for himself, and therefore ought to have an unshackled freedom, whether of choice for himself, or of suggestion for others;—but simply this, that experience shows that, at the present stage of European civilisation, these restraints do more harm than good. In spite of prohibition, works of this class are sure to make their way into any country where there is a demand for them; and the difficulty and secrecy which surround their perusal, lend additional zest to the doctrines which they contain. Under such circumstances, a writer inclined to heterodoxy will spread a film of orthodoxy over every page; but the practice which the Germans call "*Zwischen den Zeilen lesen*" then arises, and sympathising readers see in his guarded statements all the audacious things which the author would have said if he dared,



and often a great many more. Nor is the practical difficulty of finding proper censors a slight one, as Milton pointed out long ago in his *Areopagitica*. A dull man will imagine that to be dangerous which is only novel; and will prevent new thoughts from coming into the world, because to his own torpid intellect they seem unsettling. Hence a twofold mischief; the suppression of a—perhaps important—truth, and the discouragement of an ardent soul from the pursuits for which God and nature designed it. An unfair man will have one rule for this writer, another for that. But even if it could be ensured that all censors should be saints and men of genius, the evils inseparable from restraint would remain.

Once for all, coercion is an educational instrument which Western Europe has outgrown; and the citizens of her commonwealth of states are all bound to assume,—and must be permitted to assume,—the burdens and the dangers of freedom.

All this reasoning applies, it must be observed, only to coercion by *temporal* authority. Coercion by ecclesiastical censures, proceeding in the last resort to excommunication, is inseparable from the idea of the Christian Church; all that my principle requires is, that such coercion should not be enforced by penalties inflicted by the temporal authority. I may have to refer to this matter again, when I come to speak of Mr. Mill's view of the neutral character, in a moral sense, of human opinions.

From an examination of the general doctrine of the Essay, it was my intention to proceed to the discussion of two or three of the more prominent questionable statements which it contains. But as the space at my disposal will not permit of my bringing these considerations to a close in the present Number, I propose to postpone the remainder of my remarks to the next *Rambler*. A.

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#### DR. LINGARD'S ALLEGED CARDINALATE.

AT the end of last year a private controversy was being carried on between two able writers concerning the truth of the alleged elevation of Dr. Lingard to the rank of Cardinal. As several interesting facts have come out in the course of the argument, perhaps I may be allowed to put on record the conclusions to which they seem to point, so as to rescue all that appears to have an historical value from the oblivion

which the circumstances under which it was produced might otherwise entail upon it.

Whether Lingard was or was not a cardinal, is a point of no light importance to his biography. The elevation to that dignity can be no small event in the life of a modest country missionary, whose course was not diversified by much incident, however brightened by literary glory. Yet the fact can never be determined with certainty, because, if Lingard was made cardinal, he was reserved *in petto*, that is, his name was kept secret in the Pope's breast to bide its time of publication. As that time never came, the secret died with the Pope, and the question can never be clearly resolved unless it can be shown that the Pope's secret was known to some one who divulged it; but no *proof* of the kind has come out. The question, therefore, remains one of opinion, on one hand, and affectionate reminiscence on the other; it is one where feeling and fancy must to a large extent take the place of facts, and where conviction on either side may naturally be strong in proportion to the small probability of refutation.

It appears that Leo XII., in the consistory of October 2, 1826, reserved eleven cardinals *in petto*; of these he published six, December 15, 1829, and died without publicly divulging the names of the remaining five. Was Lingard one of these five? Was he pointedly described or alluded to in the allocution which announced the creation of the cardinals? Was it the general opinion of Rome at the time that he was one of those described? And did the Pope, in any private conversations or other dealings with the historian, give him to understand that he was to be made a cardinal?

The allocution of October 2, 1826, was never published; those who reported it at the time trusted to their memories or their notes. They said that one of the eleven new cardinals was described as "a foreigner, a writer of history *ex ipsis haustam fontibus*"—"a man of great talents, an accomplished scholar, whose writings, drawn *ex authenticis fontibus*, had not only rendered great services to religion, but had delighted and astonished Europe." If the Pope was known to have been on good terms with Dr. Lingard, a description conceived in these terms could scarcely be applied to any other person. But the question occurred, Were the terms accurately reported? With great trouble, the allocution itself has been discovered, and its genuine words produced: they are, "Præter hos quatuor, Cardinalem creamus virum religione, pietate ac doctrinâ archetypis et nativis e fontibus haustâ insignem, qui libris editis catholicam adversus hæreticos et schismaticos veritatem strenue non minus quam feliciter tuetur,"—"Besides these four, we



create cardinal a man distinguished for religion, piety, and learning drawn from original and native sources, who, in his published writings, defends the Catholic truth not less strenuously than successfully against heretics and schismatics." In these lines there is not a word about the person being a foreigner, or a writer of history, nor about his writings having delighted and astonished Europe. Unfortunately we are not informed whether all the eleven cardinals were described in analogous sentences, so we cannot tell whether the missing expressions were contained in other passages of the allocution. In default of this information, we cannot be sure whether they are the variations of unsteady memories, the unconscious additions of friendly feelings, the common growth of rumour, or a jumble of the descriptions of two persons into one.

Suppose, however, that this passage was the only one in the allocution that could be presumed to apply to Lingard, it is clear that the genuine words no longer tell the same clear tale as the reported expressions. All investigations conducted with real historical accuracy, by Protestants or Catholics, will at last result in a triumphant vindication of the Church; therefore the historical labours of Lingard no doubt did much to defend Catholic truth against heretics and schismatics. But if we were searching for a word which by itself should best describe and define this serviceable talent, should we call it *doctrina*? Philological arguments are generally worthless; and the composer of the allocution may have written in a hurry, without any particular reason for his choice of words. But, in its derivative sense and in its Christian use, *doctrina* is singularly inappropriate to describe historical investigation. *Doctrina* is taught or traditional knowledge. In a Christian mouth it means the Creeds and the Catechism; in a philosopher's mouth it means theory and system. The knowledge of occurrences is rather history, erudition, and science, whose sources are annals, state-papers, letters, and diaries; a man may read these for ever without drawing "doctrine" from them, in the restricted sense of a formed system of principles and facts that is received and taught *in globo*. We speak of the doctrine of the Church, of Scripture, of a school, of a philosophical historian, of a jurist, a statesman, or a naturalist—not of the doctrine of an annalist, or a collector of historical documents. These are the native sources of history, not of doctrine. If historical learning had been before alluded to, *doctrina* was a word inappropriate enough; but to use it as the first and only intimation of the particular sphere of the writer, must have made people think that it alluded to controversies of dogma, morals, or discipline.

It may not be out of place to remark that there is a technical sense in which the words "doctrina ex archetypis et nativis fontibus hausta" may be understood. There is a scientific method which the Germans call "quellenmässig," *ex ipsissimis fontibus*, as opposed to the compendious method of studying only compilations and commentaries. Those who have once tried this method, generally consider that if a book of theology or history is written on any other principle, it belongs to a wholly different category, and, however respectable and meritorious in its proper sphere, is not to be treated or spoken of as a really scientific work. A man might have Gibbon or Grote by heart, and yet have no real original scientific knowledge of Roman or Grecian history; though he might make a great show, like a barrister who is crammed for a special case, and eclipse and out-talk a far better scholar. So in theology, he might know profoundly all the books written by divines since the Council of Trent, and add up all the authorities for all the scholastic speculations that have bubbled up in the stream of thought; but, on this principle, he would be no theologian unless he had studied painfully, and in the sources, the genesis and growth of the doctrines of the Church. A theologian cannot choose between the fathers, the scholastic writers, and the modern schools, any more than a historian can choose whether he will read Livy or Polybius for the account of the Punic war. Without this method, a man may have an immense reading in theologians, and yet be but a dilettante in theology. This is why Dr. Newman's essay on St. Cyril's formula in the *Atlantis* of July 1858 has been called a fragment of theology; for it was original and progressive,—two qualities which the *via regia* of compendia can never impart to the traveller on that line. These qualities have been observed also in the late Robert Wilberforce's work on the Eucharist; and I have heard a most eminent Jesuit theologian commend Dr. Pusey's unfinished work on baptism as the best extant for the same reasons. The absence of this scientific method and of original learning classes other works in an inferior rank, from which no talent can redeem them; they may have a momentary passing importance, but the swift stream of time hurries them out of sight; they have no weight to hold them, as by an anchor. In this technical sense the "doctrina nativis e fontibus hausta" would best apply to men like Möhler, whose *Unity of the Church* appeared in 1825, about a year and a half before the allocution. But he was only thirty years old in 1826, and probably unknown in Rome, where his language is nearly as hard to be understood as ours; and if the book had



been known, his untenable sentiments on the origin and extent of the episcopal authority, though not so heterodox as some propositions in the second volume of Lamennais' *Essay on Indifference*, would probably have been a bar to any honours or even encouragement. It was not till 1827 and 1832 that he fairly established his reputation by his *Athanasius the Great* and his *Symbolik*. I do not therefore seriously advance a claim in his behalf.

It remains, then, that the expressions "doctrine from original sources," and "writings which strenuously and successfully defend Catholic truth against heretics and schismatics," are *primâ facie* much more applicable to a theological controversialist than to a historian: this is proved by the alteration they in fact underwent in order to make them seem applicable to Lingard. The only reply to this is, Perhaps the Pope changed these expressions in reading, said *historia* instead of *doctrina*, and added the word "foreigner," and the phrase about the astonishment of Europe. I have no answer to make; I can only say, that if the Pope simply read what was written for him, he did not allude either plainly or appropriately to Lingard. This is no real reason why Lingard may not have been meant, or at least why he may not have been one of the five; but if he was, the inference cannot be drawn from the allocution, and we must go to other sources.

It is argued that, in the general opinion of Rome at the time, the person alluded to in these words was Lingard. Dr. Gradwell, then president of the English College, thought so, and heard it publicly talked of at Torlonia's table; Cardinal Wiseman, then at the College, acquiesced, and retained the opinion for some years, till it was changed by a conversation with the Abbate, afterwards Cardinal, Fornari. In some circles it was believed to be Lingard, in others not. "At first," says Dr. Gradwell, "it was supposed to be Mgr. Mai, or Marchetti; some bigots thought Lamennais; though the last has almost surfeited Rome." The "bigots" are probably those who wanted to put Lingard's mediæval volume on the Index in 1823. Roman society is divided into so many separate circles, and there is such an evident absence of all means of arriving at any certain knowledge of the real statistics of opinion, that we need not trouble ourselves with a point which at most need prove no more than that Lingard's friends and admirers hoped and believed that he was the person intended.

But suppose the Pope had himself given Lingard to understand that he was to be cardinal; this would put a new

face on the matter. Lingard was in Rome in 1825; was asked by Testa, the Pope's secretary, how long it would take him to finish his History; and had a conversation with Leo XII., which, according to the account he gave to Dr. Rock, amounts to this: that Leo invited him to remain in Rome; that he declined on account of his History; that the Pontiff pressed him, and at length asked him how long it would be before he finished his work. "This," adds Lingard, "I put off with some indefinite answer." This was certainly a great deal; but it turns out that there was much more behind. Lingard did not communicate his whole secret to Dr. Rock; but gave his intimate friend Mrs. Lomax a much more detailed account, which she related in a letter to the *Times* of July 28, 1851. She tells us, as if repeating Lingard's words,

"Cardinal Litta\* called on me one morning at the English College, and told me it was the Pope's wish that I should be a cardinal. Now this was not at all in my way; so I said I could not accept it, as it was my intention to return to England and go on with my History. He said that probably the Pope might overcome that resolution, and that I was to go to the Vatican the following day. I did so; and after going through many large apartments, was shown into a smaller one, where, seated in such a position with respect to the door that I did not perceive him on first entering, was his Holiness Leo XII. He received me very kindly; seemed amused at my walking into the middle of the room and then suddenly turning round and perceiving him, and immediately broached the subject. He said he wished me to become cardinal-protector of the English missions."

The historian declines, and pleads his History. The Pope urges that materials could be got in Italy; till at length the conversation closes as follows:

"I then said I did not possess the means that were in my opinion necessary properly to maintain that dignity; to which he replied that that objection could easily be obviated. Still I remained obstinate; but even at our parting interview he returned to the subject, and said I should be a cardinal *in petto*. This I did not care about so long as I remained there, *i. e.* secret in the Pope's heart."

This narrative, if true, settles the question; and the authentic source to which it is traced forbids us to doubt of its general accuracy. There is an evident mistake in substituting Cardinal Litta for Monsignor Testa; but a quarter of a century plays strange tricks with one's remembrance of names, however facts may remain unaltered. After such a conversation, when the Pope's allocution was related to Lingard,

\* A mistake for Mgr. Testa.



especially with the slight verbal modifications which I have recorded, he naturally took the description to himself, and wrote off to Mgr. Testa, to tell him that he should find means to inform the Pope that such an appointment, in the present circumstances, would be very inexpedient. Lingard, however, did not then learn any thing more positive. He writes in a letter, probably about this period, "I know nothing more of the matter than inferences which I might draw from Leo's words to me, and inquiries which he made of me through Mgr. Testa, and his allocution." But by September 1840 he seems to have come to know that he was the man; and as Leo's death had taken away the chief motives of secrecy, he did not hesitate to write, "He described me in the consistory as one who offered to the world *historiam ex ipsis haustam fontibus*." And again, in November 1850, "I expected to find some allusion to *the fact* of my having been made cardinal *in petto* by Leo XII., when he gave me the large gold medal which you have seen." Lingard, then, evidently believed, and probably not without reason, that he was the man described; or at least one of the other four reserved. Though but little weight can be attached to the results of my critical examination of the text of the allocution, or to the opinion of the gossips of Rome, it must be conceded that these testimonies of Dr. Lingard are of great importance to the argument; and till it is satisfactorily proved that he had no foundation but his fancy for his faith, I think it reasonable to conclude that the grave, cautious, unimpulsive investigator was as slow to allow himself to be inflated with the exaggerations of flatterers as to be carried away with the sophisms of partisan historians. I do not pretend that it follows that because Leo talked of making him a cardinal in 1825, therefore he *did* make him one in 1826. The Pope may have changed his mind. But if he did not change his mind, Lingard was made cardinal. The historian suspected it in 1826, and immediately took measures to prevent or delay the promulgation; his confident tone in 1840 and 1850, when he speaks of his being cardinal as *a fact*, leads me to think that after Leo's death he must have obtained some confirmation of his suspicions. As to Lamennais, he was triumphantly received in Rome in 1823 or 1824. Leo kept his portrait in his room, and granted him exemption from his Breviary to allow him to consecrate more time to the defence of the Catholic faith; the Pope proposed to him to fix himself at Rome, offered him a cardinalitial place—that of librarian of the Vatican—with the assurance of a speedy promotion to the cardinalate; and La-

mennais only got off by representing the great utility of his presence in France to the cause of the Church.

From this, and much more that has transpired, I think that Leo intended to make both Lingard and Lamennais cardinals: the sentence of the allocution applies perhaps better to the Frenchman than to the Englishman; the contemporary opinion of Rome was divided, and Lamennais and Lingard both had their partisans. Both seem to have received a verbal promise from the Pope of the cardinal's hat; Lamennais on the condition of his remaining in Rome, Lingard unconditionally, or only with the condition required by himself, that he should remain *in petto* till he had finished his History. Why should we not believe that both were cardinals?

It may be objected, How could the same Pope think of bestowing the same rewards on two men so diametrically opposed as Lingard and Lamennais?—Lingard, who never was moved to swerve from truth by even religious affections; and Lamennais, who inaugurated in France the new idea and fashion of religious controversy,—to exaggerate the truth on all disputed points, to argue like a judge, to treat opponents with disdain, to cover them with irony, bitterness, and contempt,—whose very motto was, “hit hard, without minding whether you hit right,” and who denounced all who differed from his way of defending truth as poltroons always ready to surrender, always on the point of going over to the enemy? Yet Rome can only act on the information that reaches her; true or false, it is all she has. Many a St. Cœlestine has been deceived with the Hibernian triumphs of a Palladius. “The news of his temporary success,” says Dr. Todd,\* “soon began to spread far and wide; it was not long before it reached Rome itself, and created there the impression that the whole country had become Christian. But, as often happens, events were magnified in proportion as they became the universal topic of conversation; Palladius' success was very far from being what report pretended; it was partial and momentary.” News like this might be brought of Lamennais' work in France; his future would not be contemplated, while he was doing a present direct service to religion. The splendour of his genius, and the greatness of his reputed triumphs, would answer for him. Lingard's influence belonged to another and less popular order. But the publication of his History coincided with the Emancipation movement, and doubtless helped it, and was helped by it; and the authorities were naturally glad to trace the origin of the great fermentation to the influence of one of

\* *Patrons of Erin*, p. 6.



themselves. Thus in that peculiar political atmosphere the modest starlight of Lingard might remain visible even by the side of the smoke and glare of Lamennais' fires. There were even Frenchmen who patronised the Englishman, in hopes of counteracting the influence of their meteoric countryman. The Archbishop of Bourdeaux said that Lingard's History had "done more good to the cause of religion in France than any other that had appeared;" while in Rome it was regarded "as one of the great causes which had wrought such a change in public sentiment in England on Catholic matters." Both Lingard and Lamennais, then, were such men as a Pope might delight to honour; for their present influence alone was visible, time had not developed their respective tendencies; accuracy and passion were for the time labourers in the same field, both were reaping wondrous harvests, and so an equal reward might easily be reserved *in petto* for both.

Z.

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## Correspondence.

### NAPOLEONISM AND ITS APOSTOLATE.

SIR,—I have neither time nor inclination to follow your correspondent "J. O." through his answer to what he calls my "attack," nor am I anxious to vindicate myself from the criticisms contained in his letter. But it is important, in a higher interest than any which is merely personal to him or me, that I should point out the inaccuracy of the application he has assigned to my "severe language;" and for this purpose I must therefore appeal to you for a small portion of your space, and to your readers for a few moments of their attention.

In writing down my "thoughts on the causes of the present war," I was careful to avoid every mention of Lewis Napoleon, and every expression of opinion on his character. Not that I think him simply "a man to wonder at and admire," whose mind we cannot subject to analysis, and the main drift of whose designs we cannot see; but because the subject which I endeavoured to place before your readers is distinct from these considerations, and far exceeds them in importance: and my desire was not to excite sympathy or hatred towards any particular person, but to draw men's thoughts to the nature and progress of a political system which I believe to constitute at this moment the greatest danger of European society.

My definition of this system is, "a despotism, based on social equality; upheld by military power; aggressive as the first condition of its existence; and propagandist by the constitution of its nature."

It came into existence, and grew to maturity, under one Napoleon ; and after its first discomfiture, it emerged again under another : and, since one needs must find some name to be a symbol of its complex nature, I call it, after its acknowledged chiefs—not Imperialism, for there are other empires, formed on other principles than theirs ; not Buonapartism, for it is a thing apart from their proper family tradition ; but Napoleonism, because wherever it has yet been manifested, it has owned allegiance to a Napoleon ; and wherever a Napoleon has yet reigned, he has done so as its avowed representative.

I have described this system as the first-born of democracy, because in the whole civilised world, including America, I know no such pure democracy as that in France ; while this is the only great political system to which French democracy has given birth. And I speak of its apostolate, because the principle which gave it birth acts through it on society at large ; because it energizes, not in progress, but in conquest ; not by way of self-development or self-transformation, but by assimilating to its own type all other forms of social and political existence, trampling out with its mailed heel the independent life of nations, and going through the world with the sword in one hand and the Code Napoléon in the other, to establish a necessary “unity of power” on an actual equality of servitude.

This apostolate I believe to be an impious one,—impious alike in the origin from which it springs, the means by which it is carried on, and the end at which it aims. For what are all these, when we have traced them to their elements, but counterfeits, in which the low passions of our nature mock its noble aspirations ? Men must forget what honour means, before they can thirst for glory ; renounce their fellowship in the great victories of human intellect, before they send out bayonets and cannon to maintain the “fight for an idea ;” deny the true universal empire beneath which all ranks are equal and all races one, before they dream of forcing on reluctant nations their own principles of life and polity, and moulding the world like another chaos beneath the hand of a new regenerator. Napoleonism is impious, not merely because the combination of events has brought it for the last few months into collision with immediate ecclesiastical interests, but because in its own nature it is a reversal of that order which Divine Providence has established in the history of man. And when it passes its own local bounds, to propagate its principles by brute force in other countries, it enters on an apostolate, obligatory indeed, if those principles are true, and inevitable if they are to hold their own ; but none the less, under whatever circumstances or pretexts, simply and strictly impious.

It was in the exercise of this apostolate that Napoleonism sent its armies across the Alps. France had no wrongs to redress, no dangers to avert, no insults to avenge, in Lombardy. But the extorted homage of others is the vulgar opiate with which men lull themselves into forgetfulness of their own lost self-respect ; and those are not empty words, “Il n’y a jamais eu chez les peuples libres de gou-



vernement assez fort pour réprimer long-temps la liberté à l'intérieur sans donner la gloire au dehors." Democratic despotism is essentially a thing of one idea. It worships nothing, apprehends nothing, tends to nothing, propagates nothing, but itself. All that lies beyond the sphere of its own direct control is a weariness to its eye and a vexation to its mind ; and its action on all other systems is not to lend them strength for the perfection of their own developments, but to break down and destroy them, that it may fashion their ruins into a throne for its own solitary majesty. The standing abnegation both of history and fact, it not only represents the principle, but it constitutes the embodied triumph, of the revolution ; and wherever its influence extends, the revolution gains, *ipso facto*, at the expense of the conservatism of Europe.

For what is this revolution, of which I am told that every body knows the meaning, and yet of which, as far as I can perceive, the loudest opponents in word are the most obsequious flatterers in deed? I write *currente calamo*, and I cannot stay either to guard my propositions or to prove them ; but I have no fear of any argument that can be brought against me, when I say that the real centre of European revolution is "the throned power at Paris." For what we have to fear is not the change of dynasties, the fall of thrones, the spread of liberal opinion, the growing strength of the popular will. These lie, for good or evil, in the forward path of civilisation ; and along that path the human race advances to the term of its providential training. But what we have to fear is the reversal of its course, the turning back of society towards lower motives, meaner aims, less generous aspirations, less ennobling hopes. Brute force stands ever watching to retake the spoils that law and liberty have won in the long struggle of the history of mankind ; and every victory she gains, she gains over that conservative force by which alone society can be impelled along the settled order of its progress. Napoleonism is the living victory of brute force over the intellect and moral sense of France. It is the revolution, not in embryo, not in conflict, but consummated, triumphant, crowned.

I do not understand, then, what your correspondent means when he says, that "Louis Napoleon has not been carried away by the revolution." Of course he has not ; where should it carry him to? It is but the *ἐνέργεια*, of which the system he represents is the *ἔργον* ; and loathsome as all the stages of its course may be, it is in the light of its final result that we fear and hate it most. A partial exemption from the miseries of the way would indeed be dearly purchased by a speedier arrival at the goal : and I for one would rather a thousand-fold see Europe in a state of chronic insurgency, than sinking down into the moral and political death of a Napoleonic regeneration. But unhappily the truth in Italy is something worse than even such a choice as this. I am told that my "severe language" has been "any thing but borne out by the event." I think I am entitled to ask, if the actual event has not borne it out, what conceivable event would have done so? The French army was let loose on Lombardy

because Napoleonism found there "a just and civilising cause to make prevail ;"

" E quella sozza imagine di froda  
 Sen venne, ed arrivò la testa e 'l busto ;  
 Ma in su la riva non trasse la coda.  
 La faccia sua era faccia d' uom giusto,  
 Tanto benigna avea di fuor la pelle,  
 E d' un serpente tutto l' altro fusto."

The aim was accomplished ; the "just and civilising cause" prevailed ; and then came the beginning of the end. Who are the rulers now in Northern Italy but the emissaries of Turin ? and who rules at Turin but Victor Emmanuel's "magnanimous ally" ? The revolution, I know, has not stultified itself by carrying away Lewis Napoleon ; but the point is, that it has aggrandised itself by carrying away Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Duchies.

And what shall we say of the Legations ? I will not enter on the discussion of such a subject as the personal character of Lewis Napoleon. "He has again and again disowned any purpose of touching the Pope's temporal power." *Transeat*. The fact remains that, within the last two months, the French government has officially proposed the Pope's surrender of the Legations ; the fact remains, that the whole gospel of democratic despotism—the Code Napoléon in its fullness—is at this moment being pressed on the unarmed sovereign of a third-rate principality by the master of an army of six hundred thousand men ; the fact remains, that a threat has been uttered, in the hearing of all Europe, of the "anarchy and terror" that shall follow if this "respectful counsel" is not obeyed. Let them follow. The Papal government may need reform, like others ; its machinery may be cumbrous, or its administration inefficient. But these are not the things in question now. The struggle is for principles ; and through all history the temporal sovereignty of the Popes has had this honour, that it has been, in a special way, the rock on which great principles of social wrong have split and ultimately perished. "Shall it be peace ?" we are asked, "or shall it be anarchy and terror ?" First, then, and above all things, not peace in the sense in which "the Empire is peace." Better the sea at its wildest than the smooth approach to the whirlpool ; better the confessor dying in exile than the abomination that maketh desolate reigning in the holy place.

16th October 1859.

Σίγνα.

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#### PALMERSTON ON ARCHITECTURE.

SIR,—I do not doubt that the *Rambler* numbers among its readers many members of the legislative body, as well as a host of their constituents, to say nothing of a discerning public, whose expressed opinion exercises, from time to time, a salutary influence in restraining the vagaries of those who are good enough to sit in high places



for the purpose of directing the vessel (or rather craft) of the State. My object in seeking a little space at your hands is, to direct attention to a vagary which, if suffered to run its course unchecked, will jostle against justice, and oust Mr. Gilbert Scott from his fairly-earned privilege of perpetuating in stone and brick his very admirable design for a building which is to belong to the nation, not to a Secretary of State,—to be paid for out of the national treasury, not out of a right honourable's pocket.

All was going on well till Saul appeared among the prophets, Pam among the professors; when, most unexpectedly, such a lecture was read from his self-constituted chair of architecture by the versatile premier as roused all the latent animosities of Goth and anti-Goth; and poor Mr. Scott appears not unlikely to be sacrificed to empty clamour. It is difficult to analyse Professor Palmerston's discourse. Architecture, he says, is of two kinds, Gothic and Italian. Gothic is the dull medieval style, which came in with the monks, and went out with the Reformation. It is heavy and gloomy. It is only fit for Jesuits. It lets in too much light. It shuts out light altogether. It is but a foreign excrescence, which never took fair root on British soil, but overgrew and disfigured the stem of national art like a fungus. One can't read the *Times* in a Gothic room, nor answer an invitation to Compiègne. It is dangerous to all intellects, and fatal to the slender wits of *some* Foreign Secretaries. The other style of architecture is the Italian. All buildings not Gothic are Italian. This is the style the Jesuits hate. It is the style of progress, of gas, railways, telegrams, and finally of comfort. And in this faith I will live and die, exclaimed the professor by way of peroration. "One unwise person makes many," says the proverb; and it is not wonderful that Lord Palmerston's tirade should have been followed by a deputation of "architects" to himself, to thank him humbly for his learned exposition, to beg him to use all his great influence to punish their erring brother by depriving him of his ill-gained supremacy, and kindly to—employ one or more of themselves instead. I think ill-taste and ill-feeling never went further. Of the gentlemen composing the deputation, a very few were entitled to the name of "architect" at all. The greater number were mere builders and surveyors, purveyors of the brick-and-plaster boxes we call houses; hardly competent, perhaps, to plan a "desirable family residence," with its due proportion of cellarage, kitchen, and stables, and "a spacious entrance-hall;" but as innocent of any real acquaintance with the principles of the glorious art of architecture as the masons and bricklayers employed by them to raise their "mansions" into being.

In reply to this ungracious display of professional paltriness, allow me to trespass a little further on your space, in order that we may ascertain, by a short review of the performances of the "school" of Mr. Scott's opponents, whether any good or sound architectural grounds exist for inflicting an act of injustice on a gentleman who is beyond question at the head of the Gothic architects of his day.

Begin with a *Government* building—the new Houses of Parliament, or Palace of Westminster. Here we have the real fountain of parliamentary ill-will to Gothic. Grand as is the block of masonry, from sheer bulk chiefly, but also to some extent from its arrangement, nobody can deny that this costly pile is, on the whole, a splendid failure. Sunk in the ground, nearly to the water level, its long-extended and featureless façade all but destroys the height and dignity of its many (and mostly useless) towers, turrets, and spires. The interior has proved uncomfortable, and in every way ill adapted to the various purposes required. The mass of exterior decoration is wearisome in its endless repetition of the unmeaning forms of a debased period of art, and has been happily described as mere Gothic *vener*. Now in all this I find nothing against Mr. Scott. The first mistake lay in the choice of a bad style. The second, and greater, in intrusting the execution to a gentleman whose studies and taste had evidently led him in another direction, and who was notoriously incompetent to deal with Gothic art, at least on such a scale. It is childish not to see that the size and arrangement of rooms and corridors must resolve itself, not into a question of style, but of convenience—how difficult a question, is shown in the wretchedly-planned houses in which hundreds of us live, and which prove both the hardness of the task and the incompetence of the designers. A *well-planned* building may be carried out, in Gothic or any other style, without in the slightest degree being affected thereby as to its intended purpose.

For an example of a building designed for the custody of public documents, we may walk down Fetter Lane. Here, unfinished, after the fashion of most public works, is the Record Office. This too is in a Gothic style. The principal features are a curious parapet and a central tower, so vigorously machicolated, that Sir John Romilly will have no difficulty in flinging down his wig, or pouring boiling oil (or melted butter), on the devoted heads of any hungry crowd that may attack his rolls. The tower is undeniably the best part of the design; but its appropriateness may be questioned. I think Mr. Scott stands in no danger from the Record Office. We now leave legislation and law, and turn to finance and commerce. The Bank of England is the work of three successive architects, two dead and one living, who have presented us with a classic wall, blank windows and impermeable doors, pillars that support nothing, and steps that lead nowhere. The whole encloses the usual labyrinth of ill-contrived ugly rooms, divided by dark corridors and impracticable staircases. Trade is represented by the Royal Exchange. Here we have a fine Roman portico, through which we do *not* enter the temple of commerce, the architect having probably come professionally to the conclusion that the ways of merchants are not invariably straightforward. The sides of the shrine, in a true spirit of economy, are devoted to a series of minute shops, where Mr. Betts teaches the fiddle, Mr. Wyld, M.P., sells his maps, and a host of others emulate the busy bee. Before quitting the outside, let us glance up at



the wonderful bell-tower that adorns the further end of the roof, and the strange windmills and scientific toys with which "Lloyd's" completes the classic *tout ensemble*. On entering by the side of the temple, we find no cellar (the cellar is below, and sacred to the Bur-tonian gods, Bassus and Allsopius), but a cloistered quadrangle, where Victoria Regina does duty for Mercurius, in the centre of what may truly be termed a grand impluvium, which lets down all the rain and fogs of London on the heads of the unhappy shiverers in pursuit of gain who throng the court. Loyalty should at least have provided her majesty with an umbrella, for the sceptre is already in danger of slipping from her crumbling fingers; "Queen's Weather" does not respect the queen in marble under a City sky.

For science we turn to the British Museum. I am certainly not insensible to the calm severity of this elaborate reproduction of the Greek forms, and the effect of its dignified beauty on the mind. Any thing, however, worse fitted to its purpose cannot be conceived. The space which is now so loudly called for is all wasted. A museum requires abundant room and light, thorough ventilation, and ready means of access and passage to its various divisions. In all these respects the British Museum is wanting. The Museum headache, and the Museum fleas, are well known. The heroes of Phidias, the Cæsars and Pharaohs, the gods and goddesses, no doubt feel at home; but not so the birds, beasts, and little fishes. A gigantic peristyle befits the one, but it overwhelms the other. In a well-considered Italian or Gothic building all could have found comfortable and fitting abodes: Jupiter and his eagle, Juno and her peacock, Venus and her doves. I must not quit the Museum without a word in condemnation of the enormous *grille* in front, which suggests an idea that the place is a lunatic asylum (on coercion principles) for crack-brained Solons and Platos.

Art finds its dwelling-place in Trafalgar Square. This, the "finest site in Europe," is laid out by one great architect, embellished with statues—horse, foot, and in the air—by other artists, and terminated by the palace of painting. The poor one-armed stylite who does penance on the column in front, wisely turns his back on this choice specimen of the pepper-box taste. Peace to the ashes of the builder. He was consistent in one thing at least. The inside of his building is as bad as the outside; and justice has been done him by those who provided the cavalry and infantry, squirts and terraces, asphalte and posts, which make up the "balance" of the beauties of Trafalgar Square.

How letters have fared, we may see in the Strand and in Gower Street. It is difficult to assign any style to King's College and the London University other than the thumbnail, trowel, or bricklayers' classic; a style, notwithstanding, that enjoyed the sole favour of many lately-deceased architects of great reputation, and which is by no means discarded by their pupils and successors. Examples of it abound in the City; the most prominent, perhaps, being the General Post-Office in St. Martin's-le-Grand. The architect's notion was, no

doubt, to teach us how many useful and valuable qualities may be mated with an appallingly ugly exterior ; and if so, he has carried out his idea very successfully.

Here I think I may stop. We have no ecclesiastical edifices of a national character later than St. Paul's. Much as I admire that truly grand building, I must throw it out of consideration in the present instance, since Sir Christopher Wren was not of the deputation, nor, as I am of opinion, any representative of his genius. In mere church-building, the Goths have it hollow ; unless the author of the portico in Regent Street, and of the caryatides in the New Road, is inclined to try conclusions with a host of adversaries.

Now, sir, I again ask, whether the buildings to which I have briefly called attention (and which constitute the bulk of the really public edifices of the metropolis), by beauty of design, convenience of arrangement, or general fitness to purpose, afford one scintilla of reason for throwing aside Mr. Scott in favour of the school which produced them ? It seems to me the answer must be emphatically in the negative. I have no personal acquaintance with Mr. Scott, and protest against all partisanship. I hope I have cultivated what amount of taste nature has given me in far too generous a spirit not to acknowledge merit wherever I find it. According to my view of art, it is very possible for the same mind to appreciate justly the Parthenon and Milan Cathedral, a picture by Fra Angelico or Raffaele and one by Ruysdael or Hogarth. Of course, like all men who have at all studied the subject, I may have my own theories and my own crotchets ; but I must not permit them to mislead me in dealing with a question which involves, not considerations of art alone, but somewhat of equity also. The attack on Mr. Scott savours strongly of the jobbery which has made our national works contemptible ; and no jobbery is more offensive than that of Government, when, Dalilah-like, it lavishes its hypocritical caresses on some poor art-Samson whose place is wanted for a more pliable and obedient humble servant.

I hope, sir, you and I may live to see Mr. Scott's building *un fait accompli*.

F. C.

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#### THE CULTUS OF THE ENGLISH MARTYRS.

SIR,—Your correspondent Y. Z., who is of great authority in these matters, has told me that he considers the letter signed C. W., in the September *Rambler*, as of extreme importance ; and that, if collateral proof could be obtained of that which Yepes reports of Gregory XIII., the reëstablishment and extension of the cultus of the English martyrs would take place as a matter of course, just like that of Blessed Azevedo and his forty companions, which has been lately restored at the suit of the Jesuits.

I believe that inquiry has been made at Rome both at the Gesù



and at the Vatican. In spite of all diligence, no *procès verbal* of the concession of Gregory has been discovered. I do not suppose that the archives have been properly searched; and the treasures of the English college, where some duplicate was probably kept, have all been dispersed. We therefore come under the principle of law: "Though a writing be not necessary to the essence and validity of a concession, and though a grant does not expire with the death of the grantee, as a command expires with the death of the commander; yet *in foro exteriori* proof is so requisite, that unless the concession can be proved, it must be reckoned as not having been conceded; because *in foro externo de non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio*."

But if no *procès verbal* of the original concession can be found, can no proof be brought that some such grant was extant, by the fact that the decree of Urban VIII. was not applied to the English martyrs? Can we find no instances of the public cultus of them or their relics allowed or connived at by the ordinaries in places where the decree had been published?

In the *Rambler* of August 1857, there was published a certificate by the Duke of Gueldres of the authenticity of certain relics which he had brought from England. In it he says, that as the persecutions of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth "gave many martyrs to the Church, many patron saints to the Christian world," so did that of 1640-45, when the martyrs whom he named suffered, of whom he procured relics, which he took with him to Paris in 1645, and, he says, had preserved to this day (July 1650) in his treasury; "wherein, as we intend to enclose them all, we have judged it necessary to publish this testimony, lest oblivion should ever erase the glory of these most renowned martyrs. We therefore, desiring more and more to promote the worship of God and the honour of the saints, and having no dearer wish than that the aforesaid venerable martyrs should be worshipped, venerated, and honoured as they should be, have made known" that the martyrs died for their faith, and that we recovered the relics named in the list which follows. "In witness of all which we have signed with our own hand and sealed with our own seal this testimonial, valid for future as well as present times; and have ordered our *almoner*, in his official capacity, to sign it in the name of all our domestics."

The Duke of Gueldres, as he called himself, was of the royal house, but *desdichado*, and treated by Spain as a pretender: he had lived in England as Count d'Egmont. After his retirement to Paris, he seems to have kept up his royal style, like the Stuarts in Rome, and the Bourbons in Austria and England. As a layman, his authority is not much, but his almoner must have been under the authority of the ordinary. The copy of this certificate was found among the papers removed from the English Benedictine nuns at Cambray to the archivium at Lille.

Rayssius, in his *Hierogazophylacium Belgicum*, published in 1628, gives a long list, occupying pp. 165-173, of 135 martyrs of the English College at Douai, "de quibus haud paucas adservant reliquias,

sed quod divorum catalogo adscripti non sunt, venerationi publicæ minime exponunt." Then comes the passage, No. 4 in C. W.'s letter. P. 174, Rayssius describes the relics of the martyrs in the Benedictine college of St. Gregory at Douai without any such reservation, but exactly as if they were publicly exposed: thus, "Caput Marci Barkworth martyris, ord. D. Benedicti, et sacerdotis, panno serico tectum et ornatum." Rayssius' book appeared *three years after* the decree of Urban VIII.

My other instances are previous to Urban's decree, and may be added to those adduced by C. W. In a book by John Gee, an apostate, *The Foot out of the Snare*, printed 1624, the year before Urban's decree, there are curious extracts from books which I can nowhere find now. For instance, p. 48, he refers to "Richard Conway, Apology, p. 281. One M. Anderton, a Lancashire gent, cured of the stone by relics of Father Campion. And being afterwards of another disease laid out for dead (*ut ei jam pollices ligarentur*), by the help of the martyr's flesh laid on his body he was raised to life." Again, p. 49: "What admirable virtue do our Papists conceive to be in the poor relics of Story, Felton, Somerville, Arden, Parry, Lopez, Garnet, Campion, &c. ! The very paring of their nails doth help to do miracles. *Their pictures are so sanctified, that they are hung over the altars.*"

There was some story connected with Campion's girdle, for which he refers to *Edmund's Book of Miracles*. Other books on like subjects were written, or published, by Heigham and Sheldon, Catholics, and by Baddeley and Harsenet, Protestants, which doubtless contain quotations from books or writings no longer to be found.

In a confession of Anthony Tyrrel, another apostate, June 25, 1602, concerning the exorcisms that were much used by the priests about 1585,\* he says: "As touching the several manners of disposing the said persons, and of their fits, trances, and visions, divers discourses were penned, amongst the which I myself did pen one. Mr. Edmunds likewise writ (I am persuaded) a quire of paper of Mr. Mainy's pretended visions. . . . *We omitted* not the relics and bones of Mr. Campion, Mr. Sherwin, Mr. Brian, and Mr. Cottam to have some little testimony by implication from the devil to prove them holy martyrs." Tyrrel owns that the converts made by witnessing these exorcisms were very numerous: "Indeed, our proceedings therein had for a time wonderful success. I cannot in my conscience esteem the number fewer than, in the compass of half a year, were by that means reconciled to the Church of Rome, than five hundred persons; some have said three or four thousand."†

Gee also tells us (p. 86) that, on Good Friday 1624, there was in the morning a procession of Catholics to the gallows at Tyburn from Holborn; p. 89, he exclaims, in reference to it, "Is there no other

\* For these exorcisms, see Challoner, in the *Life of Richard Dibdale*; and Yepes, *History of the Persecution*, lib. ii. cap. 13, referred to by him.

† Apud Foulis, *History of Romish Treasons and Usurpations*, second edit. 1681, p. 345.



place in England left sacred and unpolluted? . . . . It was ancient to visit *memorias martyrum*; and so the sending of disciples to visit Tyburn maketh a deep impression on their minds of the saintliness of some that have been hanged there." As if the pilgrimage caused the impression, instead of the impression causing the pilgrimage!

I might quote another apostate, Bell, who bears testimony in his *Anatomy of Popery*, p. 97, that when the news of the martyrdom of Campion and his companions first came to Rome, "Father Alphonsus, the Jesuit, then rector of the English college in Rome, caused the organs to be sounded in the chapel, and all the students to come to the chapel (of which number myself was one); and then and there he himself, putting on his back a white surplice, to signify forsooth the purity of the martyrdom, and the stole about his neck, sang a collect of martyrs, so after his manner canonising Campion the rebel as a saint." And, he adds, "it is usual among the English Papists to keep the relics of Campion, Sherwin, and the rest." The office used in the English chapel enforces the effect of the paintings which the Pope caused to be placed there, and surely furnishes some corroborative evidence to Yepes' assertion.

Yet, as these things happened before the date of Urban's decree, but not long enough before it to constitute the period of "immemorial use," for which 100 years are required, I omit them. I have collected these memoranda chiefly to show the kind of books in which we may expect to find clues to the missing evidence.

R. S.

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### CATHOLIC POLICY, AND THE TEMPORAL PROSPERITY OF THE CHURCH.

SIR,—It has struck me, that a question which has been agitated in your columns,—Is temporal prosperity a note of the Church?—is closely connected with another mooted in an article in your last Number,—Is there a Catholic policy? If temporal prosperity is a note of the Church, it either grows out of the social action of the virtues which she encourages in the body of her children, or it arises from her premeditated influence over political movements; that is, it is either a spontaneous development of Christian manners, or it is a designed exhibition of Catholic contrivance.

1. If the promised temporal prosperity of the Church (for it *is* promised in the words "these things shall be added to you") was destined to arise from the spontaneous efflorescence of Christian manners, the backward condition of Catholic countries may be caused by the interference of other laws, equally belonging to the Christian system. For instance, the law, "judgment begins at the House of God,"\* may explain how, with equal moral merit or de-

\* 1 Pet. iv. 17; Jerem. xxv. 29; Ezech. ix. 6.

merit, the Catholic, who professes to aim at heavenly things, but has an eye upon earth, loses the earth; while the separatist, who professes that to do one's duty to the world is to do one's duty to God, gains the world. The gain of the latter may be his whole reward; the loss of the former may be either his whole punishment or his warning. As in nature, the higher the organisation the more unstable is the equilibrium of its component parts, which are more exposed to dissolution and death—so, perhaps, in grace, that union of discordant elements which constitutes the profitableness of godliness, the promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come, may be the most unstable, the most nicely balanced, the soonest upset. The corruption of the best nature is not only most fatal, but it begins earliest and progresses most rapidly.

In most questions, and in this among others, the simplest is not the most rational solution. It is not true to say absolutely either that prosperity is, or that it is not, a note of the Church; because, though Catholicity, consistently carried out in a population, might blossom into great temporal happiness, yet, on the other hand, those professing the true religion may be the first to be punished for their shortcomings. One of your correspondents says, "Almsgiving is a truer note of the Church than temporal prosperity." Here, too, I think I see that devotion to simplicity of view, which leads to grave mistakes. Doubtless it is, *primâ facie*, most excellent to give all my goods to feed the poor. But if I do it promiscuously, without considering that I encourage in one family idleness and improvidence, in another drunkenness, and in another deceit and deception, I may mean well, but I certainly act foolishly. The *Edinburgh Review* may be right, when it says that the corruption of the Roman population arises mainly from the boundless charitable endowments, which pauperise the city; and yet almsgiving may remain one of the highest Christian virtues, and Rome the centre of the true religion. For the objection is not against the religion of the individuals who endowed the hospitals, or of the government which allowed the endowment; but against the wisdom of the policy which could not foresee the evils which would arise from it.

2. And this brings me to consider temporal prosperity as it arises from the prudence of political combinations, and from the provisions which foresight makes against coming calamities. As the spontaneous development of Christian manners, it is the harmlessness of the dove; now, it is the wisdom of the serpent. Here the laws seem to interfere as much as in the former case. If one proverb tells us that "honesty is the best policy," another says, "happy is the son whose father goeth to the devil." Goodness is not always successful; why should orthodoxy be? Vice triumphs; why not heresy? If political prudence and foresight are an appanage of Catholicity, they should belong either to its saints or to its hierarchy. They should be a gift of God, given to the saints; or else, like sacramental grace, they should be attached to offices and to hierarchies. But consider how the saint is lifted more and more out



of the world; how the world becomes more and more irksome to him; and how he necessarily inclines to rule all temporal affairs with an eye to man's spiritual good; his first political maxim is, temporal matters are subject to spiritual. What a confusion this leads him into if his subjects are not spiritually inclined! Cardinal Hippolytus d'Este used to say,\* "It may easily happen that the best man is not the best prince; I prefer a physician who has himself been ill. He who requires men to do more than human nature is equal to, is not fit to rule. Miserable are they whose only safety is innocence! You wonder at the weakness of your subjects—they wonder at your strength. He who will not on occasion connive at lesser sins, may drive men into greater. We must not put up with wickedness—no; but if you will not put up with any wickedness, you will not put up with men." For as moral vices are not necessarily political vices, so there are political vices which are not moral vices, but which the moral man may fall into as easily and as fatally as the sinner.

Does the gift, then, attach to the hierarchy? Was not all the legislation, were not all the free institutions, of Europe the works of Catholic policy, emanating directly from the Catholic hierarchy? No doubt this is true to a great extent. But there are exceptions, so large as to show that the rule is by no means a certain one. Thus, under the Arian Emperor Constans, "whilst the imperial prefects were driving the orthodox prelates from their sees, and were enthroning Bishops after their own hearts, by a reciprocation which hardly compensated for these evils, the Christian counsellors of the emperors went on transfusing into the laws the general principles of their religion, and daily digging deeper the foundations of the station which the clergy were to occupy in the body politic."† It is to such doubtful characters as Constantine and Constans that we owe the christianising of the Roman jurisprudence. If they had been fervent Catholics, like Anthony, or Pachomius, or Athanasius, would they have done it better? I cannot venture to affirm it. I can easily fancy, that the worldly Arian Bishops made better politicians than Catholics after the type of the Fathers of the desert. The aspiration for perfection, which drove men into the wilderness, stripped them of their goods to feed the poor, preached asceticism and celibacy, and despised the world, had little in common with the policy which aimed at nothing higher than peace, prosperity, and order. The ideal perfection of the Catholic is unworldliness, that of the politician is confined to the world. To legislate for the world requires a knowledge of the world, and a sympathy with its material interests; which Constans might more readily have found in the worldly Arian Bishops that followed his court than in the ascetic Catholic prelates whom he chased from their sees.

Policy, so far as I can see, is neither one of the ordinary nor one

\* Muretus, *Variae lectiones*, lib. xvi. c. 4.

† Prince Albert de Broglie, *L'Eglise et l'Empire Romain*, part ii. vol. i. p. 126.

of the extraordinary gifts of God to the Church. We may easily find the highest developments of political wisdom among pagans or heretics. Bossuet maintained the thesis, "A government may be perfect in its kind, and in relation to the rights of human society, without being united to the true priesthood or the true religion,"—not morally perfect, he explains, but politically perfect ; legitimate in its origin, obligatory on the conscience of its subjects, and sovereign and independent in its own sphere. Policy, then, is a human gift, an endowment of nature. It is an art, a habit of intellect, which is formed by having the widest possible dealings with men in the most diverse relations of life. Of educated men, the worst politicians, I suppose, are physical philosophers, whose whole life has been passed with the stars, or with stones and plants and animals. Next come medical men, who consider man simply as a vital organism. How different from these is the instinctive political power of great generals, who show themselves even more varied in resources in administering than in conducting armies ! But the education of the statesman in England is that which brings a man into the most varied relations with others. As a boy, the heterogeneous company he meets at his father's table, and the keepers and grooms who guard his sports, introduce him to all grades of society ; school and the University are little worlds to him, where he meets hundreds more who have had home experiences like his, and yet unlike ; then, as squire, or barrister, or manufacturer, or magistrate, or sheriff, he is introduced to ever-new phases of society ; till at last in parliamentary parties he finds the top of the ladder of his political education, and from it he steps at once into the sphere of imperial rule. The priest appears to occupy a middle place between these extremes ; he has to do with men, but only under one aspect ; he has only to direct and persuade them in matters of morals and religion. Morals and religion, though the highest aims of man, do not exhaust the field of politics ; nay, as you proved in your last Number, have very little to do with the great mass of political questions. But from these questions the education of the clergy keeps them quite aloof. Since the Council of Trent, we do not look for men becoming priests, except they have been professionally educated for that function. We do not see the governor of a city suddenly made its Bishop, as St. Ambrose ; nor a man preparing for the archbishopric of Canterbury by the high-chancellorship of England, like St. Thomas. Nor do we look for prelates who have served their time to the world as orators and teachers of rhetoric, like St. Cyprian, St. Augustine, or St. Basil, who says,\* "my age, and the multifarious experience I have had, and especially the ample share I have enjoyed of those changes, good and bad, which are the real teachers of every thing, have made me so familiar with human affairs, that I am in a position to point out the safest path to those who are just entering on the journey of life." Ever since the Council of Trent separated the seminaries from the secular schools, took boys of twelve and marked them for the ecclesi-

\* Homily on the uses of reading the books of the Gentiles, sect. i.



astical state, tonsured them, clothed them in cassocks, and immersed them in the peculiar learning and duties of ecclesiastics, in chanting and studying the calendar, in Scripture and fathers, in administration of sacraments, rites, and ceremonies, making them for their recreation exercise themselves in the functions of the choir,—ever since, the preparation for the ecclesiastical state, instead of being a step towards, has been a positive hindrance to the attainment of civil and political eminence. Henceforth it is not among the edifying portion of the clergy that we look for statesmen; the Richelieus and Mazarens belong to a more worldly sphere. College is only a preparation for the world so far forth as the college is a little world in itself. The separation of ecclesiastical from secular education has been the separation of ecclesiastical from secular functions, and the day of the great ecclesiastical politicians has gone by.

It seems to me, then, that Catholic policy, if considered as a right inherent in the Catholic hierarchy to direct the legislative and political movements of states, is becoming more and more impossible. Not because holy orders take from a man his natural gifts,—God forbid!—but because the professional education now provided for the clergy is no preparation at all for politics. This, of course, does not apply to those clergymen who have entered that state late in life; they doubtless may have the double advantage of a wide experience of the world, and of the professional training of the seminary.

I hope that nothing that I have said will be considered as breathing any sentiment but the most profound respect and veneration for men who devote their lives to save us from dying out of the grace of God, and who voluntarily cut themselves off from the education which brings worldly preëminence, in order that they may more perfectly fulfil the Apostolic ideal of knowing nothing but Christ crucified.

X.

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#### ROSMINI AND GIOBERTI.

DEAR SIR,—I have read in an article entitled “Rosmini and Gioberti,” in the last Number of the *Rambler*, that the only way to deal a decisive blow to pantheism, is to establish the relation between existence and God as a primitive intuition of conscience. In stating that this is the philosophy of Italy, the writer of the article is wide of the mark. In Italy, the term “*Ens creat existentias*” is considered as expressive of the fundamental dogma of theology no less than of philosophy; and it is looked upon as any thing but an immediate intuition of conscience—unless, indeed, you would confound the peculiar views of individuals with the true philosophy of Italy. In Italy, the term “*Ens creat existentias*” is regarded as an algebraical formula, by means of which may be solved an indefinite number of problems which have reference to the pantheistic errors of the day. And it is to be observed, that in Italy it is held that it

follows the course of an algebraical formula, which is not arrived at by an immediate intuition of conscience, as those great men who discovered them could demonstrate; for "*Ens creat existentias*" is not the *first* idea of the mind, but the *last*, to which it reaches by means of a consecutive process of reasoning; and it is the ultimate complement of its knowledge. This complement supposes the knowledge or intuition of existing things,—*e. g.* especially of the *ένω*,—of their properties, powers, laws, and relations. All this knowledge precedes the intuition of that which is the last of their relations, which is expressed by the formula "*Ens creat existentias*." Hence it is a mistake to wish to put first in the logical order that which comes last. "*Ens creat existentias*," which is logically last, comes first, however, in the supernatural order. Thus the Apostles' Creed begins, "Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem, creatorem cœli et terræ." Divine faith has a light special to itself, and provides the mind with a groundwork upon which it may rest, and descend from the Eternal Being, the one Great Cause, to existence. This inverse order St. Buonaventura follows in his *Itinerarium*, as well as others before and after him. But observe: this inverse order is mystical, and does not militate against the Rationalist, who starts from the existences of which he has a knowledge. In his scientific works, however, St. Buonaventura follows the logical order. Of many citations which might be made, let the following suffice (lib. i. Sent. disput. xxii. quest. 3): "Cum nos non cognoscamus Deum nisi per creaturas, nos eum non nominamus nisi per nomina creaturarum."

Being interested, as an Italian, that spurious wares should not be circulated as genuine Italian productions, I have taken the liberty of addressing these few lines to you, sir, in the hope that they may find a place in your next Number.

G.\*

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#### THE EPISCOPAL SEE OF ST. MARTIN, CANTERBURY.

SIR,—Some time ago I saw in the *Rambler* an allusion to a curious detail of English ecclesiastical history, which I should desire to see cleared up: I offer the following notes, not with any pretence of exhausting the subject, but with the hope that my short essay may induce some one, with more leisure and more special knowledge than I can command, to elucidate the matter completely.

In the first volume of the *Monasticum Anglicanum* there is a plate of St. Augustin's Abbey at Canterbury. The view, which was taken about 1655, from the cathedral tower, is bounded by an irregular curved line, representing the wall of the abbey. Outside this wall, about the middle of the picture, there is a massive tower,

\* The foregoing letter is from a distinguished theologian, a fellow-countryman of Rosmini, whose assertions in such a matter are worthy of all attention.—ED.



and behind it a nave and transept. This is the ancient Church of St. Martin. I do not know that any one has made a special study of this church; the editors of the new edition of the *Monasticon* scarcely mention it. The writer of the Life of St. Augustin, in the Collection of Lives of the English Saints, has been equally meagre; and I have not seen any work which treats it more fully. Nevertheless a very singular history attaches to it, the principal point being that for 400 years, and perhaps more, it was a Bishop's see.

Bede is the first to mention the matter. "There was on the east side of the city a church dedicated to the honour of St. Martin, built whilst the Romans were still in the island, wherein the queen (Bertha), who, as has been said before, was a Christian, used to pray. In this they (St. Augustin and his companions) first began to meet, to sing, to pray, to say Mass, to preach and to baptise, till the king, being converted to the faith, allowed them to preach openly and build or repair churches in all places."\*

Here we see that the church was built before the fifth century. Ussher† refers to Radulf de Diceto and the Annals of Combes to prove that it was built by St. Lucius, the first Christian king of the Britons. I have no reason to deny the fact. St. Martin of Tours, who is doubtless the person after whom the church is now called, was indeed much later than Lucius; but the church had been violated by Hengist or his companions, and had to be dedicated anew by Liudhard, the ex-Bishop of Senlis, who accompanied Bertha, daughter of Charibert king of Paris, when she came to marry Ethelbert king of Kent. It was natural to call the church by the name of Martin; both Liudhard and Bertha were French. And that Liudhard had to reconsecrate the building is far from being a mere assumption. St. Augustin was in the same case. Venerable Bede says expressly, "Augustin having his episcopal see granted him in the royal city, . . . and being supported by the king, recovered therein a church, which he was informed had been built by the ancient Roman Christians, and consecrated it in the name of our holy Saviour God and Lord, Jesus Christ, and there established a residence for himself and his successors."‡

The objection to St. Martin's church having been built by Lucius, is its site outside the town. Now it does not appear that in that age there were any suburban churches but cemetery chapels and monastic basilicas. St. Martin's seems to have been much too considerable a place to be reckoned as a mere cemetery chapel; this would seem to force upon us the conclusion that it was originally monastic. But here comes in the difficulty. For a long time, historians, whether Catholic or Protestant, confounding *monks* with *hermits*, have made it an axiom that the first monasteries date from the end of the third century, forgetting that even before St. Paul, "the first hermit," many congregations of hermits existed in the East. Hence they cannot allow that St. Lucius built the church of St. Martin.

\* Hist. lib. i. c. xxvi. Giles's trans.

† Brit. Eccl. Antiq. p. 68, edit. 1687.

‡ Lib. i. c. xxxiii.

But this axiom has been so completely disproved, that no man with any knowledge of the historical progress of the last century would now think of defending it. Long before the time of Lucius we find monks almost every where in the Church; Ussher\* has collected the testimonies of their presence in England; though several centuries later than Lucius, they are not lightly to be disregarded; but stronger proofs are desirable. Still we must not forget that, as far as ever we can push our researches into the ancient British Church, we find the monastic life flourishing; so much so, that it is the very basis of the ecclesiastical régime. These considerations, however, are far from being decisive. And it must be owned, with some regret, that no writer anterior to the Norman Conquest has attributed the foundation of St. Martin's to the first Christian British king.† We must, then, content ourselves with the assurance that the church was built before the Romans quitted the island. On this point Bede's testimony is decisive. Moreover, the present state of the church attests its Roman origin. Not that I suppose the actual building to be that which existed in St. Augustin's time; I agree with Gibbs, that "the present church of St. Martin is not the old one spoken of by Bede, as it is generally thought to be, but is a structure of the thirteenth century; though it is probable that the materials of the original church were worked up in the masonry on its reconstruction, the walls being still composed in part of Roman bricks." Here, as we have seen, Queen Bertha prayed; and here Liudhard performed the functions of his ministry, after reconsecrating the church, as we are expressly told in the ancient legend preserved by Capgrave, and in Goselin's life of St. Augustin.

But a far more important fact is, that a real episcopal see existed in this church till after the Conquest. We have several proofs of this; the oldest being, if I am not mistaken, in the life of Bishop Lanfranc, by Milo-Crispin, monk of Bec, and a contemporary of St. Anselm. He says,‡ "In a suburb of Canterbury is a church of St. Martin, in which (it is reported) there was in old times an episcopal see; and (as they say) it had a Bishop before Lanfranc passed over to those parts. But as the authority of the canons evidently forbids that there should be two Bishops together in one city, Lanfranc ordered that a Bishop should be no longer ordained for the place." The parentheses, *ut fertur, ut aiunt*, do not in the least compromise the authority of this account. Milo employs them only because the facts came to him by report, and because he wondered at them. But the fact of Lanfranc's order being made, distinctly proves that when he first came over, there was a Bishop of St.

\* pp. 66, sqq.

† We should be glad to see the question of King Lucius fully discussed by our learned correspondent. He is doubtless aware of the grave reasons that exist for doubting the story altogether. It would be especially interesting to have the matter treated with reference to Schöll, *De ecclesiasticæ Britonum Scotorumque Historiæ Fontibus*. Berol. 1850.—Ed.

‡ cap. xiii. num. 32.



Martin's. Gervaise of Canterbury, in his *Acts of the Archbishops*, says, in the chapter about St. Elphege, "the Archbishop of Canterbury once had a *chorepiscopus*, who resided in the church of St. Martin's, outside the town; but when Lanfranc came he was abolished, as we understand was the case all over the world." From a comparison of these passages, it appears that St. Martin's was a cathedral church, and that its titular Bishop was *chorepiscopus* of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Not that he was a *chorepiscopus* proper; we have precise information about his functions. Wharton\* gives a historical fragment on the institution of the archdeaconry of Canterbury, written early in the fourteenth century, which contains some special information about the see of St. Martin. "From the time of St. Augustin, the first Archbishop of Canterbury, to that of Archbishop Lanfranc of blessed memory, for 472 years there was no archdeacon in the city or diocese of Canterbury. But from the time of Bishop Theodore, the sixth from St. Augustin, to that of Lanfranc aforesaid, there was in the church of St. Martin, in the suburb of Canterbury, a Bishop, who was ordained by Theodore with authority of Pope Vitalian, and who in the whole city and diocese of Canterbury supplied for the Archbishop in ordinations, consecrations of churches, confirmations, and other episcopal offices, for he had all jurisdiction in the city and diocese by authority of the Archbishop, when the see was full; in the absence of the Archbishop and vacancy of the see, he exercised the authority of the chapter over the whole province for 399 years, to the time of Lanfranc aforesaid." This shows, first, that the Bishop of St. Martin's had no *ordinary* jurisdiction in the diocese of Canterbury; he was not even what the Germans call a *Weihbischof*, or suffragan, with a title *in partibus*. These often perform episcopal functions, even in presence of the Bishops, and moreover supply the place of Vicars-general. Nor, secondly, was the Bishop of St. Martin's an archdeacon. He had no other duties to the see of Canterbury than to supply for the absent Archbishop, and to fulfil at his death the duties which, since the Council of Trent, have been those of the *Vicar Capitular*. Doubtless all this was precarious at first; but established customs grow up by the mere repetition of things done simply by deputy. No other writer than the one just quoted assigns the establishment of the see of St. Martin's to the times of Theodore, or the authority of Pope Vitalian; no trace of this opinion is found in the numerous writings on the administration of the archbishopric. In the letter of Vitalian to Theodore, confirming to him all the rights formerly conferred on Augustin, there is not a word about the establishment of a Bishop to supply for the Archbishop, absent or dead. Moreover it is clear, from Milo's account, that Lanfranc knew of no particular papal authority, as he abolished the see simply as contrary to the canons.

Thomassin† has two passages on the see of St. Martin, sup-

\* *Anglia Sacra*, tom. i. p. 150.

† *De Disciplin. Eccles.* pars i. lib. i. c. xxix. et pars i. lib. iii. cap. xli.

pressed by Lanfranc. He thinks it was either a bishopric established in a monastery, or else a British bishopric. He shows that in many monasteries there were formerly lines of Bishops—a fact which nobody denies, but which is inapplicable to the case in hand; because it is clear that, after the restoration of the church under Ethelbert, it was never monastic. To make it a British bishopric, he says, “There is some appearance that the Bishops who resided in this church were those of the ancient Britons, as distinguished from the successors of St. Augustin, the apostle of the English. Properly it was only of the English and Saxons newly arrived from Germany into Great Britain that St. Gregory and St. Augustin were the apostles; there still were, and were for a long time afterwards, a considerable number of the ancient British who were Christians and Catholics, having their own clergy and Bishops. And if the greater part of them retired into Wales, this could not have prevented some remaining in the other provinces of so large a kingdom.” But the great difficulty of this theory is, that it is utterly inconsistent with all that we know of the districts occupied by the Anglo-Saxons, and particularly of Kent, still more of Christ Church and St. Martin’s, Canterbury.

My own opinion is simply, that St. Liudhard established a see at St. Martin’s; that the ordinary jurisdiction of the Bishop did not extend beyond the enclosure, or the cemetery, around the church; that St. Liudhard had a line of successors up to the time of Bishop Lanfranc, who, finding that they had become in a manner deputy Bishops to the Archbishop, thought that this was having two Bishops in one see, and so abolished the suburban bishopric, as contrary to the canons. Doubtless this opinion has the appearance of being a bare guess; but it has a basis partly in history, partly in ecclesiastical discipline. When the Anglo-Saxons invaded the southern and eastern parts of England, they enslaved the inhabitants who could not escape in time. St. Gildas the Wise says so. The clergy, especially the Bishops, behaved precisely as the Spanish Bishops did afterwards, at the Moorish invasion. They retired to the mountains of the west. Now it was ever a principle of ecclesiastical government, that when a Bishop is taken by pagans or schismatics, or prevented by them from administering his diocese, his see is considered in a manner vacant, and his jurisdiction devolves on his presbytery or chapter; or, in case of their dispersion, it is the duty of the neighbouring Bishops to provide as well as they can for the wants of the faithful of the widowed diocese. This principle is formally enunciated in Boniface VIII.’s decretal *Si quis Episcopus*, and applied by St. Gregory the Great to England, in his letter to Thierry and Theodebert, kings of the Franks, wherein he severely condemns the supineness of the French Bishops, in neglecting to provide for the religious wants of their neighbours, the Anglo-Saxons, whose “earnest longing for the grace of life had,” he says, “reached his ears.” Though St. Gregory only speaks here of the Anglo-Saxons, it is evident that he considers the countries occupied



by them as deprived of Bishops ; and consequently he declares that it was the duty of the French Bishops to extend their apostolic functions to them. As we have seen, Liudhard, Bishop of Senlis, had gone to Canterbury, and had fixed his chair in St. Martin's ; this was in itself the establishment of a new see ; for at that time there was no need of all the formalities now requisite, and it was no part of the general discipline that no new bishopric should be erected without the consent of the Holy See. Liudhard, then, was real Bishop of St. Martin's, but his flock was very small ; I doubt whether it was much more than Bertha and her suite. It seems certain that Liudhard would have attempted to dispose the Anglo-Saxons to receive the Gospel ; he was a saint, therefore he must have been zealous. And the letter of St. Gregory the Great to the kings of France shows that the Saxons begged to be instructed. But it seems that Ethelbert was afraid of appearing to favour the propagation of the Gospel by a Bishop who was countryman of his wife Bertha ; perhaps he did not like to seem to be under French influence, for fear of awakening the national susceptibilities,—who knows ? It is certain that Christ Church, inside the town, was not assigned to the queen and Bishop Liudhard, but that Ethelbert granted them a church situated some way out of the town ; an evident sign that his policy was not favourable to the propagation of the faith by the queen's chaplain.

It seems undeniable, then, that there were either national or personal obstacles to the zeal of Liudhard, and that his flock was very small. I need not relate how Augustin received little by little a much wider liberty of preaching, so that he soon became master of the position. The consequence was, that, as he had been the Apostle of the Anglo-Saxons, he was nominated by the Pope to the archbishopric of Canterbury. But this could not annihilate the bishopric of St. Martin's, whose rights remained inviolate, however its territory might have been straitened. These rights were only abolished about 1075. At that time Lanfranc was Archbishop ; the Bishop of St. Martin's died. The Archbishop refused to consecrate a successor. Matters remained thus for some time ; but soon afterwards the Prelate instituted the archdeaconry, and conferred it on a clergyman named Valerius, to whom he assigned a house near the monastery of St. Gregory, in one of the suburbs. The archdeacon could fulfil most of the duties which formerly fell to the Bishop of St. Martin's during the absence of the Archbishop.

After the suppression of the bishopric, the question would arise, To whom is the church to go ? Ecclesiastical law would have given it directly to the Archbishop, if the Bishop had been a suffragan of Canterbury. But though the writer of the history of the archdeaconry says that Lanfranc, "*alium substituere non decrevi*," I should be sorry to affirm that this bishopric was not, so to say, acephalous ; hence perhaps it was, that, so far as I know, his name is never found as having been present at councils, enthronisations of Archbishops, or other ceremonies, where a suffragan would natu-

rally have been. But I am far from being positive, because my researches on this point have not been sufficiently minute. And, in general, I wish this letter to be taken, not so much as a definite essay, but as a series of questions proposed to those who have more time, more sagacity, and more books on English ecclesiastical antiquities, than I have.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.

Y. Z.

### Literary Notices.

Schmidt Weissenfels: *Geschichte der französischen Revolutions-Literatur*.—*History of the Literature of the French Revolution, 1789-1795*. (Prague, 1859.) This book deserves attention as the first attempt, so far as we know, to treat of a very important but neglected branch of a popular subject. And it is the novelty of the subject, not the merit of the writer, that induces us to notice the work. Of his competency to write on French subjects, we may judge by his translating (p. 345) the title of Camille Desmoulins' paper, *Le Vieux Cordelier*, "The Old Shoemaker." Equally crude are his notions of the revolutionary theory, of which he says that "the first distinct traces are to be found in the *Telemachus* of Fenelon" (p. 4). Fenelon there addresses a king with the words, "It is by a contract made with the people that they are your subjects: will you begin by violating your fundamental title? They owe you obedience only by reason of this contract; and if you violate it, you no longer deserve that they should observe it." So far from resembling, as our author affirms, the language of the *Constituante*, this is nothing more than has been repeatedly declared by Popes and prelates, and acknowledged by the princes themselves. It is the principle of legitimate resistance. Warnings of a more direct kind were not uncommon in the age which witnessed the calamities of the last years of Louis XIV. All the great preachers of the day,—for Bossuet and Bourdaloue died in the very year of the first great reverse, the battle of Blenheim,—preached penance, and pointed out the public evils against which repentance is a remedy. Before them, Marshal Catinat is said to have been the first to say that nothing would go well until the order of things had been overturned in France. There were signs, too, which lay deeper than those of the political world. "I find," writes Leibnitz in 1703, "that opinions of this kind are gradually insinuating themselves into the minds of men of the world, who direct others, and on whom depend public affairs, and penetrate into popular books, disposing all things for the general revolution with which Europe is menaced, and utterly destroying all that remains in the world of the generous sentiments of the ancients. . . . If men can yet be cured of this epi-



demic of the mind, the bad consequences of which begin to appear, these evils will perhaps be prevented ; but if it goes on, Providence will chastise mankind by the revolution which must come from it" (*Nouveaux Essais*, l. iv. c. 16). This seems to us the most remarkable of all the prophecies of the French Revolution, because it was inspired, not by the outward aspect of public affairs, or by the prevalence of irreligion, but by the earliest symptoms of an intellectual movement, the scope of which Leibnitz was the first to understand. The mistake of representing Fenelon's warnings as forerunners of the revolutionary declamations, consists in failing to see that they are of a purely moral kind and tendency. The Revolution transferred to the order of right and politics what was true in the order of religion. Because a prophet has denounced vengeance upon a wicked king, subjects are not justified in rising against their prince. It is not theirs to judge and to punish his sins. Because all men are brethren in the eyes of the Church, that is no argument in favour of democracy. In the same way, Catholic divines, Suarez, for instance, and Mariana, have been made responsible for the crimes of regicides. Ravallac had as much right to appeal to the teaching of the Jesuits, as the followers of Cromwell to justify their acts by the examples of the Old Testament. Gregory the Great says (*Moral.* lib. xxiv. cap. 2) : "Mos medicinæ est ut aliquando similia similibus, aliquando contraria contrariis curet ;" yet we have never heard the priority of the discovery of homœopathy claimed for him.

What chiefly distinguishes the modern historical art from that of the ancients is, that the history of ideas is now understood in its bearing on the history of events. Formerly, it is true, the connection was less visible ; the movement of mind was less rapid, ideas were not so easily interchanged, their consequences were not so quickly developed as now. In the middle ages, especially, the same stock of ideas continued to furnish several generations with their motives of action : whole centuries are occupied with the same problems, and the progress is slow. The number of writers and the number of books was far less than before or since. Even then there were moments when controversy was carried on briskly, and when long discussions were concentrated into a few years. The pontificate of Gregory VII. is the earliest instance of this. The points at issue were so keenly and abundantly discussed, that we have a work on the literary history of that dispute like the one we have now before us on the period of the Revolution. To exhibit the course of ideas and the course of events in their parallel progress, and their action on each other, is a principal function of the modern historian. Still it is rather a desideratum than an achievement of our time. Much has been done, especially by French writers, to illustrate the history of a period from its writings. Something, too, has been done, particularly in England, to make history interesting and distinct by descriptions of the state of society ; and a strong materialistic tendency pervades a very popular portion of our literature. But what is really wanted, and what we ought to claim of our historians, is

the reverse of this. If history is to be understood as an intellectual, and not as a natural process, it must be studied as the history of mind. The accidental will disappear, what seems episodic and isolated will be absorbed and ranged in the harmonious course of history, in proportion as we understand the ideas which have influenced each separate country and each successive age.

Literary history is commonly treated on too confined a scale to be of very great service in this respect. It approaches the history of art more than the history of events. That species of thought which most directly and consciously influences action, is the least to be distinguished in that which is called national literature. The immediate historical importance of a work resides in its practical, not in its æsthetical character; and books of a purely practical kind are excluded from the common definition of literary history, which deals only with those which possess æsthetical, artistic merit. Writings of an ephemeral kind, in the eyes of the literary historian, possess a value and a durability of another description in the events which they have influenced. The chief sources of historical knowledge are in few cases contained in works which have great literary fame. Our knowledge of modern history is derived from a very different style of histories from those which record the Peloponnesian or the Punic war. There is, then, a vast portion of writing which has no value in the estimation of literary historians, and is therefore generally forgotten; but which is of the utmost value to history. Those books which have most influenced men,—the polemical writings of divines, and the political speculations of philosophers and statesmen,—rarely possess that sort of merit which secures renown. But to the historian they are more important than works of great genius. He is more interested in the *New Atlantis* than in the *Advancement of Learning*, in the *Areopagitica* than in *Paradise Lost*.

Profane historians have yet a lesson to learn from the method of ecclesiastical history. There the history of doctrine is the soul and centre of events; and the thoughts of St. Augustine or St. Cyril are as much the real subject-matter as the deeds of Constantine or Charlemagne. The analogy between the influence of political and social theories upon profane history, and that of religious doctrines on the history of the Church, is closer than has been generally understood. There is a near resemblance, and even some connection, between the progress of theological opinion and the revolution of political ideas. There have been times when political thoughts have influenced the Church as much as, at other times, theological controversy has influenced the outer world. In the middle ages the Church passed through a peculiarly social and a peculiarly political phase of existence. From the time of Gregory I., or even of Leo I., she had to deal with the new ideas of society introduced with the barbarians. After the age of Gregory VII., she was engaged in perpetual conflict with a new political system. The theory of the sovereignty of the people has played as great a part in history as the doc-



trine of justification by faith only. The revolution which it inspired was quite as important an event as the Reformation. Both events were primarily the result of certain speculative ideas; neither would have been so successful but for external temporary circumstances. But they cannot be explained by these alone. Deeds as well as words are the signs of thoughts; and if we consider only external events, without following the course of ideas of which they are the expression and the result, and which they influence in their turn, we shall have but a lame notion of history, and shall overlook an alternate link in the chain of human progress. The taking of the Bastille, for instance, was a great sign; the appearance of Sieyès' pamphlet, *What is the Third Estate?* was a greater fact.

The most instructive part of the history of ephemeral literature during the French Revolution our author dismisses in a few words: we mean the Royalist press. In the manner in which the French monarchy was defended, more than in the manner of attack, we can trace the causes of its fall. The opponents of the Revolution stood mostly on the same ground as their adversaries. The monarchy had been revolutionary before the Revolution destroyed it. It had forged for its own uses the weapon by which it perished. Therefore the old *régime* was defended in the tone, and often in the spirit, of the Revolution. Its enemies had all the advantages of logic, of consistency, of sincerity, and of energy. Louis XVI. himself never maintained his rights on the proper grounds. It is remarkable in more ways than one that a leading Royalist journal, *Le Petit Gautier*, should have written, May 20, 1791: "Who is the author of our ills? Louis XVI., by his weakness, his incapacity, his pusillanimity, his impotency, on the throne." Another Royalist paper, of a very low description, *Le Journal des Halles*, says: "What we want is a king able to take part in affairs, but without injuring them; a king to whom it should be impossible to do harm, but who should have the right of doing good." The chief of the Royalist papers, *Les Actes des Apôtres (de la Révolution)*, which was conducted by Montlosier, Rivarol, Peltier, and others, defended the cause in the spirit of Voltaire, as we learn from the extracts in Monseignat, *Histoire des Journaux de 1789 à 1799*, and represented that part of the old society which it is the merit of the Revolution to have exterminated. Their tone is not only ribald and indecent—in the style of *John Bull*, when Hook was editor,—but as sanguinary as that of the Jacobins. At a time when Marat was demanding the moderate figure of 10,000 heads, they promise that the Emperor will set up

"Quinze milliers de potences,  
Qui seraient fort bien en France," &c.

*Sketch-Book of Popular Geology: being a Series of Lectures delivered before the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh.* By Hugh Miller. (Edinburgh, Constable.) The late Mr. Hugh Miller had designed a work on which he hoped his reputation would be founded—*The Geology of Scotland*. Interrupted by his death, his

work has come to us in fragments, instead of as a whole; and his widow has testified her regard for his fame by editing them under the titles of *The Cruise of the Betsy*, *The Rambles of a Geologist*, and the present *Sketch-Book of Popular Geology*.

The chief point of contact between the theories of geologists and the doctrines of theologians is in their respective opinions on the cosmogony. Not that the doctrine of creation out of nothing can ever be a question of physical science, whose first principle is *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that is, whose field is only the *changes* of existing things, not the beginnings of their existence; but with regard to the dates or epochs of creation, and the order in which things came to be, a collision between the inspired statements of Moses and the conclusions of men of science seems but too possible. Or at least, if we can get rid of the collision, there too commonly remains a system which is only reconcilable with that of Moses by complete alienation; that is, by assuming that the two systems are not treating about the same subject-matter. Such must be the conclusion of Christians who follow the school of Lyell; the theory of Sir R. Murchison renders a much greater service to the apologist of revelation. The school of Lyell, without necessarily denying creation, or the progress of nature by the successive addition of new orders of organised beings, holds that it is quite impossible to prove any such progress, on account of the successive destruction of all organised remains in geological strata; as in the course of ages they one after the other sink down, and come within the influence of the central heat of the planet. In the most ancient granites and gneisses Lyell holds that organic remains once existed, but have been melted out; and that if we could find any unfused portions of coeval strata, we should find them full of fossils, indicating as high organisms as now reign on the globe. Murchison, on the other hand, thinks that the primeval granite and gneiss were formed when the world was quite unadorned with organic forms of any kind: that in the "Silurian system" we find the first traces of the beginning of the "work of adornment," as the schoolmen called the work of the three last Mosaic days: that in those beds we find only animals of the lowest type—radiata, mollusca, articulata: that in successive epochs, and in natural order of development, there were added fishes, reptiles, birds, mammals; beginning with the marsupials, going on to the placentie, and ending with man. Hugh Miller belongs to this latter school; and he has done good service to apologists by showing its bearings on the authority of Moses. Mrs. Miller only anticipates a "dreamy infidelity" from the possible refutation of these evidences. We cannot see the force of this anticipation. The school of Murchison tries to support the statements of Moses with positive evidence; but the school of Lyell does not pretend to bring any positive evidence against those statements. Moses said that there was an order in creation; Murchison says that geology proves this order; Lyell declares that all the evidences are destroyed, that what Murchison takes for the oldest documents are



not really so, and that his beginning is not really the beginning. And if Lyell should be right, after all,—though we confess that we believe him to be wrong,—he will have proved nothing more than Solomon asserted: “Mundum tradidit disputationi eorum, ut non inveniatur homo opus quod operatus est Deus *ab initio usque ad finem*.”

We do not pretend to deny that Lyell's opinions are inconsistent with belief in the Christian doctrine of creation; we only deny the necessary connection of his conclusions with his premises. We are aware that he takes every opportunity of shocking the established opinions, not only on the antiquity of mankind on the earth, but also on the origin of species. At the recent meeting of the British Association at Aberdeen, he laid before the geological section the “result of some observations he had made in France on the proofs of the antiquity of the human race;” human remains, it appears, bones or manufactured flints, have been found deeply imbedded in bone-caves and gravel-beds, among the remains of extinct hyænas, bears, and elephants. Hence suspicion has arisen that the date of mankind must be carried much further back than geologists had imagined. These suspicions, at first received by scientific men with great reluctance, are at last developing into an admission that the reluctance has been pushed to an extreme.

Geologists, however, and historians have lately been tolerably liberal in their allowance of man's antiquity. Bunsen\* declares that Mr. Leonard Horner had established the fact “that Egypt was inhabited by men who made use of pottery about 11,000 years before the Christian era.” This date is got at by calculating the amount of the annual depositions of the Nile, and dividing the numerical value of the depth at which the pottery was discovered under the surface by this number. The calculation assumes that the action of the inundation is uniform, and that the places where the pottery was found were not upon old courses of the river, or old canals for irrigation, long since silted up. Nevertheless Bunsen, with characteristic credulity, receives the proof as certain, and, building upon it, announces that he intends to prove:

“1. That the immigration of the Asian stock from Western Asia (into Egypt) is antediluvian.

“2. That the historical deluge, which took place in a considerable part of Central Asia, cannot have occurred at a more recent period than the tenth millennium B.C. . . .

“4. That man existed on this earth about 20,000 years B.C., and that there is no valid reason for assuming a more remote beginning of our race.”

We cannot tell whether Sir Charles Lyell wishes to increase this allowance; but, whatever he proves, we do not anticipate much danger from the controversy. The real chronology of the Bible is a difficult question, still unsettled, and directly involving no question of doctrine. Bunsen declares that his researches “do not contra-

\* Egypt's Place in Universal History, Eng. trans. vol. iii. p. xi.

vene, in the slightest degree, the statements of Scripture, though they demolish ancient and modern rabbinical assumptions ; while, on the contrary, they extend the antiquity of the Biblical accounts, and explain, for the first time, their historical truth." He does not, however, refer to the scriptural cosmogony, but to the patriarchal history.

Concerning the other question, Sir. C. Lyell said, "On the difficult subject of the origin of species, a work will shortly appear by Mr. Charles Darwin, the result of twenty years of observation and experiment in zoology, botany, and geology ; by which he has been led to the conclusion, that those powers of nature which give rise to races and permanent varieties in animals and plants, are the same as those which, in much longer periods, produce species, and, in still longer series of ages, give rise to differences of generic rank." This is the theory of the author of *Vestiges of Creation*, and before him of Lord Monboddo. It has hitherto been discredited by the authority of Humboldt, Professor Owen, Forbes, and others ; and is so obviously incapable of demonstration, that its adoption depends mainly on the religious and metaphysical opinions of philosophers. We cannot see how it can be possibly held consistently with the Christian creed.

In a recently published work, *The Natural History of the European Seas*, the late Professor Edward Forbes makes some observations on "provinces" and "centres of creation," which will show the present opinions of scientific men. "The genesis of new beings has been more exerted in some portion of the province, and that usually more or less central, than elsewhere. . . . This feature of zoological and botanical provinces gives rise to the term *centres of creation*, which I and others have applied to them. There may be minor centres within a province. Nowhere do we find a province repeated ; that is to say, in none, except one centre of creation, do we find the same assemblage of *typical* species : or, in other words, no species has been called forth originally in more areas than one. Similar species, to which the term *representative* is mutually applied, appear in areas distant from each other, but under the influence of similar physical conditions. But every true species presents in its individuals certain features, *specific characters*, which distinguish it from every other species ; as if the Creator had set an exclusive mark or seal on each living type. . . . As, from all the facts we know, the relationship of the individuals of any species to each other exhibits the phenomenon of descent ; since in every case in which the parentage of an individual, or group of similar individuals, has been traced, the parent-stock has been found similar to it or them,—we connect the idea of descent with the definition of a species, and (hypothetically) assume the descent of all the individuals of each species from one original stock. The term *specific centre* has been used to express that single point upon which each species had its origin, and from which its individuals become diffused."



## Contemporary Events.

### HOME AFFAIRS.

#### 1. *Catholic Matters.*

BESIDES the passage which we quoted from the Pastoral of the Irish Hierarchy in the last *Rambler*, that document contained other paragraphs of great importance. The Catholic University of Dublin was proclaimed to be the centre of the new system of education, in every department of which the separate principle is to be established; and the faithful were invited to contribute the necessary funds. The abuses of the Irish poor-law, the wretched condition of the workhouses, the exclusively Protestant constitution of the Board, which has absolute power to appoint and dismiss Catholic chaplains, the want of workhouse chapels, and the Protestant character of workhouse schools, were pointed out. The exclusion of Catholic chaplains from the navy, and the anomalous relations of Irish landlords and tenants, were discussed; and the pastoral concluded with exhorting the faithful not to content themselves with a mere cordial acquiescence, but to hold meetings, petition Parliament, "call upon the representatives to press these claims upon the attention of Government, and, if need be, even to make the concession of them the condition of their support."

This has been taken for a recommendation of the policy of independent opposition. "The Bishops have agreed upon a political platform, and called on the clergy and laity to require their representatives to make its adoption the condition of their support to any government. The rights of the Irish tenant, of Catholic soldiers and sailors, of the Catholic poor; the condemnation of the godless colleges; the confirmation of the Catholic university; the vindication of the jurisdiction of the Church over Catholic education; the demand for separate schools for primary, intermediate, and collegiate education; and the defence of the rights of the

Holy See,—are declared to constitute a sufficient political programme to justify the combined action of Catholics irrespectively of other parties in the state." But the *Freeman* of Sept. 1 denied, "on authority," any intention to enlist the Catholic members and direct their movements, or to infringe on their "perfect liberty to take whatever side they chose on the question of education," or even to "suggest the formation of a special party to press the Bishops' views in Parliament."

The pastoral was very severely criticised by the whole Protestant press, nor did all the Catholic organs abstain from comments. The *Cork Reporter* even denied "the right of any synod" to interfere; "if it enters the domain of secular instruction, it does so to advise, not to legislate." Owning that "a vast numerical majority of the faithful would, with more or less reluctance, adopt the sentiments, or at least follow the direction, of the Bishops," it anticipates opposition from the middle and educated classes, and protests against a decision which "virtually condemns the majority to ignorance." It imputes to the Bishops a wish to bind parents to send their children to the episcopal schools, and to condemn every system of education not directly proceeding from, and directed by, the clergy. But this is not the case. Fathers are not forced to send their boys to episcopal schools; but episcopal schools are provided, that fathers may not, as now, be forced to send their sons to schools not approved by the Bishops. The object is to make episcopally-authorised education possible, not to make it compulsory.

The ecclesiastical authorities having decided what our aim should be, it remains for us to see how it can be accomplished, and what are the practical difficulties to be encountered

The means relied on to obtain this end are—1. The action of an inde-

pendent opposition on the closely-balanced parties in Parliament.\* 2. The coöperation of the Liberals. But this can only be counted on for a reform of the present system, not for the establishment of the denominational system, which they declare to be "impossible." They will help to enforce the rule against giving any religious instruction whatever in school-hours, and to reform the Board of Commissioners, who have abused their powers by furtive attempts to decatholicise the people. If this is not enough, they declare that "all state education must be abolished in Ireland, for a system of grants to the respective sects is impossible." 3. The movement is expected to be supported by the coöperation of the Irish Establishment, which is also seeking a denominational grant. Now, apart from the rickety nature of this unstable coalition, which, even if it lasts, is sure to frustrate itself by putting Parliament on its mettle, both parties have hitherto failed to point out the means of enabling Ireland to support a system of education on the voluntary basis. The voluntary test is a severe trial even for England; its application to Ireland is declared by practical men to be a dream: "the simple result of it would be, the comparative cessation of all education in Ireland."

We must then either demand from Parliament the English system in its totality, with all its freedom and all its responsibility, or we must demand the continuance of the present Irish system, so far as state support is concerned, together with the English local independence and freedom from all interference, or even suggestion of teachers, books, and modes of instruction. This evidently would not be the English system, but something different. Are we wrong in imagining that the English system has been misunderstood by journalists who have demanded it? that the fact has been overlooked that with us it is no cheaper to keep school with Government aid than without? that the Government only aims at the improvement of schools, not at the withdrawal of *any part* of their burden

\* The Liberal majority that displaced Lord Derby has been actually annihilated by the results of the parliamentary petitions.

from the public, except by the new capitation grants, and by assisting to defray the expenses of building and books? The difficulties that will have to be got over before the English system can be applied to all Ireland are these: 1. Its incompleteness: it fails to reach the agricultural village; even in populous but poor districts it is worked with great difficulty. But Ireland is altogether an agricultural country, and often poorest where most populous. 2. Its uncertainty: its consolidation requires a basis of intelligence, integrity, and resource in one or more of the inhabitants. Where, as is too often the case, these qualities are not to be found, the voluntary system is either not tried, or tried only to fail disgracefully. With this dependence on individuals, we often find one sect well provided for, while another, equal or superior in numbers, is altogether abandoned. But in Ireland it would be harder than here to find in each rural district Catholic managers with the requisite means, self-reliance, and discretion. And if, through lack of these, a Catholic school was found impossible, the field would be completely open to the action of Exeter Hall. 3. Its expensiveness: the cost, *exclusive of government aid and school-fees*, is six shillings a year for each scholar; all this must be raised by voluntary contributions to maintain schools already built. Where schools have yet to be erected, it builds three where one is enough on the secular system. But in Ireland the richer classes are Protestant, the poor are very poor; and an unhappy notion has got abroad, that he who gives twopence to schools robs the clergy. 4. Its danger; for it necessarily trusts entirely to the integrity and ability of individuals for whose character and acquirements no sureties can be taken, and thus in time gathers a large stock of scandals. At the same time, it places teachers helplessly in the hands of managers, too often at enmity with the teacher and with each other. But in Ireland, these managers would always be priests, and any suspicion of a job or scandal would be a direct wound to the Church. 5. Its variableness; the Privy Council introducing new regulations and modifying



minutes at pleasure. But in Ireland, every change, however beneficial, has to encounter a mass of prejudice; and the Committee of Council, whose head-quarters must always be in London, would be continually suspected of tyranny and oppression.

Another class of difficulties will arise from the real or alleged successes of the present system; such as the triumph achieved this year by the Irish colleges in the examination for civil service for India, when out of the five first four were Irish, and of the twenty-four first ten Irish; seven from Trinity College, Dublin, two from the Queen's College, Belfast, and one from the Queen's College, Cork.

But if Ireland asks for the continuance of its own system of government support, grafted on the English system of denominational independence, the difficulty is greater. The pastoral requires that the teachers, both as to appointment and removal, and the selection of all books for religious instruction, and the arrangements for it, be under the control of the ordinary. This liberty is enjoyed by us; but then we pay for it. If our schools were entirely paid for by Government, we should not have it; if we asked for it, there would be at once a clamour about jobbery; we should be told that if so much patronage were given into the hands of one man, all his relations, all the relations of his relations, all the idlers of his native village, would crowd round him, waiting for places. Or else we should be told, that if the Bishops were to have so great a disposal of government patronage, and such entire power over the secular direction of the rising generation, Government must demand a voice in the appointment of Bishops. Thus all the old questions about payment of the clergy, and the other powers usually conferred by concordats with Rome, would be again mooted. Our freedom from government interference is now only maintained by the maintenance of a certain independence of government support. On the other hand, it cannot be questioned that Irish Catholics are entitled to more than their English brethren, because they are the majority in Ireland, and be-

cause they are saddled with the maintenance of the Church of the minority. If the Government does not satisfy them, they will be unquestionably justified in agitating for the destruction of the Establishment. Moreover, the existence of a certain amount of disaffection to the English Government in Ireland is notorious; and the wisdom of the legislature will not gratuitously provide this feeling with fresh fuel. But though these views may count for something in speculation, they would be eminently unsafe to act upon. In the mean time, we are delighted to see that at Carlow the schools have been removed from the National Board and given to the Christian Brothers; perhaps a Government grant on the English plan may be claimed for them. And thus for the lower schools it may be found possible to let the English and Irish systems, like corn and cockle, subsist together for a time; that one may grow beside the other, and the other not be destroyed before a successor is ready to take its place. Doubtless the mixed system is of various degrees of badness: for the university, it is destructive of all philosophic and moral as well as religious principles; for primary education, if conducted with real fairness, it may often be made well-nigh innocuous.

Up to this time (Oct. 20) the meeting of Irish members called by Mr. Maguire and the O'Donoghue, to concert plans of parliamentary coöperation, has not come off.

In Canada, political movements have called for the interference of the hierarchy. Sunday Aug. 14, a "declaration" of the Bishop of Montreal, which has subsequently received the adhesion of the other Bishops, was read in the churches. It begins with regretting the necessity for rectifying twice within a few months the opinions of the readers of a Catholic journal. In February the Bishops approved of the principles of the *True Witness*, and their advice was received with docility and lively faith; but it became necessary to reiterate their counsels in August. They inform the faithful that the *True Witness* enjoys their sanction — 1, in opposing the "representation by population," which would lead to

Protestant ascendancy; 2, in repudiating the voluntary principle; 3, in denouncing the mixed-school system; and 4, in condemning those who foment prejudices of race. The Bishops desire that public opinion should submit to principles, and not principles yield to party, to the exigencies or prejudices of race, and to personal interests.

The Synodical Letter of the English Bishops assembled at the third council at Oscott contains—1, an exposition of the harmonious coöperation of the regular and secular clergy, and of the services and sacrifices of each; 2, of the advantage of the coöperation of the laity, who are specially thanked for the meeting at St. James's Hall, June 8, and reminded that the three objects there proposed are still to be realised,—they are, the religious emancipation of Catholic sailors, of Catholic inmates of workhouses, and of Catholic prisoners. "Our work, therefore, is not accomplished; and we must continue our unrelaxed efforts and our happy coöperation, till we can congratulate, not ourselves, but our poor, that we have no more to solicit on their behalf."\* The letter then adverts to certain points with which the Bishops have been occupied, and to which they wish to call our attention. 1. They exhort us to persevere in the cause of education. 2. They advert to the "great, perhaps growing, negligence of parents in sending their children to Catholic schools." Parents seem to measure education solely by its secular, not by its religious standard. The poor are to be roused from this apathy by the "pulpit, the confessional, the

\* A letter in the *Tablet*, Sept. 17, signed "E. Ryley," acknowledges that no further steps have been taken to carry out the resolutions of the meeting. But the Government, *motu proprio*, had issued an order of the Poor-Law Board, Aug 23, by which some facilities were given for the religious instruction of Catholics in workhouses. The religion of each pauper orphan is to be registered in conformity with that of the father, or, if that is not discoverable, that of the mother. The orphan is to be instructed in this religion, unless, being above twelve years old or otherwise considered competent to choose by the board, he elects to be taught another. The master or matron to take all practicable steps to procure the attendance of a minister of this religion to instruct the orphan at times not inconsistent with the good order of the house.

domestic visit, the tract, and the casual conversation."\* 3. They advert to the deficiency of means of clerical education in England, and our dependence on foreign Churches for missionary priests. After acknowledging the princely foundation of an English seminary at Bruges by a convert, they ask for funds to carry out the Tridentine system of diocesan seminaries. 4. They then advert to the Divorce Court, and stigmatise it as a tribunal to which Catholics "never can have recourse."† 5. The revision of the first Catechism has been approved. 6. Prayers are asked for the health, tranquillity, and peace of the Pope and his states. The letter concludes by adverting to the altered dangers of Catholics. "It is by the attempts to draw away our middle classes, and even our poor, to unbelief in Christianity, that our religion is now most endangered. By lectures, tracts, periodical literature, shallow science, and works of fiction, the poison of infidelity is infused into minds unprepared by preservatives, unfurnished with antidotes; and the havoc thus caused is perhaps greater than what sectarian attempts have ever effected. . . . Piety and devotion are the great safeguards of faith,—far more than intellectual discussion or abstruse investigations." Henceforth, the Bishops tell us, our controversy is not with the sectarianism, but with the infidelity, of the day. This golden advice ought henceforth to be a beacon to all our controversialists.

## 2. Domestic Events.

Under this head we can only advert to the fanatical insanity of the Irish revivals, and the fanatical riots of St. George's-in-the-East; to the success (:) of the *Great Eastern* ship, in spite of its accident, and the touching episode of the death of Brunel in the

\* We venture to suggest that we shall never have done all in our power to render this apathy inexcusable, till we have made all our schools so good as *bonâ fide* to offer, besides their religious advantages, as great secular advantages as any sectarian school professes to provide.

† We presume that this applies solely to the "dissolution of marriage," not to the "judicial separation," which this court also grants, for acts of adultery, cruelty, or desertion, and which, to our knowledge, Catholics have petitioned for.



midst of his chief engineering triumph; and to the return of the Franklin-search expedition under Captain M'Clintock, with full proofs of the fate of the lost ships, which were last seen in Baffin's Bay, July 26, 1845, after which they wintered at Beechy Island, and were beset with ice, Sept. 12, 1846, north of King William's Island, where they were fixed more than eighteen months (during which time Franklin died, June 11, 1847), and were abandoned April 22, 1848, by 105 survivors, under Captain Crozier, who landed with the intention of making their way to the Great Fish River. Some of the party seem afterwards to have attempted to regain the ships; their skeletons were found in a boat; the majority must have perished by the way. It is not impossible that a few of those who probably gained the continent may still survive among the Esquimaux or Indians of the extreme north of America.

1. There are two events of sufficient political significance to require longer notice. The great curse and scandal of Ireland is the system of agrarian murder, and the concealment of the murderer by the people. Sunday, Aug. 21, there was a meeting at Raham, King's County, with the object of putting an end to crime. The parish priest found it necessary to instruct his people in the novel truth that they might, with a good conscience, coöperate with the police in upholding the law. If the police could not find the criminals, he said, "it is then clearly the duty of those who know the breakers of the law to aid the authorities to bring the delinquents to justice. . . . To give information when a paid police cannot detect the evil-doers is imperative on you as men and as Christians, both by the law of God and the rule of conscience." Every man, it was said, ought in such cases to act as a special constable; and a resolution was passed pledging the assembled people "to aid and assist the magistrate in maintaining the majesty of the law."

Lord Derby has tried rougher means to inculcate the same lesson. July 26, a tenant, William Crowe, was murdered in daylight, near a police-station, with a number of persons

standing about, at Doon, Limerick co. Lord Derby, either through a hot temper, or because he sees reason to suspect his tenants of a guilty knowledge of the murder, has given eleven out of his fourteen tenants at the place notice to quit. Among these are the parish priest and his curate, who, by the mere fact of their being priests, are as much opposed to ribbon outrages as Lord Derby himself. But it was said at the inquest that the curate had denounced Crowe from the altar for voting for a conservative candidate; still the murder was manifestly agrarian, not political, and there is no pretence to justify this insult on the clergy.

Different states of society require different laws; while society is in a state resembling clanship, the clan must be punished for the offence of its members, or crime will always go unpunished. Mehemet Ali arrested Arab assassination by hanging the Sheikh of the district where a traveller was murdered. The French checked murder at Rome by shooting the proprietor of the wine-shop where the crime occurred. In both instances success crowned the policy, and proved that the law had at last reached those who could prevent the outrage if they chose, and without whose guilty connivance the murder would not be perpetrated. However unbearable such a law is felt to be in civilised countries, they have yet all attained their rank through the schooling of such laws. Our Saxon ancestors had their frank-pledge, which bound all the people to mutual good behaviour by attaching every man inseparably to his tything, and forbidding him to quit it without license, because, in case of his misdemeaning himself, his district was obliged to produce him, or pay his fine; so the whole nation was held under sureties, and every man was held to bail by his neighbours. Thus have we been taught that each of us is interested in the law, and that the police are only our paid substitutes for performing a duty which still is ours in their absence; we can scarcely comprehend a state where people and police are in opposition, and where society, instead of seconding, thinks it its duty to thwart the operation of the law. Our law obliges every one

of us to join the *posse comitatus* of a county to put down riots; every man is a policeman against a felony, a trustee of the state, a guardian of the Queen's peace, directly interested in enforcing the law. In America, the principle takes the most unexpected developments. Dr. Channing says of Boston, "there is no city governed so little by police, and so much by mutual inspection and what is called public sentiment." Where the administrators of the law are weak, voluntary associations supply their place, and Judge Lynch occupies the vacant bench till it can be filled with a regularly appointed official. But in all these cases, the punishment, however promiscuous and hard, has borne the stamp of public authority. Lord Derby has given the pernicious example of a private man setting himself up for judge over his neighbours. He had a right to evict them as landlord, but not as judge. He has taken away not only their holdings, but their characters; and now we shall see every pelting petty landlord in Ireland usurping the functions of a reformer of society, and damning every pretended or suspected criminal by evicting him.

2. The strike of the London building trades has occupied the public mind, partly because of the commentary it affords on the agitation for workman's suffrage. The vague admiration for workmen in general, which had become a commonplace of politicians, has been rudely shocked, both by the strike, and by the evidence of the corruption of the poorer voters at Wakefield and Gloucester: Mr. Bright's comparison of the follies of statesmen with the wisdom of the people has been much disturbed; and Lord John Russell, at Aberdeen, has made a temperate speech about reform, repudiating all abstract theories, and declaring that the one thing needful is to find who are the fittest persons to whom a certain degree of power shall be given; and though he thinks the 10*l.* franchise is too high, owning that it is a matter for consideration and examination. Lord Brougham, at Bradford, went further still; and showed that, if renting a 10*l.* house gives the franchise, a man occupying a 6*l.* house might have it by saving 20*d.* a week

in beer. Of the loudest agitators, he says, very few would pay this price to obtain it, and therefore do not deserve it.

The strike began Aug. 6. The men employed by Messrs Trollope required their day's labour to be reduced from ten to nine hours, with the usual deductions of an hour and a half for meals; the wages to continue the same. The reason given was, the benevolent wish that the numerous unemployed artisans who were walking the streets might have their turn at working. The men on strike counted on being supported by the trades' unions, or benefit societies, to which they belonged, aided by the contributions of the artisans still employed. To meet this danger, the masters formed a counter-association, and "locked out" all their men; their yards not to be reopened till Messrs. Trollope had recommenced work, and only then to men who would sign a declaration engaging them not to become members of any society which interfered (1) with the regulation of the hours and terms of labour, or (2) with the rights of employers and employed individually to make such engagements as they might see fit.

This determination of the masters produced an agitation among the men, in which the nine-hours question was forgotten, and the collective energy directed to the preservation of the societies whose existence was threatened. These unions are only a recent creation; they were legalised by the Act 6 Geo. IV. c. 129, and further protected by the Act 22 Victoria, c. 34; which Acts allow them peaceably to fix, or endeavour to fix, the rate of wages, and without intimidation to persuade others to abstain from working till such wages are given. But any endeavour to force a workman from his employment, or to prevent his hiring himself, or to oblige him to join the Union, or to force the masters to alter their regulations, is made penal. The freedom of the unionists is secured, but the law guards against their assuming a power to rule others.

With great energy they have seized on the concessions of the law, and have developed their unions into wide organisations. In this they



have profited by the wonderful facilities of cheap and quick communication which we enjoy. Their endeavours have had but one object—to maintain the value of labour. For this end, they have agreed to limit the number of apprentices; to secure work for the greatest possible number of their members, they provide that no one should monopolise too much; they forbid “piecework” and “overtime;” they adopt rules limiting the amount of strength which a workman may put forth—thus the bricklayer is not allowed to lay the trowel out of his right hand, nor the hodman to carry more than a certain number of bricks for each load. At last, they decreed that the working-day should be reduced from ten to nine hours;—still with the one object of making the common fund of labour go further among its divisors. All this, however foolish on economical grounds, is strictly legal while they confine their decrees to their own body; but they attempt to carry them out beyond. They assume that every workman in each trade should belong to its union. Different measures, such as forbidding unionists to work with non-unionists, are adopted to drive men into it. These measures are said to be only “moral suasion;” but workmen who resist are “blackened,” or excommunicated, and thereby deprived of sustenance.

At the beginning of the strike, the men declared that they “were determined to reduce the amount of surplus labour in London, because machinery is superseding hand-labour to such an extent as to drive the men to walk the streets for many months in the year. Reduction of hours of labour would give employment to more men, and give them more time for mental improvement and domestic comfort. The workmen think there is something wrong: they do not wish to be levellers; but there is plenty of wealth in the country, if it was more equally divided”—(Delegate Patching, at Reigate).

But the market being overstocked with builders, instead of being a reason for more pay and less work, is a reason for diminution of wages; for the price of every commodity, and therefore of labour, must rise or fall according to the proportion between

supply and demand. As to machinery, if the master is made to pay too much for the hand-labour of workmen, who *will* strike at the most inconvenient moments, he must try to substitute machines. Strikes have actually forced upon capitalists the power-loom, the self-acting mule, sawing-mills, and numerous other machines.

Whenever a manufacture is movable, strikes have always driven it to another locality. As buildings must be local, the masters in the present strike had no choice but to bring fresh workmen from other places, or to supply the places of the unionists by non-society men. This measure was so effectual, that by Sept. 7 Messrs. Trollope were able to announce that they were in work again; upon which the masters opened their yards, but only to men who would take the declaration. By the end of September, about 8000 men had resumed work on these terms; while about 7000 stood out, refusing to accept the “odious document,” but willing to drop the nine-hours agitation.

The declaration, with its “stump counter,” was declared to be a badge of slavery; the men refused to be ticketed with a number, like charity-boys, or to carry about with them a paper that might facilitate police interference, like the *livret* of the French workman, which arose from a law of 1749, preventing an artisan who had once entered a factory from quitting without a written dimission; was suppressed in 1791, when freedom of industry was legalised; re-established in 1803, when the scarcity of men led masters to entice them away from other employers; extended in 1855 to a kind of pass, without which no workman can be employed at all, in which are registered all the duties of his employment and dimission; which is *visé* by the police, to serve as a passport, and as a means of knowing the conduct and haunts of every workman.

The masters neither wish this, nor do they attack the rights of association guaranteed by the law to the men. They leave all mutual benefit societies absolutely untouched; they recognise the right of the unions to determine *for their own members* on what terms they will work—for this

is necessary to their existence as benefit societies, they could not determine when a member was entitled to support from being out of work, unless they had power to determine what they would consider sufficient wages;—but they wish to put a stop to the coercion, moral or otherwise, exerted by the unions on non-society men.

At the end of September, the masons' union attempted to establish a separate agreement with the masters, the men relinquishing the nine-hours agitation, and the masters the document; the masons also declared their readiness to meet the masters upon any collateral points at issue. The masters replied, that if they gave up the document, the masons' society must revise its rules, so far as they "should be declared by the President of the Board of Trade, or any retired judge, *to be contrary to the spirit of the law of the land.*" This was evaded. The masters then proposed arbitration by "some eminent impartial authority," adding, that "all rules and practices should be removed which interfere with the freedom of workmen, or prevent members of unions from working with other artisans." They were obliged to demand this in favour of the 8000 men who had taken the declaration and were at work. But the masons formally declined to entertain the proposition, and the proportions of the strike were rather increased. At the same time, the masters formally declined to have any communication with the Trades Conference, wishing to treat with each trade by itself. But the workmen ratified the powers of the Conference, and declined treaty with the masters in any other manner.

In the first fortnight of October, the masons made renewed attempts, using Mr. Ayrton as their mediator; he failed, in consequence of the men refusing to alter their tyrannical rules in deference to any external authority whatever. But the masters have 11,000 men at work, and will doubtless soon learn to compensate by machinery for the absence of the 5000 who still hold out.

### 3. *Foreign Relations of England.*

1. *China and Japan.* The treaty of

Tien-tsin, negotiated by Lord Elgin, and signed June 26, 1858, provided that ratifications should be exchanged at Peking within a year, and that an English embassy should be established there; March 1, this year, Mr. Bruce, Lord Elgin's kinsman and successor, was instructed to proceed to Peking accordingly, and in case of a civil reception, not to insist upon the permanent settlement at Peking, but only an occasional visit of the British mission to the capital. The admiral to send up a sufficient force to the mouth of the Peiho, and Mr. Bruce to go as far as Tien-tsin in a British ship-of-war. No compromise to be made as to exchanging ratifications elsewhere than at Peking. Accordingly Mr. Bruce answered, May 4, that in consequence of the repair of the forts on the Peiho, he had determined to sail in company with an imposing force of the same strength as that which formed the expedition last year. Lord J. Russell, July 6, approved the arrangement, and considered the force sufficient. After this there followed attempts of the Chinese commissioners to hinder Mr. Bruce's departure till the year of the treaty should be passed; and Mr. Bruce was informed that the Emperor was "entirely averse to the ambassador's residing in the capital, and had resolved not to grant him an audience." Mr. Bruce, however, left Hong-Kong as soon as the French envoy was ready to accompany him; he wrote home from Shangae, June 14, that it was clear a war party existed at Peking, who wished to push on the Emperor to extremities; and that he had sent Admiral Hope to the mouth of the Peiho to inform the commandant of the forts that the English and French ministers were approaching, and to beg him to transmit the intelligence to Peking. The admiral reached the place on the 16th; he was met only by an armed rabble, who would not allow him to land, and who declared that there was no authority, military or civil, on the spot. They promised, however, that in three days a passage should be opened in the staked river to allow the ministers to proceed by the river to Tien-tsin. On the 18th the squadron approached, and only anchored within the bar on ac-



count of the heavy swell; the Chinese commissioners having previously communicated their wishes to Mr. Bruce that the vessels-of-war should be anchored outside the bar, and then that he, without much baggage, and with a moderate retinue, should proceed to the capital. On the 20th, Admiral Hope found that, instead of the obstacles to navigation being removed, they had only been increased. On the 21st, the English and French ministers wrote a joint note to the admiral, formally requiring him to remove the obstacles. On this the admiral notified to the Chinese, that as a passage up the river had not been opened, he should proceed to open it himself. On the night of the 24th the admiral succeeded in blowing up some of the obstacles; and the attempt to pass the barriers and to proceed up the river was fixed for the morning of the following day.

The admiral had previously reconnoitred, and had found the works destroyed last year reconstructed in earth in an improved form, strengthened with ditches and abattis, and an increased number of booms; few guns visible, but many embrasures masked. When the outer boom was cut, on the night of the 24th, the inner was found to be a mass of timber 120 feet wide and 3 deep. It was 2 P.M. on the 25th before the vessels were in position, and then the *Opossum* speedily opened a passage in the first boom; then the *Opossum*, *Plover*, *Lee*, and *Haughty* moved up to the second barrier, when a simultaneous fire of 30 or 40 guns from 32-pounders to 8-inch was opened upon them. At 3 P.M. our ships inside the barrier had to drop outside, but they took up fresh positions; the *Plover*, *Lee*, and *Kestrel* were sunk or run aground; yet by 6.30 the north forts were silenced. At 7 the south fort shut up, except 5 guns. At 7.20 a small force of marines, sappers and miners, and seamen was landed opposite the south fort, to gain which it had to make its way over a quarter of a mile of mud-bank, intercepted with deep ditches and holes. In spite of this, and of a fire of the 5 guns, gingalls, and rifles, 150 officers and men reached the second ditch, and 50 arrived close under the

walls, whence the unexpected opposition of the Chinese obliged them to retire. The mud is described as being over the men's knees, often over their waists. After a quarter of a mile of this they arrived at a wet ditch ten feet broad and five deep; they passed it with soddened pouches and useless ammunition: another ditch was passed; there remained one more, close under the walls; the fifty men who crossed it would have scaled the fort if they had had ladders: but all the ladders but one were broken; the covering fire was failing; darkness was setting in; the retreat was ordered: it also was effected under fire; by the light of carcasses the Chinese threw their flights of grape and musket-balls on the weary men who were staggering through the mud, and searching as they retired for their wounded comrades. The last man was got off by 1.30 A.M., June 26. Of the four gunboats that grounded, three were sunk, one was recovered. In the first attack there were 25 officers and men killed, and 93 wounded; in the shore attack 64 officers and men were killed and 252 wounded of the English, and of the French, who contributed 60 men, 4 killed and 10 wounded. Mr. Bruce says, "Nothing could exceed the heroism of those engaged in the attack; and judging from our past experience of Chinese warfare, there was every reason to expect success. But the Chinese fired on this occasion with a skill and precision of which there is no previous example, and which would seem to show that they must have received foreign instruction, even if they have not foreigners in their ranks."

After this disaster, Admiral Hope having notified that his force was insufficient to clear the passage, the envoys agreed to consider the mission to Peking as at an end for the present; and Mr. Bruce requested the admiral to dispose of his force in such a way as best to preserve tranquillity at the ports open to trade. Mr. Bruce addressed, July 13, a letter, in defence of his proceedings, to the Government; and Lord J. Russell answered it, September 26, fully approving of every thing he had done up to the arrival at the Peiho, when the envoy "was placed in circum-

stances of great difficulty, and had to weigh contingencies on which no safe calculations can be made:" the Government, without committing itself to an absolute approval, sees nothing in his decision to diminish its confidence in Mr. Bruce. The Queen has commanded preparations to be made, which will enable her forces, in conjunction with those of the Emperor of the French, to support him in the execution of the instructions which will be addressed to him.

Since this affair, the Peiho has been blockaded, great preparations have been made to recover our prestige, and the Chinese government is said to be ready to disown the acts of its officers, and to carry out the treaty.

In Japan, though the treaty was duly ratified, July 11, it has been evaded by the government, which tries to confine foreigners to a small island about ten miles from Jeddo, under the same sort of surveillance as was formerly exercised over the Dutch at Decima. They have further sought to confine foreigners to the use of a coin not current among the natives, to be exchanged at the treasury, thereby depreciating foreign coins to the amount of 66 per cent. The British consul has protested, and stopped trade for the present. We do not wonder at the reluctance of the Japanese. The good order of Japan, which is perfect, results, not from the morality of the people, but from the finished mechanism of the government. The people are all in leading-strings, to which custom has given the strength of chains. It may be that the isolation of the nation is necessary to preserve this; that the influx of English, American, French, and Russian sailors and traders will gradually destroy the prestige of custom, and nullify the web of police regulations.

Will the character of the people be strong enough to support the change? Is their civilisation built on individual force, or on a mechanical combination? If only the latter, it would run great danger of ruin under the rough contact of our ruder individualism, unless the successors of St. Francis Xavier can succeed in underpropping the falling artificial system

with the principles of Christianity, which alone can impart the required force of individual character.

2. *America.* An outrage, that might easily have led to interruption of peace between the United States and England, has occurred in the colony of British Columbia. By a treaty of 1846, the boundary between this colony and the States was fixed to run E. and W., on the line of latitude 49°, from the Rocky Mountains "to the middle of the channel which separates the colony from Vancouver's Island, and thence southerly through the middle of the said channel" to the Pacific—the navigation of the whole to remain open. It turns out, that on the 49th parallel there are two islands between the mainland and Vancouver's Island, dividing the channel into three; a question has been raised, *which* is the channel meant in the treaty. *We* maintain that it is the eastern one, the main channel, next the continent; the Americans, that it is the narrow one, between Vancouver's Island and the disputed island of San Juan.

A commissioner was appointed by each of the two governments, about three years ago, to settle the difficulty; but they have come to no agreement. Till they do, however, the President of the United States instructed the Governor of Washington territory, in 1855, "that the officers of the territory should abstain from all acts on the disputed grounds calculated to produce conflicts; . . . the title ought to be settled before either party should exclude the other by force;" and recommended a conciliatory course. The Governor of Vancouver's Island, to whom this correspondence was communicated, acted up to it with entire frankness; and the Hudson's Bay Company, who held the island in trust for England (which, out of respect to the Americans, abstained from exercising acts of exclusive sovereignty), were in peaceable possession till July 27th. Hence the American local press pretends that the question of title affects that Company only.

General Harney, the American commander on the mainland, paid a friendly visit to Victoria early in June; on his return he organised a



military expedition, and July 27th landed troops on the island, in company with the American commissioner, who is supposed to have advised the proceeding. He took possession of the island in the name of his government, established United-States laws and courts, appointed a resident stipendiary magistrate, who in turn appointed two constables, and declared that any American citizen was free to squat. August 3, American reinforcements arrived.

Captain Prevost, the English commissioner, remonstrated with the American commissioner; but was treated with great discourtesy. General Douglas, the Governor of Vancouver's Island, protested Aug. 2d. Aug. 6th, Admiral Baynes arrived in the *Ganges*; and we had five ships-of-war, mustering 151 guns, about 1145 seamen, and 400 marines—enough to annihilate the American force: but the admiral determined not to take any hostile measures till he heard from England, though he appears to have been pushed to do

so by the English population of Victoria.

To the United States, the island, which is only thirty-five miles long and from five to fifteen broad, is useless, except for annoyance, and as a wedge to wrest Vancouver's Island from England. To England the island is said to be of the first importance. It is the key to the Gulf of Georgia, and commands the narrow channel through which alone British Columbia and the inner coast of Vancouver's Island can be approached.

We do not know yet whether the outrage is only a filibustering stroke of General Harney, who may wish to gain popularity among the American squatters of those parts; or whether he was acting under superior orders. The Washington Cabinet, without publicly disavowing the act of General Harney, had sent General Scott to supersede him; the only officer by whom he could be superseded without being reprimanded and disgraced thereby.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

### 1. *The Revolution and the Church.*

Under this head we shall trace the progress of the revolution in the Roman States, or the attack upon the temporal sovereignty of the Pope.

In May the Papal government had been assured by the Austrians that there was no possibility of the Imperial forces quitting Bologna without allowing time for the entrance of a Pontifical garrison. But the Austrians were unable to keep their engagement. Prince Napoleon maintained close to Bologna a Tuscan corps, which was continually exciting the Bolognese to attack the Austrians. Other detachments were placed close to Faenza, Forli, and Perugia, for the same purpose. Prince Napoleon visited the detachment near Bologna, whence arms were introduced for the revolutionists. A French vessel of war touched at Rimini, officers were landed, the French Consul gave a dinner, and the people were excited.

Shortly after another French vessel visited Ancona, and demanded to know how many Austrians were there; whether they were erecting fortifications, paying the workmen, and oppressing the country; finally, whether the vessel would be allowed to enter the harbour. No information on this point being given, the vessel left, with a threat of returning. Then came the battle of Magenta, the effect of which, says Prince Napoleon, in conjunction with the march of his 5th corps, was such as to determine the Austrians suddenly to abandon Ancona, Bologna, and the other positions on the right bank of the Po. The French then did not respect the neutrality of the Papal States; but took all means of hastening the departure of the Austrians, whose presence, in default of Papal garrisons, was the only guarantee against revolution.

France, then, had succeeded in establishing the revolution in the Ro-

man States. Was this only for the purpose of expelling the Austrians, with whom she was at war? or was it to get hold of the Romagna, so that she might hold it in pledge for the introduction of the reforms sketched for the Roman States in the pamphlet *Napoléon III*, and in M. About's letters to the *Moniteur*? If only for the former purpose, nothing would have been easier than to replace the Austrian by French garrisons.

Let us see what France actually did.

It is not to be supposed that all the inhabitants of the Romagna revolted: indeed, at Bologna, out of 18,000 persons who were entitled to vote for the new government, only 6000 voted; at Ravenna only 1000 out of 8000; in the province of Ferrara only 3200 out of 60,000. Letters from trustworthy sources have appeared in the *Times*, declaring that the bulk of the people take no interest whatever in the revolution. On the contrary, there were many who begged the Pope to rescue them from the tyranny and terrorism of the intruded governments. Upon this, immediately after the Perugian expedition, the Pope ordered a small body of troops, including the garrisons of Rome and other towns, to march on Romagna, and reduce it to obedience. But in the mean time Massimo d'Azeglio, with two Piedmontese regiments and numerous volunteers, had arrived at Bologna. It was one thing to attack a mob, headed by a few revolted soldiers; and another to go to war against the Piedmontese army. The Papal troops were evidently too few. The Pope consulted the French ambassador, who remarked on the obvious danger of attacking, recommended a policy of delay, and promised to demand of Piedmont the withdrawal of her commissioner and her troops. Then came the armistice and the preliminaries of peace at Villafranca. The Pope took the opportunity of asking the French government to restore his authority in the Legations; the request was refused, chiefly on the ground of the *quasi* engagements of France to Italy, and the whole question was postponed till the Zurich Conference should be concluded. A few weeks later the Pope wrote to Napoleon III.

a letter, wherein, after conceding that circumstances did not permit France to interfere directly, he asked whether he might hope to see French garrisons occupying the marches of Ancona, and other points, then occupied by Papal troops, in case he were to order his own soldiers to march against the Romagna. The French government answered in the negative.

The Pope then looked about for assistance from other quarters.\* The court of Madrid readily entered into his views, and offered to place 20,000 men at his disposal. It was, however, impossible to introduce them into the Roman States without previous notice given to the French government. The answer received was, that France would neither consent to, nor permit, the entrance of the Spaniards into the Roman States; that Spanish intervention would only introduce a fresh complication into the affairs of Italy; and that France would look upon it as a direct challenge. On this the Pope had to resign himself to watching the revolution run its course of spoliation and violence; and this in spite of the assurances which he had received from the French cabinet, backed by the whole French episcopate, that the integrity of his dominions should, under any circumstances, be guaranteed.

Before the departure of the Duke of Grammont from Rome, Cardinal Antonelli had placed in his hands a memorial addressed to the French cabinet, in which, after demonstrating that the Bolognese revolution was the result of a plot of long standing, which had been conceived and developed under the influence of Piedmont, he asked the French government to explain categorically its intentions with regard to the Romagna.

The Duke of Grammont returned to Rome Aug. 24th, and had an audience of the Pope, Aug. 29th. After communicating the wishes of the French government for the reforms in the Papal States, which were those sketched in the pamphlet *Napoléon III*, he entered on the subject of the Legations. He expressed the regret of the French government at being unable to interfere to restore an order

\* It is said that a similar application of the Pope to the King of Naples has been since frustrated in the same way.



of things which had been rejected by the population, and which the French government itself could not approve. Then he formally demanded the Pope's consent to the separation of the Legations from his dominions; the new state was to enjoy the right of self-administration; the Pope to have, for the first occasion only, the right to nominate the governor of the new republic.

The Pope testified the greatest surprise at such a demand, after the assurances which he had received from the Emperor; and declared that he would never consent to abandon one of the rights of the Holy See. In that case, replied the Duke of Grammont, France will withdraw her troops from Rome. The Pope is said to have answered, "Your government, therefore, wishes to dethrone me. It knows that, with the revolutionary spirit which is abroad in Italy, the withdrawal of its troops to-day will be the signal for the revolution breaking out in Rome to-morrow. It is scarcely generous in a power like France to use such moral violence to force out of an old man concessions which he may not make. But this old man is the Pope, and by the grace of God he will remain firm. Tell your government that, after its unexpected demands, I can no longer occupy myself with the plans of reform which I had entertained. It may withdraw its troops, and so force me to retire from Rome, to which its troops restored me in 1849. If so, I will seek a refuge in some corner of Catholic Europe; and if Europe fails me, I am prepared to go forth to the ends of the earth, before I will break my oath, or consent to the usurpation of the smallest portion of the patrimony of St. Peter."

The sentiments of France towards the Legations were immediately known, and encouraged the Bolognese Assembly, under Pepoli, to declare, by a unanimous vote, the cessation of the Papal authority. They justified their proceedings by nine considerations: 1. That they were assigned to the Pope in 1815 against their will; 2. That the Papal government neither revived their former privileges, nor retained the good institutions of the kingdom of Italy (the Code Napoléon), but afflicted them with its notorious maladministration;

3. Hence continual disturbance and revolution, repressed by a perpetual state of siege, to the destruction of the moral sense of the people, and to the danger of the tranquillity of Europe; 4. That no prayers for reform were attended to, and every promise was broken; 5. That the government has proved itself incompatible with Italian nationality, civil equality, and political liberty; 6. Unable to defend the lives and property of its subjects; 7. *De facto* abdicated into the hands of Austrian generals; 8. And dependent on foreign assistance, and therefore incompatible with permanent order; 9. Lastly, that the temporal government of the Pope was substantially and historically distinct from the spiritual government of the Church, which these populations will always respect.

Sept. 7. The Assembly further voted unanimously, "the people of the Romagna desire annexation to the constitutional kingdom of Sardinia, under the sceptre of King Victor Emmanuel."

This complication of misfortunes had a disastrous effect on the Pope's health, who was reported to be very ill, Sept 6. and convalescent, Sept. 17. But his attitude with the ambassador seems to have disconcerted the French policy for the moment; since the Pope's agents have been busy at Marseilles enlisting the Swiss discharged from Naples, and (in spite of the protest of the king of Sardinia) recruiting in Austria. Nevertheless the Pope's army, reported as amounting to 8000 men under General Kalbermatten, with its advanced posts within gun-shot of General Fanti's Bolognese, has never been strong enough to commence hostilities, though they were daily expected.

Great difficulties and delays were interposed to the reception of the Bolognese deputation by Victor Emmanuel; at last he received it, Sept. 24, not at Turin, but at Monza. His answer to their address, agreeing in the main with those previously given to the Tuscan and Modenese deputations, contained some significant differences. "I am grateful," he said, "for the wishes of the people of the Romagna. As a Catholic sovereign, I shall myself always retain a profound and unalterable respect for the

chief Head of the Church As an Italian Prince, it is my duty to recollect that Europe, acknowledging and proclaiming that the condition of your country called for prompt and efficacious measures, has contracted formal obligations towards it." He then promised to be its advocate before the Emperor and Europe, and recommended perseverance. It is noticeable that this alone of all the king's replies was given in the *Moniteur*; and it was reported, Oct. 1, that as soon as it was known in Rome, the Pope ordered that the Sardinian minister, Count Vittore della Minerva, should receive his passports: he was, however, allowed to delay his departure for a week, during which time the Pope left Rome for Castel Gandolfo, and the opportunity was taken to make a manifestation in favour of Piedmont, with which the French officers, however, interfered.

Sept. 26. The Pope pronounced an allocution on the events in his states; the establishment of dictators, who afterwards took the name of commissioners extraordinary, and then of governors general; who dismissed all who were faithful to the Pope from all public functions, usurped ecclesiastical power by subjecting the hospitals, orphan establishments, and the like, to new laws; exiled or imprisoned the clergy; convoked, Sept. 6, a national assembly at Bologna, and promulgated a decree "full of lying pretexts and accusations, in which, falsely alleging the unanimity of the people," they threw off the papal authority, and the next day, "as is now the custom," stated their wish to be annexed to Piedmont.

Meantime, the chiefs incessantly labour "to corrupt the people by licentious books and journals, which insult the Pope, mock at piety, and ridicule the prayers commonly offered to the Blessed Virgin. In the theatres there is no respect of public honesty, modesty, or virtue; and persons devoted to God are held up to derision and contempt: yet the doers of this declare that they are full of respect for the supreme spiritual power and authority of the Pope."

The Holy Father is consoled that the majority of the population detests and stands aloof from all this,

and retains its fidelity to the Pope as its prince; and that the clergy brave all perils in discharge of their duties. He reprovcs and declares null all the acts of rebellion, and all others encroaching on the power, ecclesiastical immunities, or civil sovereignty of the Holy See; and finally, enjoins prayers to God to bring back the guilty, "some of whom, perhaps, know not what they do, to better thoughts." One consoling point about this allocution is, that the picture which it gives of the excesses in the Romagna is not nearly so disheartening as that painted in several documents which cannot pretend to such authentic information.

Our account of the French policy towards Rome is confirmed by Napoleon's reply to Cardinal Dounet at Bordeaux, Oct. 11, who expressed a firm hope that the Emperor would yet prove the eldest son of the Church in maintaining the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, which both he and his uncle had declared to be necessary to the Church and beneficial to Italy.

The Emperor thanked him for having recalled his words, and hoped "that a new era of glory would arise for the Church on the day when the whole world will share his conviction that the temporal power of the Holy Father is not opposed to the liberty and independence of Italy. . . . . The government which replaced the Pope on his throne can only give him counsel inspired by a respectful and sincere devotion to his interests. But it is anxious, and with good cause, about the day which must soon come, when Rome will be evacuated by our troops; for Europe cannot allow that the occupation which has lasted for ten years shall be indefinitely prolonged; and when our army withdraws, what will it leave behind it,—anarchy, terror, or peace? To resolve this question in these times we must, instead of appealing to ardent passions, endeavour calmly to fathom the truth, and pray to Providence to enlighten peoples and kings on the wise exercise of their rights and extent of their duties."

Are we wrong in construing this to mean that unless the Code Napoleon is adopted, Rome will be left to revolutionise itself?



No new light is thrown on these matters by Art. 18 of the treaty of Zurich. France and Austria desire that the power of the Pope should be insured, and are convinced that this can only be done by the introduction of reforms, the necessity of which the Pope has already recognised, and which the two contracting parties pledge themselves to recommend.

## 2. *The Revolution in Italy.*

The revolutionary states are four : Tuscany and Modena, the return of whose rulers was agreed to at Villafranca; Parma, for which no such agreement was made; and the Legations, forming part of the States of the Pope, whose integrity was assured by France.

Dismissing the idea of permanent anarchy, leading to foreign intervention, the chief plans that have been agitated for the settlement of Central Italy are three: 1. The return of the Grand-Dukes, insisted upon by Austria. 2. The erection of a new independent kingdom of Central Italy, with or without the Legations, which would go back to Rome, and Parma, which might go to Piedmont, under Napoleon-Jerome, or some other prince; a plan which seemed highly probable up to the time of its formal disavowal in the *Moniteur*, Sept. 28. 3. The annexation of the whole to Piedmont.

This is the line taken by the provisional governments of all four states. In the course of September all four unanimously voted the irrevocable fall of the former governments; all four voted union with Piedmont, and sent deputations to tender their submission to the King of Sardinia. Four answers were given by the king, all to the same effect; and the matter has been referred to the arbitrament of the high European powers. We print the king's answer to the Tuscan deputation at Turin, Sept. 3.

"Gentlemen,—I am deeply sensible of the wish of the Tuscan assembly; I thank you in my name, and in the name of my people. We have received your wish as a solemn manifestation of the will of the Tuscan people, who, after having made the last vestige of the foreign domination in Tuscany to cease, desire to

contribute to the constitution of a strong kingdom, which shall defend the independence of Italy. But the Tuscan Assembly will have comprehended that the accomplishment of its wish can only take place by negotiations which are about to begin on the affairs of Italy. I will second your desire, becoming myself strong by the rights which are given me by your wishes. I will support the cause of Tuscany before the Powers in which the Assembly places its hopes, and especially before the magnanimous Emperor of the French, who has done so much for the Italian nation. I hope that Europe will not refuse to practise towards Tuscany that work of redressing grievances which it has, under less favourable circumstances, practised towards Greece, Belgium, and the Danubian principalities. Your noble country gives an admirable example of moderation and concord. You will add those virtues to that one which ensures the triumph of all honest undertakings, and which overcomes all obstacles, namely, perseverance."

None of the four replies, least of all that to the Bolognese, gives any positive result; the king only appeals to a congress, and that in hopes of being absolved by Europe from the engagements of Villafranca, which, if they do not bind the Duchies, at least bind him. It was publicly said at Vienna that "the clause of the preliminaries by which the expelled sovereigns are to return to their states will be simply copied into the treaty of peace. The affair becomes simple, when we remember that Victor Emmanuel signed those preliminaries, including the clause relative to the Duchies. Whether he did it willingly or unwillingly matters little; he did it, and he will be obliged by the other contracting powers to hold to it. He is bound by his signature; and as neither Austria nor France is disposed to allow the article to fall to the ground, he must sign the treaty of peace which reproduces it. He cannot, then, accept the annexation of the Duchies; before the treaty is signed, he may flatter his admirers' hopes by professing not to know what will be the final result of the Zurich conference; after the signature, he will only be

able to express his regret that, in spite of his best intentions, his efforts have failed. He will neither accept his election, nor permit another candidate to be chosen. The permanence of revolution will be a legitimate cause for intervention. The only other course is the return of the princes. Only let the Piedmontese agitators be removed by menacing the Sardinian frontier, and the populations of Central Italy be delivered from revolutionary terrorism, and a spontaneous reaction will take place in favour of the dispossessed sovereigns, if they proclaim the reforms to which the people are entitled."

Similar conclusions result from an article of the *Moniteur*, Friday, Sept. 9. We give its substance.

"After the battle of Solferino, the chances of success were equal for Austria or for the allies; Germany was ready to rise, when the war would have been transferred to the Rhine, and the cause of Italy, if not lost, at least seriously compromised. Napoleon III. concluded peace as much for the good of Italy as for France. The Emperor Francis Joseph (1) ceded Lombardy; (2) freely abandoned his Italian supremacy, and recognised Italian nationality and federation; and (3) promised the most extensive concessions to Venetia, so as to make her a real Italian province, admitting for her future organisation the same relationship as exists between Luxembourg and the German Confederation: but the *sine qua non* of these concessions was the return of the archdukes to their states, who, however, were to be bound to introduce serious reforms. By this treaty, accepted with touching frankness by the Emperor Francis Joseph, Austria becomes an Italian power, no longer a German potentate with Italian provinces. If, then, after the peace the destinies of Italy had been confided to men more anxious about the future of their common country than of petty martial successes, they would have aimed to develop, and not to thwart, the articles of Villafranca. The Emperor of Austria would have been contented to be only the Grand-Duke of Venetia for Italy, as the King of the Netherlands is only Grand-Duke of Luxembourg for Germany. Napo-

leon III. had a right to expect not to be misunderstood by the Italians; instead of risking a European war, of again expending 300,000,000*f.* and shedding the blood of 50,000 more men, he accepted a peace which sanctions for the first time for many centuries the nationality of Italy, under the hegemony of Piedmont; with the single condition of the restoration of the old sovereign houses to their states. If Italy does not accept this, the archdukes will not be brought back by foreign intervention; but the Emperor of Austria will be liberated from all engagements in favour of Venetia. He will keep his forces on a war-footing there; and instead of a policy of conciliation and peace, there will be seen to revive a spirit of mistrust and hatred, which will lead to fresh troubles and fresh disasters. No congress could compel a great power to make concessions, without offering fair compensation. War only could solve the difficulty. But let not Italy deceive herself—there is but one power in Europe that makes war *for an idea*; that power is France, and France has accomplished her task."

This article explains the letter of the young Grand-Duke Ferdinand, read in the Tuscan Assembly before its vote on the fall of the dynasty. He represented that his return would mitigate the treatment of Venetia, sever it from all political connection with Vienna, and make it as national and Italian as Piedmont.

But nothing prevented the Tuscan government from taking the king's answer as an acceptance of their tender. They therefore proclaimed, Sept. 4th, "King Victor Emmanuel has acceded to our wishes. . . . Thanks to this great act, Tuscany again becomes an Italian land, without any vestige of foreign dominion; . . . the provinces of the peninsula spontaneously unite under the magnanimous defender of Italian independence." The next day the French ambassador was recalled from Florence.

This did not stop the four provisional governments in the course they had commenced; they made their proclamations in the name of the King of Sardinia, hoisted his colours, displaced the arms of the ex-



pelled princes for his, and stamped his effigy on their coins. They assimilated all their administrative forms to those of Piedmont. They fused the countries together in a customs union, and passport union, and in a common federal army, and thus daily rendered any other settlement more difficult.

This consistency in the course first taken seems to have been preserved in spite of many weaknesses in the government, and of almost universal apathy in the populations. The Assemblies have been much occupied in ordering monuments to be erected, medals to be struck, portraits to be painted, swords of honour to be presented, decorations to be distributed, fêtes to be observed. The men themselves have been described as silken and perfumed "danglers after married women," dilettanti, indulging in a flux of proclamations, declarations, manifestos, and professions of faith. They have also been led into despotic measures. As the *Armonia*, *Cattolico*, and *Italia* papers, and *Bon Sens* of Savoy, have been suppressed or seized in Piedmont, so have the *Arlecchino* and *Risorgimento* in Tuscany, and *Le Romagna* at Ferrara. Letters are opened at the post-office in Florence. At Modena and Parma there have been increased taxes, forced loans, compulsory military service. At Florence there were early in September loud complaints of scarcity of means of living, dear bread, stagnation of industry, and great suffering amongst the poor. Aug. 25, Gallenga (it is said) wrote to the *Times*, "Out of a hundred *popolani*, not one man understands why the former rulers have been set aside, and a new prince proclaimed. There was no hatred amongst the Tuscans against *il nostro granduca*. The movement is exclusively the work of the middle classes." The Jews, too, must not be forgotten; "the strong boxes of the Hebrew money-lenders of Modena, Reggio, Sinigaglia, and Ancona, have been freely opened to the new governments." Aug. 24, the Tuscan memorandum summed up proofs of the hostile animus of the dynasty of Lorraine against Tuscany in one curt paragraph: "Belvidere, the asylum sought in Austria, and Solferino, speak volumes. From a

love of moderation and reasons of courtesy, we desist from dwelling farther on such an argument; finally, it may be added, faith was broken when foreign troops were called in, and by the abolition of the constitution (in 1852) the compact which united prince and people was broken." The moderation of the accusation, for which the government made itself publicly responsible, is more curious when contrasted with the extreme violence of the volume, *Toscana ed Austria*, published with the consent of the government at Florence, and full of what purports to be documentary evidence of the perfidy of the grand-ducal family. The most ridiculous means that were supposed to contribute towards the end were not neglected: of this kind was the endeavour, early in September, to get up in London a committee for Italian liberty, with Lord Shaftesbury at its head; and, in a less degree, the attempt to prejudice Napoleon against the Duke of Modena and the Duchess of Parma by publishing some old letters which contained sentences scarcely respectful to the Emperor. It is always assumed by Austria and Rome that the revolution is entirely due to Piedmontese agents. And Count Reiset,\* on his return to Paris, is reported to have declared that nothing would be easier than the restoration of the archdukes, if Piedmontese agents and influence could be removed from the Duchies.

In the mean time the position of the provisional governments is becoming harder every day; that of Tuscany has already forestalled eighteen months' income, and dares not for its life impose new taxes, or create a paper circulation. The pay-day must come; and then follows the end, which may yet illustrate the

\* Count Reiset, and afterwards Prince Poniatowski, were sent by France to Florence to negotiate the return of the grand-dukes; the mission entirely failed. Before the war the Sardinian agents in the Duchies do not seem to have aimed at the dethronement of the princes, but at their alliance with Piedmont and France; a course which was quite inconsistent with the pretensions of the King of Sardinia to their thrones. Perhaps the resignation of Count Cavour was intended to enable him to prosecute out of office a policy which the preliminaries of Villafranca would have precluded his pursuing in the cabinet.

saying that "revolutions are not made with rose-water."

On the evening of Oct. 5, Parma was the scene of an outrage that recalled the murder of Rossi at Rome in 1849. Count Anviti, formerly colonel of the troops in Parma, who had been mixed up with the government of the late Duke Charles, on whose death he was placed on the retired list, and sent to reside at Piacenza, where he lived five years, was passing through Parma on his way to Piacenza, but was recognised at the railway station and arrested. The populace, informed of his arrest, broke open the barracks of the gendarmerie, seized the prisoner, overwhelmed him with insults and blows, dragged him through the streets by a cord tied to his wrists, till he was opposite a *café* which he used to frequent, where they cut off his head, and carried it amidst frenzied cries of joy to the *Grand Place*, and set it on a column. The national guards and military arrived when it was all over. Every thing leads to the suspicion of the complicity of the authorities,—his illegal arrest, the information conveyed to the mob, the weak defence of the barracks (which held out barely a half-hour), the absence of all functionaries from the scene of the murder, the dilatory arrival of the military. The riot began at 6 p.m., at 9 all was quiet; the body conveyed to the hospital, the city was patrolled; not a word about any search, arrest, or pursuit. The whole city had time to interfere, but calmly acquiesced in the crime.

Oct. 8. The French Consul at Parma received orders to quit his post unless prompt justice was done, and exemplary punishment inflicted on the murderers. We do not hear that the intendant-general, Cavallini, was censured for issuing a disgraceful proclamation which rather excused the foul deed: "Citizens . . . a villain appeared among the people whom he had cruelly offended. The fever of vengeance seized upon some unhappy men, blinded and maddened them, and made them dye their hands in blood." Farini, the dictator, however, on his return, spoke in quite other terms, and appears to be awake to the gravity of the situation. As yet, however, he has only issued se-

vere proclamations, made a few arrests, and destroyed the column on which Anviti's head was displayed.

### 3. *Austria and Germany.*

1. *Austria.* Since the war the dissatisfaction in the country has been enormous; the Emperor is discredited, the aristocratic generals hated and despised, and unable to show themselves in the *cafés* with the other officers. Benedek, as the only successful general and as a *bourgeois*, enjoys boundless popularity with the army. But it is not only the army that is angry at having been led to defeat by incapable chiefs, but both army and people are vexed at the neglect of the private soldiers, resulting from mismanagement and want of funds. The common people are fearfully excited about this. Though the army was starving in Italy, yet discipline was rigorously enforced on men dying of hunger and thirst, which their officers would not allow them to slake. The wounded also complain bitterly of the butchery of the great military hospitals. To a people accustomed to the thought of a paternal government, all these sufferings are an occasion of extreme animosity.

To comprehend the reforms announced August 20th, we must consider the changes which were necessitated by the revolution of 1848. Before that time there was no uniform administration for the empire. The German provinces altogether, and Bohemia partly, depended on the Viennese bureaux; but Hungary and its dependencies, as well as Transylvania, had constitutions of their own six centuries old. There was then not unity of government, but of the person governing; who reigned absolutely at Vienna, and constitutionally at Pesth.

1848 proved that this unity was insufficient. This had ever been felt: since the accession of the Hapsburgs in 1527, they had always been striving to germanise the Magyars; after 1848 the endeavour assumed a far more systematic character, under the able management of the Baron Bach.

It is always dangerous when political divisions coincide with the stratification of society, or with the lines of provincial demarcation. Quar-



rels between rich and poor, nobles and peasants, Hungary and Austria, are either anarchical or revolutionary; not so the quarrels between the ordinary political or religious parties. The political unity of the empire was evidently a necessity. Hence the independent administrations were suppressed. This led to a large increase of expense; for the Hungarian nobles, who had acted as unpaid magistrates, like our lord-lieutenants and sheriffs, were superseded by paid officials from the Viennese bureaux. But, to compensate for this centralisation, other measures of decentralisation were provided, to give the independence to classes and corporations which had been taken away from the separate provinces. First came religion; and the Concordat, which gave liberty to the Catholics, was only the earliest instalment of the concessions to religion. The patent granted to the Protestants September 10th, so far from being contrary to, is only a development of the policy which dictated that measure.

This Patent regulates the privileges of the Lutherans and Calvinists of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, the Servian Voivodina, the Temesch Banat, and the military frontier districts. 1. They are classed into parochial, districtual, and superintendental communities. 2. Respectively presided over by the presbytery, or local assembly, the consistory, and the convention or assembly, under the supreme direction of the general conference for one confession, and the synod for the other. . . . 4. All the *employés* to be Protestants. . . . 6. As soon as the Protestant ecclesiastical courts are established, the imperial authorities will cease to have jurisdiction in matrimonial matters. 7. Till the synods publish their matrimonial codes, the present laws to continue in force. . . . 9. In all matters of discipline, Protestant ministers subject to their ecclesiastical authorities; matters like contracts, debts, inheritances, &c. to be referred to the civil courts. 10. Notice to be given to the ecclesiastical superintendent whenever a Protestant clergyman is involved in a civil or criminal suit. 11. The superintendence of the crown over schools to be exercised by Protestant officials. In case

of moral or political mischief in a school, the police to be assisted in their investigation by a representative of the superintendent. 12. The schools to be under the direction and inspection of their ecclesiastical organs. 13. The subjects of instruction to be the same as those in the Catholic schools; and books to be approved of by the general conference and the bureau of ecclesiastical affairs. . . . 16. Only Protestant teachers can be employed in Protestant schools erected at the expense of the state. . . . 20-22. Protestant communities may acquire and inherit funds. 23. The two confessions may manage their own church, school, and foundation property; the bureau for ecclesiastical affairs may inspect the accounts. . . . 31. Each parish freely elects its own rector, vicar, and schoolmaster. . . . 42-45. Meetings and synods legalised, and a legislative power granted to them, subject to imperial sanction. . . . 53, 54. State support and assistance guaranteed. 55-57. The further development of the Protestant Church left to the ecclesiastical authorities.

This statute is perfectly liberal and sensible; it has been long drawn up, and it is not Bach's fault that it was not published sooner, so that his successor Goluchowski is only decking himself in borrowed plumes. The Protestants had no real grievances; and the decree only secures to them rights which, for the most part, they practically enjoyed. This accounts for their exhibiting no great delight, for there is no great change. But the clamour about Protestant oppression is silenced, and the cry against the Concordat weakened; for this statute is conceived in the same spirit, and drawn up on the same principle, and in fact completes the work of the Concordat. The Catholics have most reason to rejoice at it; for it concedes to the Protestants privileges very harmless in themselves, but far greater than were granted to the Church. Paragraph 16 provides that no Catholic teacher shall be appointed to a Protestant school. It was impossible to obtain a corresponding privilege for Catholic schools; hence this passage has, amusingly enough, been complained of, on the plea that the Catholics

might now demand the same thing, though it was refused in the Concordat. The Lutheran assembly of Thiss has even protested against the constitution, because it was not drawn up by the synod.

In Italy the policy of Austria has been one of inaction. The Austrians, tolerably agreeing with the French, are resolved not to interfere; but by refusing to recognise the new settlements, they reserve to themselves the power of upsetting them all when an opportunity offers.

The late war revealed who are the friends and who the enemies of Austria. The German people were almost entirely with her; the governments, except when carried away by the popular feeling, generally against her. Many of the smaller princes are fascinated with French imperialism, and do not sympathise with the liberal institutions which subsist with more or less vitality all over Germany. These are the friends that Austria has lost by the Concordat. Before 1848, her government was the most unpopular in Germany; the bugbear of the liberals, and of the press. But the courts regarded it as their bulwark; every prince sought in it the safeguard of his power. Metternich was as much protector of the Confederation which he had created, as Napoleon had been protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. The mild absolutism and good-natured tyranny of Austria seemed the ideal of monarchy, while France was only a disguised republic. But now these princes think that Austria, by the Concordat, has sacrificed the most indispensable element of despotism. The prince who does not reign over men's souls, is supposed to have a very precarious hold of their bodies. It is Austria that is now the mongrel, half absolute, half free. It has surrendered to the most formidable and insinuating of enemies, and has admitted an *imperium in imperio*. As Dr. Busby, the pedagogue, insisted on walking before the king when he visited the school, for fear the boys should imagine there was a greater man in the world than the head-master, so, now Francis Joseph has ceased to take precedence of the Pope in ecclesiastical matters, will not his subjects see

there is at least one, possibly many a greater man than he? The pernicious example has borne fruit; the wise old Protestant King of Wurtemberg has been forced to make similar concessions; and the Grand-Duke of Baden has had to yield to the Archbishop of Freiburg, like a royal puppet of the dark ages, terrified by threats of excommunication, and living in the fear of God! Those who think thus are the enemies that Austria has made by the Concordat. But though, as a state, she used to be as hateful to the Germans as she is now to the Italians, in the late war she enjoyed not only the sympathy, but the enthusiasm, of the German people. Even in Prussia, the chief part of the press had, in spite of the government, espoused the side of Austria before April last. The two ablest writers of the democrats of 1848, -- Gustav Diezel, and Julius Fröbel, one of whom suffered a long imprisonment in Wurtemberg; while the other, after being condemned to death at Vienna, was cured (homœopathically) of democracy by a long residence in the United States, -- wrote, the first, before his death, last year, most powerful pamphlets in favour of Austria and the Concordat; the other, a pamphlet on the peace of Villafranca, which is the ablest apology for Austria that has appeared.

If Austria, he says, has lost ground in Germany by the war, Prussia has lost more by her unskilful diplomacy. The Gotha party, which aims at the prussification of Germany without Austria, succeeded in depriving Austria of all German support, but injured itself by its success. Prussia can never absorb Germany while Austria remains a great power. Even at her weakest, as in 1848, she can protect the smaller states against Prussian ambition. On the other hand, Austria never entertained designs similar to those of Prussia; and the third alternative, the division of Germany between them, is impossible; (1) because they could never agree, and (2) because it would be the interest both of the small states and of Europe to prevent it. But it is certain that the Diet, as at present constituted, cannot last, though France and Russia will do all they can to preserve it, because it renders



Germany powerless in Europe; and besides, all change will be rendered most difficult by the internal division of the German patriots.

The weakness of the Confederation is not in the mass of small states, but in the presence of the great powers. Austria and Prussia, as possessing non-German provinces, have interests distinct from the Confederation, and cannot devote themselves to a purely German policy. Hence the purely German interests of the small states cannot prevail at Frankfort, as was shown by the late war, when all German patriots were on the Austrian side; not for her sake, but for their own. They wished to show a united Germany, resenting as a whole an attack on any part. In this they have more to gain than Austria. Her help is worth more to Germany than the help of Germany to her. At present, if Prussia is attacked in her German provinces, the Confederation will help her, and Austria will contribute her contingent of 95,000 men; but if the late war had established the principle that the integrity of each state, not only in its federal territory, but *as a whole*, was the common cause of all Germany, Austria would have resisted an invasion of the Rhenish provinces with her whole weight of 400,000 men. This was the first occasion for the Confederation to go to war; and one of its members then declared, that as one of the five great European powers, it could not be controlled by a majority of the Diet, and so refused to submit to the laws of the Confederation. This proves, not the bad faith of Prussia, but the weakness of the whole institution. Prussia only went wrong when she tried to use the troubles of Austria to establish her own dictatorship in Germany, and when she sought popularity by lecturing Austria on her bad government, whilst admitting her right; forgetting Seneca's maxim, "*primum esse, tum philosophari*;" and not so kind as Lafontaine's pedagogue, who found the child in the water, and "*ayant tout dit, il mit l'enfant à bord*."

The war proved that the interests of Germany are held in abeyance by those of the great states that belong to Germany; a reform, then, has to

get rid of the dependence of the Confederation on its two great members, of whose dissension, when they disagree, all Germany is the victim, and whose behests, when they agree, all Germany must follow. Reform, then, is emancipation.

In 1848, two projects approved themselves to the parties who wished to profit by that plastic moment to improve the constitution of Germany. The *gross-Deutsche*, or greater-German party, understood Germany as including Austria, and so far only negatived the project of excluding Austria, with no plan of its own, till it proposed that *all* Austrian territories should belong to the Confederation; thereby putting Germany, with its 34,000,000 inhabitants, into the pocket of Austria, with its (then) 40,000,000. This plan was never accepted, even by the Austrians; it was feebly mooted by Schwartzenburg, and condemned and ridiculed, *on Austrian grounds*, by Metternich. The *klein-Deutsche*, little-German or Gotha party, openly aimed at the unity of Germany under the Prussian crown, by the total exclusion of Austria. It was then a definite plan, vigorously encouraged by Prussia, and by the mass of the liberals, who voted at Frankfort to give the imperial crown to the King of Prussia, and were laughed at for their pains. The plan, (1) would give unity to Germany, though shorn of Austria; (2) would double the power of Prussia, which is only a great power when it takes the lead of Germany; (3) would be a great victory of Protestantism; (4) would put Germany at the mercy of the revolution. Once united by a French centralisation, the victory of the barricades in a single town would revolutionise all Germany. Now there must be as many successful revolutions as there are states before the revolution can succeed. This is the soul of the Gothicism of to-day, of which Carl Vogt, the most ungodly demagogue of 1848, is the loudest champion. The objections to the plan are, (1) its utter impracticability through the refusal of Austria to be excluded, of the small states to be gobbled up, and of France and Russia to tolerate such an increase of Prussia; (2) its cutting off from Germany so many rich ter-

ritories, and especially that power which vindicates the dominion of the Teutonic over the inferior races. The first plan makes a Germany of 74,000,000 souls; the second a Germany of 34,000,000, and adds Austria to her enemies. Though the mass of literary men, including Ranke and his school, supported this plan, it was always foolish, and is now weak besides.

The possibilities, then, are:

1. A league, in which Austria and Prussia join by virtue of their German provinces, as in the present Confederation; which all wish changed, because the Diet is only the arena for Austria and Prussia to contend for supremacy, while the little states look on without either influence or independence.

2. Schwartzenburg's plan, that all Austria should belong to the league. It would nullify Prussia, and austri-  
cise all Germany.

3. The Gotha project of a league from which Austria should be wholly excluded, still popular in Prussia, but supported chiefly by the lowest demagogues for revolutionary purposes. It would lead to the prussification, protestantising, and revolutionising of Germany.

4. There appears to remain only a league of the lesser states among themselves, excluding both Prussia and Austria; this league, again, to join as a collective unit in a confederation with the two other great powers. It would itself be a great power of 18,000,000 souls, with an army of 400,000 men, all the great federal fortresses, and sixteen universities; the Catholics in it would be in about the same proportion (one-third) as in Prussia, where they hold their own perfectly; parity would be enforced in all states of the league. The petty malignant ill-treatment of the Church that occurs in odd corners and little states, where priests are not tolerated, would become impossible by the extension of the scene, by responsibility to a central authority, and by a closer union with Catholic districts. The lesser states desire a stronger central power than that of the Diet; to form this they must surrender some of their sovereign rights; this they will never do to powers whose interest is different from theirs.

The union of the lesser states would include no great power, and would have the great element of union—an exclusive German nationality. In presence of the collapse of the two great schemes of 1848, this seems the only non-revolutionary one that can succeed. Under such an arrangement, Germany would have gone to war this summer, in spite of Prussia; and Lombardy would have been saved; as it would also if Austria had been totally separated from Germany, and had not kept 130,000 men in reserve ready to march on the Rhine. It would be an equally sure ally to Prussia, and would neutralise the jealousy between her and Austria. The organisation of the confederation would not be difficult; there would be a college to represent the union of Austria, Prussia, and Germany, consisting perhaps of an Archduke, a Zollern, and a German sovereign to represent Germany, and to preside over the triumvirate; perhaps the four kings, Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, might have this office in turn for a given time. They would have a responsible federal ministry, and a federal parliament with two chambers, one representing the confederate states, the other the nation, as in the analogous case of America; one appointed by the several governments, the other elected by the parliaments of the several states. But it is useless to develop an idea which only more or less approximates to the tendency of events.

#### 4. France.

“C'est un des signes les moins contestables de la prédestination de la France, que le don de considérer ses affaires comme les affaires du monde, et le besoin de régler celles-ci comme les siennes propres” (*Correspondant*, June 1859). The “gift” of regulating other people's affairs as if they were her own, is the key to much of the policy of the Revolution, and of the first and second Empires: they were established, not to make France free, but to make her formidable; not to make her a neighbour, but a mistress; not to make her more observant of laws, but to enable her to impose them. The exterior aggrandisement of France, whether by conquest or



"influence," is her end. And no sensible man in Europe doubts that she considers the means *sine qua non* to this end to be the humiliation of England. This is to be accomplished either, 1, by devoting the sole attention of the country to her marine and to commerce, and so to crush England by sea, when the Continent, freed from our sinister influence, will fall into proper subordination; or 2, by first gaining a continental ascendancy, and thus destroying the continental balance against France, which is the traditional policy of England. In other words, England may be attacked, either directly in its own territories, or indirectly through Belgium or Prussia.

No one can doubt that one of these plans is contemplated by the French government, and governs all its military and naval expenditure. After the Italian war, an immediate reduction in both arms was announced; the reduction in the navy has been carried out as follows: "Great activity is displayed in completing the frigates *Gloire* and *Invincible*, which are being sheathed with thick iron plates, and are to carry engines of 900-horse power, and armaments of 40 rifled cannon." "The liners *Castiglione* and *Massena* may be considered finished." "200,000 shells and 30,000 rifles have been ordered for the use of the fleet." Two new first-class liners, the *Magenta* and *Solferino*, are commenced; they are to be 320 feet long, steel-plated, and armed with the new rhinoceros-horn, to run down ships, and cut them in two. The northern coasts of France are to be defended with rifled ordnance, and with turning batteries of iron, each having two tiers of rifled guns, and moved by steam with the greatest ease. The mercantile steam navy has been overhauled, to test its capacity for warlike purposes. Long ago four iron-cased ships were all but finished, and the application of the same species of armour to some small gunboats had been tried with success. Since the disarmament was proclaimed, orders have been given, and partly executed, for the construction, within eighteen months, of twenty steel-cased liners, and fifty impregnable gunboats. The same armour is being applied to coast fortifications on the

Channel and the Mediterranean; and an order has been given for more rifled cannon, in order to put Cherbourg on a war-footing. "Fifty large steam transports, each capable of containing 3000 men, will be finished in a short time." Here are signs which require "eyes and ears for the time, and hearts for the event."

The policy of the Catholic party in France, which disapproves of attacks on Catholic Europe, is the direct invasion of England, because England is the enemy of European justice. "If Great Britain was not the enemy of Europe, would there be found, wheresoever there was disorder to create, a weak sovereign to upset, a revolutionary movement to provoke, the gold of England, her agents and intrigues? &c. . . . Shut up the sea against her, she shall succumb; carry on against her a formidable competition, you shall ruin her; keep on the ocean powerful squadrons capable of intercepting her commerce, and of struggling with her fleets, you shall destroy her security" (*Univers*).

The Imperial policy seems to be the more circuitous one of attacking England through her ancient European allies, and thus breaking up the last remains of the confederation that dethroned Napoleon I.

The most interesting internal movement in France has been the agitation for liberty of the press. The day after the amnesty, the *Moniteur* announced (Aug. 18) that all former warnings to newspapers would be considered as non-issued. There had previously been rumours of a relaxation of the press-laws of Feb. 1852. Hopes now rose high, and some writers ventured to use the freedom they anticipated. The emancipation and decentralisation of the communes was discussed; the part of the Emperor in the invention of the rifled cannon, and in the conduct of the war, was warmly canvassed. But, more than all, there was a discussion on the rights of publication. This drew forth a note in the *Moniteur*, Sept. 18, denying that any change of the law was contemplated; declaring that the press is free to discuss *all* the acts of the government, and thereby to enlighten the public mind. Those papers which claim a larger liberty are only the unconscious organs of hostile parties

in their attacks against order and the constitution. The established system will be persevered in; for it allows a field wide enough for discussion, while it keeps out calumny and error.

Sept. 19. The Duke of Padua, Minister of the Interior, addressed a circular to the Prefects of the Departments relative to the press, in which he said that the legislation of 1852 only provides legal weapons, which are guarantees, not impediments, of liberty, and necessary for the constitution of France, founded on unity and universal suffrage. "The government does not fear any fair straightforward discussion of its acts, as it is strong enough not to dread any attack." "1789 conquered for every Frenchman the right to publish his opinions; and this right cannot be taken from so enlightened a nation as France:" but this right is not to be exercised through the periodical journals, which constitute a force in the state, and so must be subject to rules of repression and surveillance. But so long as the journals respect the constitution, the Bonaparte dynasty, order, morality, and religion, the government, "far from imposing servile approbation of its acts, will always tolerate serious contradictions; it will not confound the right of control with systematic opposition and calculated malevolence."

In spite of the discouragement which this note was calculated to produce, some papers went on making the most of its favourable hints, and gradually drawing out the demands of the journalists to a clear head. They wanted "subjection only to a well-defined law, and to a regular legal process, not to the arbitrary rules and the mercy of an official." The first result was a *communiqué* addressed to the *Opinion Nationale*, Sept. 23, and another to the *Journal des Villes et Campagnes*, declaring that the organic law of 1852 was precise and clear, and that no subaltern *employé* has to administer it; for "the high responsibility of the Minister of the Interior is directly engaged in all decisions respecting its application." But the law of 1852, so far from being precise, forbids "to write any thing which shall tend to excite one portion of the nation against another;" and

the Minister of the Interior is but an official, changed with every change of Imperial policy, and often led blindfold by the suggestions of subordinate officials. The journalists wished to be tried only by juries. The *Constitutionnel* replied, on behalf of government: "We respect the jury; it is one of the most legitimate conquests of 1789; but though competent to deal with crimes against common law, it is much less competent in political questions; the oath of the jurymen does not make him lay aside his opinions and sentiments."

From recent examples, we may see, not what kind of criticism will be allowed, but what will not be allowed. No journal will be allowed to hint that a better *régime* is conceivable for France than that which she now enjoys. Whether it be that France is unfit for freedom, and that only a small knot of obscure politicians desires it; or whether it be that the present constitution is perfect freedom, if men would but see it,—no hint to the contrary is allowed, whether conveyed through praise of English institutions, as in M. de Montalembert's famous article; or through quotations of the Emperor's former opinions, as was lately done in the *Union del Ouest*, which forgot that, though the Emperor loves and admires liberty, from the high elevation where his wisdom is seated, he sees that France not only requires but wishes for something different.

Amidst all this discouragement of free-speaking, the French Bishops have not scrupled to express their sentiments about the rebellion of the Legations against the Pope. The Pastorals of the Bishops of Arras, Poitiers, Algiers, and Orleans, have been especially remarkable. The first said, "Our alarm at the social decomposition of Central Italy is increased by its unfortunate coincidence, as if in despite to the glory of our arms, with a war undertaken, with noble disinterestedness, to give to Italy an organisation more in accordance with modern ideas, but which has as yet produced only a disorganisation that baffles all calculation; and with a peace which, though one of its fundamental clauses tended to add a new circlet to the Pope's crown, has been followed by redoubled outrages against the



Holy Sec." And the Bishop of Chalons has written to the *Univers* that it would be an insult to the French clergy to accuse them of want of unanimity in this cause. The bold language of the Archbishop of Bordeaux to the Emperor, drew forth from him the unsatisfactory reply which we have recorded above.

Since this, the *Univers* has received a first warning for a bold attack on the government for the conduct of the Cochon expedition, and immediately afterwards a private notification from government not to publish any more episcopal circulars: the object of the prohibition was "to protect the acts and dignity of the Bishops from the violence of the newspapers;" much in the same way as, after an outrage of the mob upon the Bishop of Bergamo, September 20, the Sardinian government confined him to his apartments "out of regard for his personal safety." The *Univers* hopes that the prohibition is only temporary; "if it is to continue, the most precious part of civil and religious liberty is taken away from us." This journal, which is now playing a noble part, would enjoy more sympathy if its past conduct had not mainly contributed to the victory of that despotism under which it is now suffering. There are reports of an insolent circular addressed to the Bishops by the Minister *des Cultes*, warning them "that their flocks are watching them."

#### 5. *The Treaty of Zurich.*

*Zurich, Oct. 18.*

The following is an analysis of the treaty of peace concluded between France and Austria, as signed by the plenipotentiaries, but which has not yet received the ratification of the two Governments,

The treaty commences with the usual preamble.

Desirous of putting an end to the calamities of war, and forming into a definite treaty the preliminaries made at Villafranca, the two Emperors have named their plenipotentiaries, and communicated to them full powers; and the said plenipotentiaries have agreed to the following:

That peace is concluded, &c.

France returns to Austria the Aus-

trian steamers seized during the war, but on which judgment has not been passed, &c.

Austria gives up Lombardy, with the exception of Mantua, Peschiera, and as far as the frontier-line fixed by a special commission (the limit of which is already known).

The Emperor of the French declares that he transfers these portions of Lombardy to the King of Sardinia.

Then follow the articles concerning the jurisdiction, namely the option for the *employés* of Piedmont and Austria to remain in the service of the two Governments, and to have the option of transferring within a year their goods to Piedmont, and *vice versâ*; they would, however, retain their right to any property left behind them when they move their domicile from Austria to Sardinia, or from Sardinia to Austria.

The pensions acquired by persons in Lombardy will be respected and paid by the new Government to those entitled to them, and, in those cases where it is so stipulated, to the widows and children of those pensioned.

Then follows the settlement of the debt, which is the subject of two articles, one of which is an additional agreement for the mode of payment. According to these articles Piedmont is to pay to Austria 40,000,000 florins (*Conventions-Munze*), and besides is rendered responsible for three-fifths of the debt of the Monte Lombardo-Venetian (altogether the debt transferred to Sardinia amounts to 250,000,000 francs).

Then follows article 18, which runs thus:

"Desiring that the tranquillity of the Church and the power of the Holy Father should be ensured, and being convinced that this end could not be obtained in a more effective manner than by a system suited to the wants of the population, and by reforms, the necessity of which has been already recognised by the Sovereign Pontiff, the two contracting parties will unite their efforts in order that a reform in the administration of the States of the Church should be carried out by his Holiness."

Article 19 states that the territorial

limits of the independent states of Italy, which did not take part in the last war, could be changed only with the assent of the other powers of Europe, which took part in forming and guaranteed the existence of these States. The rights of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, the Duke of Modena, and the Duke of Parma are expressly reserved by the high-contracting powers.

Article 20. The two Emperors will assist with all their power to the formation of a Confederation of all the States of Italy, the object of which will be the preservation of the independence and integrity of Italy, which will ensure the development of their moral and material interests, and will watch over the defence of the interior and exterior of Italy by means of a federal army.

Venetia, which will remain under the rule of the Emperor of Austria, will form a part of this Confederation, and will participate in the rights and in the obligations of the Federal Treaty, the clauses of which will be

established by the representatives of all the States of Italy.

Article 21 stipulates that persons having taken part in the late events will not be attacked either in their persons or their property, and can remain unmolested in the two countries.

Article 22. The present treaty shall be signed and ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Zurich within fifteen days.

Other articles stipulate—

That Austria shall be obliged to free from military service the soldiers belonging to the territory which she gives up.

Austria undertakes to restore the securities and deposits of private persons placed in the public establishments belonging to Austria.

Article 16 grants to the religious establishments in Lombardy the liberty to dispose freely of their private and landed property, if the possession of such property is incompatible with the laws of the new Government.